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INTRODUCTION

F

OREIGN affairs law appears immune from the recent spate
of revisionist thinking about federalism in the United States.
Professor Louis Henkin states the orthodox view well:
Federalism... was largely irrelevant to the conduct of foreign
affairs even before it began to be a wasting force in U.S. life
generally .... Revolution in the national mood in the 1990s has
tended to seek to take from the federal government and give to
the states, but this trend is not likely to have impact on foreign
affairs. At the end of the twentieth century as at the end of the
eighteenth, as regards U.S. foreign relations, the states "do not
exist."

This Article challenges this understanding of the relationship
between federalism and foreign affairs in several respects.
'Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the United States Constitution 149-50 (2d ed.
1996).
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In analyzing the orthodox view, it is important to distinguish
between plenary federal power and exclusive federal power. The

Constitution establishes plenary federal power by four means.
Article I, Section 10 bars states from performing certain foreign
affairs functions, such as treaty-making.2 Article I, Section 8 and
Article II broadly authorize the federal political branches to
conduct foreign relations through the enactment of federal statutes, treaties, and executive agreements.' Article VI establishes
that these federal enactments are supreme over state law. And
Article III extends the federal judicial power to cases involving
these federal enactments and to other transnational controver-

sies.' Taken together, these provisions give the federal political
Article I, Section 10 states:
No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters
of Marque and Reprisal .... No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing it's [sic] inspection Laws .... No State shall lay
any Duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter
into any Agreement or Compact... with a foreign Power, or engage in War,
unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.
U.S. Const. art. I, § 10.
3E.g., U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (Congress authorized to "regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations"); id. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (Congress authorized to "establish an uniform Rule
of Naturalization"); id. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (Congress authorized to "define and punish ...
Offences against the Law of Nations"); id. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 (Congress authorized to
"declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning
Captures on Land and Water"); id. art. I, § 8, cl. 14 (Congress authorized to "make
Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces"); id. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 18 (Necessary and Proper Clause); id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (President authorized to
make treaties with advice and consent of two-thirds of senators present). The President's authority to make executive agreements derives sometimes from congressional
delegation and sometimes from his own foreign relations powers, including his power
as commander-in-chief and his power to receive ambassadors. Id. art. II, §§ 2, 3; see
also Henkin, supra note 1, at 54-56 (discussing presidential lawmaking).
4 U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the
Land .... ").
Article III states, in relevant part:
[The judicial Power shall extend to] all Cases... arising under this Constitution,
the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made ... under their Authority;to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;--to all
Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;-to Controversies ... between a
State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
2
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branches comprehensive power to conduct foreign relations without interference or limitation by the states.6
This Article does not question this understanding. It does not
argue for federalism or enumerated power limits on the federal
political branches' authority to enact foreign relations law. Instead, it challenges the conventional wisdom concerning the allocation of state and federal power in the absence of such a controlling federal foreign relations enactment. Sometimes, states
act in ways that adversely affect U.S. foreign relations but that
do not violate any provision of the Constitution and that are not
preempted by federal statute or treaty. For example, states execute aliens, tax multinational corporations, declare themselves
refugee sanctuaries, and violate customary international law. At
other times, an issue emerges in international litigation that appears to implicate U.S. foreign relations but that is not governed
by an enacted federal law. A classic example is the validity for
domestic purposes of a foreign act of state; other examples include forum non conveniens and the enforceability of transnational forum selection clauses. These and related issues focus
attention on the role of federal courts in conducting U.S. foreign
relations. They raise an important question of judicial federalism: Should federal courts presented with such issues apply state
law, or should they instead develop and apply a judge-made federal common law of foreign relations?
The conventional view is that courts should develop and apply a federal common law of foreign relations. The justification
for this view is essentially as follows. The federal government
has the exclusive power to conduct foreign relations free from
interference by the states. This power is presumptively lodged
in the federal political branches. But as the examples above suggest, due to ignorance or inertia the federal political branches
will sometimes fail to exercise this power to preempt state activity that adversely affects U.S. foreign relations interests. In such
circumstances, the structure of the Constitution establishes a selfexecuting presumption-analogous to the dormant Commerce
Clause-that such activity is governed by federal law. Federal

6See United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937); Missouri v. Holland, 252
U.S. 416,432-35 (1920).
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courts charged with enforcing structural constitutional guarantees
must invalidate state laws or acts that impermissibly impinge
upon the unique federal foreign relations interest and, when necessary, replace them with judge-made rules. Otherwise, parochial
state acts could threaten the foreign relations interests, and perhaps the national security, of the entire nation-a situation the
Constitution is plainly designed to avoid. In foreign affairs, the
nation must speak with one voice, not fifty. The orthodox view
concludes that judge-made federal foreign relations law constitutes that voice until the federal political branches say otherwise.
The federal common law of foreign relations has been rarely
invoked in traditional foreign relations contexts such as diplomatic relations or the regulation of war, because such matters are
largely, if not exclusively, governed by enacted federal law. Instead, the doctrine's primary relevance lies in other areas.7 One
such area is private international law. Courts have federalized
not only quasi-procedural doctrines like act of state' and the recognition of foreign judgments,9 but also more substantive areas
like tort, contract, and property. For example, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently held that a tort
suit by Peruvian citizens against American and foreign corporations for environmental damage in Peru "implicat[ed] important
foreign policy concerns" and thus was governed by the federal
common law of foreign relations." Courts have also employed
the federal common law of foreign relations under the guise of
the "one voice" test that supplements the dormant foreign Commerce Clause's traditional antidiscrimination analysis.1 ' They
have also used it to preempt state foreign relations activity like
reciprocity inheritance statutes. 2 Finally, the federal common law
of foreign relations is the primary basis for the widely held view
that customary international law has the status of federal com-

7See infra Section I.C.
' See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,424-27 (1964).
,See, e.g., John Sanderson & Co. (Wool) Pty. Ltd. v. Ludlow Jute Co., 569 F.2d
696, 697 (1st Cir. 1978).
'Torres v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 113 F.3d 540, 543 (5th Cir. 1997).
"See, e.g., Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434,448-51 (1979).
,2 See, e.g., Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
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mon law.' 3 By this account, the post-World War II customary
international law of human rights-which prohibits, for example, executions of juveniles and prolonged arbitrary detentionstrumps inconsistent and otherwise valid state law under the Supremacy Clause."
This Article argues that the federal common law of foreign relations as currently practiced by courts and understood by scholars lacks justification. The argument begins by demonstrating
that, contrary to the suggestions of many courts and scholars,
there was no judicially enforceable, self-executing federal foreign relations power for the first 175 years of our constitutional
history." After clearing away specious historical claims, the Article focuses on more plausible functional arguments made in
support of the modem practice.'6 These functional arguments
make some sense under a traditional conception of foreign relations as relations among national governments of sovereign nation-states, in which the central concerns are military security
and diplomacy. The problem is that the traditional conception
of foreign affairs has changed to include matters formerly
viewed as purely domestic issues, and the federal common law
of foreign relations is concerned almost exclusively with these
new foreign relations issues. But as the distinction between foreign and domestic affairs has waned, the criterion of "foreign
relations" has lost whatever reliability it might have had as an
indicator of matters that should presumptively be governed by
federal law.'7 Moreover, it is no longer true, if it ever was, that
the national political branches prefer federal regulation of all
(or even most) issues that can be characterized as involving foreign relations. These factors make it more difficult for federal
courts to ascertain the need for and content of federal foreign
relations law. They also render the development of such law by
federal courts normatively problematic in many contexts. For as
the category of foreign relations comes to include matters tradi,"
See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 886-87 (2d Cir. 1980).
'4See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, Federalism, State Authority, and the Preemptive Power
of International Law, 1994 Sup. Ct. Rev. 295,322-26, 342.
"See infra Part II.
,6
See infra Section III.A.
"See infra Section III.B.
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tionally regulated by states in which the states have a genuine
interest, prevailing understandings of American federalism require that the decision to regulate these matters by federal law
be made through political deliberations in which the states have
a voice.
Functional arguments for the federal common law of foreign
relations are further undermined by separation of powers and
institutional competence concerns that are usually ignored in this
context. 8 Courts and scholars have so strongly identified foreign relations with exclusive federal power that they have failed
to consider how the distribution of this federal power among
federal political and federal judicial actors affects its exercise.
On both institutional competence and substantive legitimacy
grounds, the federal political branches are the presumptive makers of nonconstitutional federal law, especially foreign relations
law. The federal common law of foreign relations is an exception to this presumption that is justified as a way to prevent
states from intruding on federal political branch prerogatives in
foreign relations. The doctrine thus assumes that the federal
political branches are incapable of monitoring and redressing
aberrant state foreign relations activity at an acceptable cost,
and that the costs of state foreign relations activity in the face of
political branch silence are greater than the costs associated with
the federal common law of foreign relations.
Both assumptions are wrong. The federal political branches
are much better at redressing state intrusions on federal foreign
relations prerogatives, and the federal courts much worse, than
is commonly thought. Thus, there is little need for a federal
common law of foreign relations, and good reason to believe that
federal courts do not develop this law in a fashion that achieves
its stated goals. Moreover, structural considerations suggest
that while the political branches are likely to intervene to redress inappropriate state activity in foreign relations, the normal
presumptions of legislative inertia apply when federal judges inappropriately exercise federal common law of foreign relations
powers to preempt state law. This asymmetry in likely political
branch action results in an arrogation of federal lawmaking
18See infra Section III.C.
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power by federal courts at the expense of both the states and the
federal political branches.
Building on these and related points, this Article makes the
case for the elimination of the federal common law of foreign relations as currently understood. It explains how this conclusion
finds substantial support in recent Supreme Court decisions.19 It
then defends the conclusion against three other possibilities: a
narrower rule-based approach to the federal common law of foreign relations; federal judicial lawmaking at the behest of the
executive branch; and judicial review of state acts on the basis of
an impermissible purpose to influence foreign affairs.'
The analysis warrants three qualifications at the outset. The
first concerns the meaning of "federal common law of foreign
relations." I use this phrase and its synonyms to mean judicial
foreign relations lawmaking that occurs when there is political
branch inaction. I intend to distinguish this situation from one
in which a court interprets vague terms or gaps in a treaty or
statute. At the margins, this distinction will obviously be hard
to maintain. Nonetheless, in every instance of judge-made foreign relations law under consideration here, there is no plausible
statutory or treaty basis for judicial lawmaking, and the courts
do not purport to base the law they make on any such source.
My analysis will focus on this "pure" judge-made law,21 but in
the end I will consider the implications of the analysis for the
borderline cases.'
The second qualification concerns my focus on federal courts.
Some of the issues under consideration here will arise in state
courts. To the extent that such cases are governed by federal
common law, state courts will have a duty to develop and apply
such law. Nonetheless, because the legitimacy of state court development of federal law in this context derives wholly from the
legitimacy of the practice in federal courts, I will focus on federal courts. But the arguments apply with at least as much force
19 See infra Section

IV.A.
infra Section IV.B.
21 Cf. Thomas W. Merrill, The Judicial Prerogative, 12 Pace L. Rev. 327, 328 (1992)
(distinguishing judge-made prerogative law from judicial lawmaking under the authority
of enacted law).
20See

2 See

infra Section IV.B.2.
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to state court development of the federal common law of foreign relations.
Finally, my analysis is limited to the judicial invalidation of
state law based on the state law's connection to foreign relations.
Some state acts potentially governed by the federal common law
of foreign relations will involve discrimination against a foreign
nation or person. Such acts thus might implicate antidiscrimination provisions of the Constitution like the Equal Protection
Clause or the antidiscrimination component of the dormant foreign Commerce Clause. This Article does not argue against the
validity of these antidiscrimination doctrines. Instead, it argues
against an additional level of federal judicial regulation, via federal common law, based on the foreign affairs quotient of state
acts that survive such antidiscrimination scrutiny.
I. THE FEDERAL COMMON LAW OF FOREIGN RELATIONS

This Part explains the origins and logic of the federal common
law of foreign relations. It then examines the various and increasingly prevalent contexts in which courts have applied the
doctrine.
A. Origins

The federal common law of foreign relations was born in the
1960s but can best be understood against the background of the
United States Supreme Court's 1938 decision in Erie Railroad Co.
v. Tompkins.' Before Erie, federal courts applied a "general
common law" most famously associated with Swift v. Tyson.24
The federal judiciary "resorted to [the general common law] to
provide the rules of decision in particular cases without insisting
that the law be attached to any particular sovereign."' Federal
courts thus applied these rules of decision without apparent
authorization from Congress or the Constitution, and without
being bound by state court decisions. In Erie, the Court declared this practice by federal courts to be an "'unconstitutional
- 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
2441 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
21William A. Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of the Judiciary
Act of 1789: The Example of Marine Insurance, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1513, 1517 (1984).
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It held that "[e]xcept in matters gov-

erned by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the
'
law to be applied in any case is the law of the State."27
Erie changed, but did not eliminate, the common law powers

of federal courts. After Erie (as before the decision 8), courts
developed a "specialized" federal common law ultimately governed, or authorized, by the Constitution or a federal statute. 9

Unlike pre-Erie general common law, this federal common law
is authorized by a federal enactment and thus is part of the
"Laws of the United States" binding on the states under the Su-

premacy Clause." There is much debate over what counts as
adequate authorization for federal common law.3 Most of federal common law can be viewed as statutory gap-filling or as a
(usually implicit) congressional delegation of authority to the federal courts to make law related to a statutory scheme. 2 In these

contexts, the line between interpretation and lawmaking is often
indiscernible. In other contexts, the authorization for federal
common lawmaking derives from constitutional text. For example, even before Erie, the admiralty and interstate jurisdiction
clauses were understood to authorize federal courts to make

federal law in the absence of any legislative guidance,3 subject

26304 U.S. at 79 (quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow
Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
11Id. at 78.
21SSee infra note 33 and accompanying text.
29See Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And of the New Federal Common Law,
39 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 383,405-07 (1964).
30U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
31Compare Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1985) (requiring something close to specific intent), with Louise Weinberg, Federal Common Law, 83 Nw. U. L. Rev. 805, 813 (1989) ("[W]hat justifies
an exercise of national lawmaking power is the existence of a legitimate national
governmental interest.... [N]o other 'authorization' is required.").
3"See Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99
Harv. L. Rev. 881, 890 (1986).
"See, e.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 215 (1917) (admiralty); Kansas
v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 95-98 (1907) (interstate disputes). This understanding was
reconfirmed after Erie. See Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 409-10 (1953)
(admiralty); Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92,
110 (1938) (interstate disputes). Although the federal common law of admiralty and
of interstate disputes is sometimes justified by reference to its authorization in Article
III, these decisions are in fact probably based on structural inferences about the need
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to subsequent congressional revision. Finally, the authorization
for federal common law is sometimes based on structural inferences from the Constitution or a federal statute. In these cases,
courts determine that a particular issue implicates "uniquely federal interests 3 4 that must be resolved by a uniform federal law
prescribed by courts but always subject to congressional revision. 5 The federal common law of foreign relations is based on
just such a structural constitutional authorization.
The Supreme Court first applied the doctrine in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino 6 In Sabbatino,a Cuban bank sought
to recover proceeds from the sale of a shipment of sugar that the
Cuban government had previously expropriated from a company primarily owned by U.S. residents. The defendant who
controlled the proceeds argued that the bank was not entitled to
them because the expropriation violated customary international
law governing state responsibility toward aliens. The bank, in
turn, invoked the act of state doctrine in an attempt to preclude
judicial inquiry into the validity of the Cuban expropriation. In
its classic formulation, the act of state doctrine requires "the
courts of one country... not [to] sit in judgment on the acts of
the government of another done within its own territory."37 The
issue in Sabbatino was whether there was an exception to the
doctrine for an act of state-the expropriation-that violated
customary international law. The Court held that there was
not. 8 It thus applied the act of state doctrine and declined to
inquire into the expropriation's validity under customary international law. 9
In reaching this conclusion, the Court did not seek authorization for the act of state doctrine in the text of the Constitution'
for federal supremacy that are more akin to what I am calling the structural authorization for federal common law.
Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500,504 (1988) (quoting Texas Indus., Inc.
v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981) (quoting Banco Nacional de Cuba
v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,426 (1964))).
'-'See Alfred Hill, The Law-Making Power of the Federal Courts: Constitutional
Preemption, 67 Colum. L. Rev. 1024, 1048-67 (1967); Merrill, supra note 31, at 36-39.

36376 U.S. 398 (1964).
37Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250,252 (1897).
31Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 427-37.
39 Id. at 428.
40Id. at 423.
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or in a political branch enactment.' The Court nonetheless made
clear that the doctrine had the status of federal law. Analogizing to other areas of federal common law thought "necessary to
protect uniquely federal interests," 2 the Court explained that the
doctrine involved foreign relations problems that were "uniquely
' and thus "must be treated exclusively as an
federal in nature"43
aspect of federal law."" The Court drew on what it called
"'constitutional' underpinnings" in crafting the act of state doctrine."5 But importantly, the Court based both the need for, and
the content of, the doctrine on its own independent analysis of
the foreign relations interests of the United States."6 In this respect, Sabbatino appeared to establish
an independent power for the federal courts to make [foreign
relations] law on their own authority. It was the federal judiciary that decided that the foreign relations of the United States
required the Act of State doctrine; and it was the judiciary that
was deciding, in Sabbatino, that the foreign relations of the

41Id. at 421-27, 432-36; see also Louis Henkin, The Foreign Affairs Power of the
Federal Courts: Sabbatino, 64 Colum. L. Rev. 805, 814 (1964) ("In Sabbatino, no
authorization from the political branches for the courts to make law was found, or
sought."). The Court also made clear that the doctrine was not required by international law. Sabbatino,376 U.S. at 421-23.
42 Sabbatino,376 U.S. at 426.
43Id. at 424.
"Id. at 425. See also id. at 427 ("[P]roblems surrounding the act of state doctrine
are ...intrinsically federal.").
45 Id. at 423. The Court explained that the doctrine "arises out of the basic relationships between branches of government in a system of separation of powers. It concerns the competency of dissimilar institutions to make and implement particular
kinds of decisions in the area of international relations." Id. at 423. In particular, the
doctrine reflects the prerogative of the executive branch, and the incapacity of federal courts, to conduct foreign relations. See id. at 427-37.
46 The Court stated:
The [act of state) doctrine... expresses the strong sense of the Judicial Branch
that its engagement in the task of passing on the validity of foreign acts of state
may hinder rather than further this country's pursuit of goals both for itself and
for the community of nations as a whole in the international sphere.
Id. at 423. See also id. at 437 ("[W]e conclude that both the national interest and
progress toward the goal of establishing the rule of law among nations are best served
by maintaining intact the act of state doctrine in this realm of its application.").
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United States did not require (or permit) exception for acts of

state that violate international law.47

Four years after Sabbatino, the Court exercised a similar for-

eign relations lawmaking power in Zschernig v. Miller.48 At issue in Zschernig was the validity of an Oregon statute that denied inheritance to East German heirs because they could not
establish that (a) East Germany provided reciprocal inheritance
rights for Americans and (b) East Germany would not confiscate foreign heirs' rights to the proceeds of Oregon estates.49

The Oregon statute was not preempted by any federal statute or
treaty. Moreover, the United States government emphasized in

its role as amicus curiae that "the application of the Oregon escheat statute in the circumstances of this case [does not] unduly
interfere[] with the United States' conduct of foreign relations. '
But the Supreme Court thought otherwise. Once again performing an independent assessment of the foreign relations consequences of applying state law, it determined that the state
statute had a "direct impact upon foreign relations and may well

adversely affect the power of the central government to deal with
those problems."'" The Court concluded that the statute was "an

intrusion by the State into the field of foreign affairs which the

47
Henkin, supra note 1, at 139 (footnote omitted). This broad interpretation of the
federal common law powers established by Sabbatino is standard but by no means
inevitable. One might instead read the decision's emphasis on federal court deference to the executive in foreign affairs to permit federal common lawmaking only
when necessary to protect exclusive executive prerogatives. I will largely ignore this
alternate reading of the federal common law of foreign affairs because it has not won
the approval of courts or commentators.
389 U.S. 429 (1968).
,9 I&.at 430 n.1.
Id. at 434 (quoting Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 6 n.5, Zschernig (No. 21)). See also Memorandum for the United States at 5, Zschernig (No. 730)
("The Department of State has advised us... that State reciprocity laws, including that
of Oregon, have had little effect on the foreign relations and policy of this country."); id.
("[A]ppellants' apprehension of a deterioration in international relations [is] unsubstantiated by experience .... "); id. at 6 ("[T]he Oregon act is [not] in conflict with any federal law or policy bearing upon the subject matter of this litigation.").
1,
Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 441. See also id. at 435 ("[The statute's] great potential for
disruption or embarrassment makes us hesitate to place it in the category of a diplomatic bagatelle."); id. at 441 ("[A] State's policy may disturb foreign relations.").
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Constitution entrusts to the President and the Congress."" It
thus invalidated the statute.
B. Logic

Commentators sometimes treat Sabbatino and Zschernig as
exemplifying different types of judicial lawmaking. On this view,
Sabbatino'sfederal common law of foreign relations is a legislative power in the federal judiciary, while Zschernig's foreign affairs preemption doctrine is a species of structural constitutional

preemption. 3 In fact, the two decisions involved the exercise of
functionally identical judicial lawmaking powers. In both deci-

sions, the issue at hand was not governed by enacted federal law.
Both decisions rest on the notion that the Constitution's assign-

ment of foreign relations powers to the federal government entails a self-executing exclusion of state authority. In this sense,
both decisions rely on a form of "dormant" foreign relations
preemption analogous to the dormant Commerce Clause. ' The
justification for preemption in both decisions was the need to

protect political branch prerogatives in foreign relations. In both
decisions, the Court ascertained this need on the basis of its independent assessment of the foreign relations consequences of
applying state law.5 The content, too, of the judge-made federal

law in the two decisions was based on a judicial analysis of the
requirements of U.S. foreign relations. Finally, both decisions
were ultimately subject to congressional revision. 6

S2 Id. at 432. See also id. at 436 ("[T]his kind of state involvement in foreign affairs
and international relations [concerns] matters which the Constitution entrusts solely
to the Federal Government.").
5
See, e.g., Henkin, supra note 1, at 139-40, 162-65.
The Supreme Court has interpreted Article I's grant of power to Congress to regulate commerce, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, to have a "dormant" component that limits
certain state regulations of commerce even in the absence of federal legislation. See
Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law §§ 6-1 to 6-14, at 401-41 (2d ed. 1988).
55
Zschernig,389 U.S. at 440-41; Sabbatino,376 U.S. at 424-27.
16 Congress in fact overruled the decision in Sabbatino. See 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2)
(1994) (stating that act of state doctrine shall not prevent U.S. courts presented with
"a claim of title or other right to property" from inquiring into the validity of foreign
expropriations of such property under international law), constitutionality upheld,
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 243 F. Supp. 957, 972 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), aff'd, 383
F.2d 166, 182-83 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 956 (1968). Congress's power
to override Court decisions flows from the justification for federal judicial lawmaking
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The judge-made federal laws in Zschernig and Sabbatino are
thus examples of what Professor Henry Monaghan calls "constitutional common law."' They draw their "inspiration and authority" from constitutional structure, they have a content that is
based on independent discretionary policy judgments by courts,
and they can be overturned by legislation rather than by constitutional amendment.58 If the federal judicial lawmaking in the
two decisions seems different, it is because Zschernig appeared
to invalidate the state reciprocity statute without replacing that
law with an affirmative judge-made rule that the state must apply, while Sabbatino appeared to "legislate" an affirmative act
of state doctrine the states must follow. Even these characteri-

zations are misleading, because Zschernig created new federal
law that states must apply in certain circumstances, and Sabbatino
left the states leeway in applying the act of state doctrine.59 But
even assuming the characterization to be correct, the difference is
merely one of degree. Sabbatinoperhaps involved a more expansive and creative use of federal judge-made law, but the

source of and justification for this law was the same as in Zschernig. For these reasons, this Article will treat Zschernig's dormant

foreign relations preemption doctrine as a form of the federal
common law of foreign relations.
in this area, which is the protection of political branch prerogatives. As in the dormant commerce context, it would make no sense to limit a power of the federal political branches in the name of protecting that power. See Henkin, supra note 1, at
164-65; Martin H. Redish, Federal Jurisdiction: Tensions in the Allocation of Judicial
Power 137-38 (2d ed. 1990).
Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term-Foreword: Constitutional
Common Law, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1975).
11See id. at 2-3.
51For example, the Sabbatino Court left open the possibility that "a state court might,
in certain circumstances, adhere to a more restrictive view concerning the scope of
examination of foreign acts than that required by this Court." 376 U.S. at 425 n.23.
In addition, the states presumably remain free, under forum non conveniens or a related rationale, to close their courts altogether to cases involving the adjudication of
foreign acts of state.
10This conclusion is similar to the view that dormant Commerce Clause decisions are a
form of federal common law. See, e.g., Jesse H. Choper, The Scope of National Power
Vis-t-Vis the States: The Dispensability of Judicial Review, 86 Yale LJ. 1552, 1585-86
(1977); Noel T. Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power-Revised Version, 47
Colum. L. Rev. 547, 559 (1947); Monaghan, supra note 57, at 17. As Professor Henry
Monaghan explains, the functional similarities between dormant Commerce Clause
jurisprudence and other forms of "constitutionally inspired common law" are often
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C. Scope

The Supreme Court has rarely considered the legitimacy or
scope of the federal common law of foreign relations since Sabbatino and Zschernig. But lower courts and scholars have
broadly embraced the doctrine. Indeed, although there is much
debate about the legitimacy of federal common law generally,61
there is a remarkable consensus about the legitimacy of the federal common law of foreign relations.62 "Even commentators
relatively unsympathetic to the development of federal common
law recognize that foreign relations is a special case ... .63Foreign relations is a special case because it is viewed as the exclusive prerogative of the federal government.'
The precise scope of the federal common law of foreign relations is less settled than the validity of the doctrine itself. This

uncertainty is due in part to the Supreme Court's relatively infrequent application of the doctrine. It is also due to indeterminacy in the Court's test for applying the doctrine. This test is
almost always expressed in terms of the effects of state acts."
Sometimes courts focus on a state law's effect on the political
overlooked because "the sanction of nullity for violation of the [dormant Commerce
Clause's] free-trade policy is the same as under a Marbury-like invalidation and does
not 'look like' the affirmative creation of federal regulatory rules." Id. The same
logic applies to the relationship between dormant foreign relations preemption and
the federal common law of foreign relations.
61See George D. Brown, Federal Common Law and The Role of the Federal
Courts in Private Law Adjudication-A (New) Erie Problem?, 12 Pace L. Rev. 229,
245-56 (1992) (describing debate).
62See, e.g., Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1245, 1292 (1996) (describing federal common law of foreign
relations as "[o]ne of the more prominent modern enclaves of federal common law").
I have found two exceptions to this consensus. Professor Peter Spiro has argued that
dormant foreign affairs preemption is "obsolete." Peter J. Spiro, The States and Immigration in an Era of Demi-Sovereignties, 35 Va. J. Int'l L. 121, 161-74 (1994). And
Professor Arthur Weisburd has argued for a narrower federal common law of foreign
relations. A.M. Weisburd, State Courts, Federal Courts, and International Cases, 20
Yale J. Int'l L. 1, 2 (1995). I consider these analyses below at note 253 and notes
363-364 and accompanying text.
61
Brilmayer, supra note 14, at 332 n.109.
64 See id. at 304, 332 n.109; Clark, supra note 62, at 1296-98; Larry Kramer, The
Lawmaking Power of the Federal Courts, 12 Pace L. Rev. 263,288 n.84 (1992).
62
In a very few cases courts look to the purpose rather than to the effect of state acts.
These cases, which have not been central to the development of the federal common
law of foreign relations, are considered infra notes 384-386 and accompanying text.
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branches' ability to conduct foreign relations,' while other times
they focus on a state law's effect on U.S. foreign relations itself'
These are related but different inquiries; a particular state law
might affect U.S. foreign relations without affecting the political

branches' conduct of these relations, and vice versa. A different
uncertainty concerns the appropriate level of adverse foreign relations effects needed to warrant preemption of state law. Various formulations exist. Some suggest a broad approach where
"foreign affairs [is] a domain in which federal courts can make
law with supremacy."' Other formulations are more specific
but not much more helpful. They justify federal judicial lawmaking when a case otherwise governed by state law is "related

to foreign affairs"69 or "implicat[es]... our relations with foreign

nations,"'" or "has a direct impact upon foreign relations,' or
"touch[es]on 'external sovereignty,"" or "might affect.., foreign
relations,"" or "is substantially relatedto foreign affairs.' '
6See,
e.g., Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 441 (noting that Oregon's probate statute "may
well adversely affect the power of the central government to deal with [foreign relations]"); Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 432 (observing that judicial invalidation of foreign
acts of state "could seriously interfere with negotiations being carried on by the Executive Branch"); see also Tribe, supra note 54, § 4-6, at 230 ("[A]II state action,
whether or not consistent with current federal foreign policy, that distorts the allocation of responsibility to the national government for the conduct of American diplomacy is void as an unconstitutional infringement upon an exclusively federal sphere
of responsibility.").
67See, e.g., Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981)
(dictum) (stating that federal common law includes areas "concerned with ... international disputes implicating.., our relations with foreign nations"); Zschernig, 389
U.S. at 440, 441 (emphasizing that Oregon's probate statute "affects international
relations in a persistent and subtle way" and has a "direct impact upon foreign relations"); Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 432 (predicting that judicial invalidity of foreign acts
of state would "likely ...give offense to the expropriating country" ); see also Erwin
Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction § 6.2.4, at 349 (2d ed. 1994) ("Federal common
law is created ...because the application of state law would frustrate the uniformity
needed in the United States' relations with other countries.").
61 Henkin, supra note 1, at 139; see also Redish, supra note 56, at 125 (Sabbatino
recognized "the power of the federal judiciary to create federal common law in the
field of international relations").
61Chemerinsky, supra note 67, at 350 (emphasis added).
10Texas Industries,451 U.S. at 641 (dictum) (emphasis added).
7 Zschernig,389 U.S. at 441 (emphasis added).
72 Clark, supra note 62, at 1297 (emphasis added).
7319 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur H. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice
and Procedure § 4517, at 555 (2d ed. 1996) (emphasis added).
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What follows is a catalog of the areas in which courts have

applied the federal common law of foreign relations and in which
scholars have discussed it.75
1. PrivateInternationalLaw

Many scholars have noted an increase in the percentage of
civil lawsuits in United States courts that involve foreign parties
or transactions.76 Such suits typically implicate issues that fall in
the gray zone between substance and procedure: transnational

choice of law, transnational forum non conveniens, the enforcement of transnational forum selection clauses, and the recogni-

tion of foreign judgments. These issues are not governed by enacted federal law. The question thus arises whether they are
governed by state law or federal common law.' The Supreme

Court has not resolved this question.78 But some lower courts
74Henkin, supra note 1, at 139 (emphasis added).
75The reader should keep in mind that here, as elsewhere, I use the term "federal

common law of foreign relations" to include dormant foreign relations preemption.
See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
76 See generally Gary B. Born, International Litigation in United States Courts (3d
ed. 1996).
7It is possible that these issues are procedural for Erie purposes and thus governed
by federal judge-made procedural rules in federal court and state procedural rules in
state court. With regard to forum non conveniens, this view finds support in American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443 (1994), which stated in a domestic maritime
context that forum non conveniens was "procedural rather than substantive" and
thus was governed by state law in state court. Id. at 453. However, the Court declined to rule on the appropriate source of law for forum non conveniens in international cases, id. at 453 n.3, and it remains possible that "federal interests in foreign
commerce and foreign relations provide the basis for a substantive federal common
law rule of forum non conveniens." Born, supra note 76, at 360.
IsIn Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981), the Court left open the
source of law for transnational forum non conveniens. Id. at 248 n.13; see also
American Dredging,510 U.S. at 457 (same). In The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.,
407 U.S. 1 (1972), the Court held in a transnational maritime dispute that American
interests in international trade required the development of uniform federal common
law rules governing the enforcement of forum selection clauses. Id. at 9-10; see also
Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991) (applying Bremen principles
in another admiralty context). But admiralty jurisdiction is a traditional fount of federal common lawmaking; it remains an open question whether federal courts have
the authority in diversity cases to develop federal common law rules governing international forum selection clauses. See Texas Industries, 451 U.S. at 641-42. In the
pre-Erie decision of Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895), the Court established a
reciprocity requirement for the enforcement of foreign judgments. Id. at 227-28. But
this was a non-federal general common law rule, see Aetna Life Insurance Co. v.
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have ruled that these issues implicate federal foreign relations
interests and should be governed by the federal common law of
foreign relations.79 Commentators overwhelmingly agree with
this conclusion.
Tremblay, 223 U.S. 185, 190 (1912) (holding that in the absence of a relevant treaty,
recognition of foreign judgments does not present federal question); Johnston v.
Compagnie G~n~rale Transatlantique, 152 N.E. 121, 123 (N.Y. 1926) (declining to
follow Hilton), and it is unclear after Erie whether this rule binds the states as federal
common law. See Stephen B. Burbank, Federal Judgments Law: Sources of Authority and Sources of Rules, 70 Tex. L. Rev. 1551, 1577-82 (1992). Finally, in Day &
Zimmermann, Inc. v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 3 (1975) (per curiam), the Court followed
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941) (deeming choiceof-law rules substantive for Erie purposes) and held that state choice-of-law rules
rather than federal judge-made choice-of-law rules govern in an alien diversity suit to
recover for damages resulting from a tort that took place in Cambodia. Challoner,
423 U.S. at 4-5. But the scope of Challoner's holding with respect to choice of law in
transnational cases is uncertain, because the act of state doctrine federalized in Sabbatino is also a choice-of-law rule that bars the forum from applying its public policy
exception when foreign acts of state would otherwise govern the case. See Louis
Henkin, Act of State Today: Recollections in Tranquility, 6 Colum. J. Transnat'l L.
175, 178-79 (1967).
71 Choice of law: See, e.g., Bi v. Union Carbide Chems. & Plastics Co., Inc., 984 F.2d
582, 586-87 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 862 (1993); Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A.,
764 F.2d 1101, 1121-22 (5th Cir. 1985); Republic of Iraq v. First Nat'l City Bank, 353
F.2d 47,50-51 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1027 (1966). Forum non conveniens:
See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Chick Kam Choo, 817 F.2d 307,321 (5th Cir. 1987), rev'd on
other grounds, 486 U.S. 140 (1988). Transnationalforum selection clauses: See, e.g.,
TAAG Linhas Aereas v. Transamerica Airlines, Inc., 915 F.2d 1351, 1353 (9th Cir.
1990); Appell v. George Philip & Son, Ltd., 760 F. Supp. 167, 168 (D. Nev. 1991).
Enforcement of foreign judgments: See, e.g., Tahan v. Hodgson, 662 F.2d 862, 868
(D.C. Cir. 1981); Hunt v. BP Exploration Co. (Libya) Ltd., 492 F. Supp. 885, 892
(N.D. Tex. 1980).
10Choice of law: See, e.g., Henkin, supra note 1, at 139; Daniel C.K. Chow, Limiting
Erie in a New Age of International Law: Toward a Federal Common Law of International Choice of Law, 74 Iowa L. Rev. 165 (1988); Donald T. Trautman, Toward Federalizing Choice of Law, 70 Tex. L. Rev. 1715, 1735-36 (1992). Forum non conveniens: See, e.g., Mark D. Greenberg, The Appropriate Source of Law for Forum Non
Conveniens Decisions in International Cases: A Proposal for the Development of
Federal Common Law, 4 Int'l Tax & Bus. Law. 155, 156 (1986); Andreas Lowenfeld,
Nationalizing International Law: Essay in Honor of Louis Henkin, 36 Colum. J.
Transnat'l L. 121, 136-38 (1997); Spencer Weber Waller, A Unified Theory of Transnational Procedure, 26 Cornell Int'l L.J. 101, 123 (1993); Russell J. Weintraub, International Litigation and Forum Non Conveniens, 29 Tex. Int'l LJ. 321,322 (1994). But
see Laurel E. Miller, Comment, Forum Non Conveniens and State Control of Foreign Plaintiff Access to U.S. Courts in International Tort Actions, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev.
1369, 1371 (1991) ("states should be able to develop their own forum non conveniens
rules"). Transnationalforumselection clauses: See, e.g., Friedrich K. Juenger, Choice
of Law and Multistate Justice 214-18 (1993); Lowenfeld, supra, at 133-36; Harold G.
Maier, The Three Faces of Zapata: Maritime Law, Federal Common Law, Federal
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The federal common law of foreign relations also extends to
more substantive areas of state law such as contract, tort, and
property. Some courts have held that private tort suits by aliens
against American citizens for environmental damage abroad implicate "issues of international relations [that] are incorporated
into federal common law, which presents a federal question."'"
Another court has held that "[s]tate law claims [for breach of
contract and specific performance under an agreement to develop oil fields in Kazakhstan] rais[e] issues of international relations [that] implicate federal common law for federal question

jurisdiction purposes."8 And the Second Circuit has ruled that
a common law conversion suit against Ferdinand Marcos and his
associates "arises under federal common law because of the nec-

essary implications of such an action for United States foreign
relations."'83 There has been little academic discussion of this
trend.' But the logic of the federal common law of foreign relations appears to permit courts to federalize these areas of state
law to the extent that they implicate or unduly burden U.S. foreign relations interests.
Courts Law, 6 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 387, 396 (1973); Linda J. Silberman, Developments in Jurisdiction and Forum Non Conveniens in International Litigation:
Thoughts on Reform and a Proposal for a Uniform Standard, 28 Tex. Int'l L.J. 501,
528-29 (1993). Enforcement of foreign judgments: Henkin, supra note 1, at 139; Ronald A. Brand, Enforcement of Foreign Money-Judgments in the United States: In
Search of Uniformity and International Acceptance, 67 Notre Dame L. Rev. 253, 257
(1991); Robert C. Casad, Issue Preclusion and Foreign Country Judgments: Whose
Law?, 70 Iowa L. Rev. 53, 77-80 (1984); Lowenfeld, supra, at 125-31; John Norton
Moore, Federalism and Foreign Relations, 1965 Duke LJ.248, 285; Eugene F. Scoles,
Interstate and International Distinctions in Conflict of Laws in the United States, 54
Cal. L. Rev. 1599, 1605-07 (1966). But see Burbank, supra note 78, at 1577-82.
81Sequihua v. Texaco, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 61, 62 (S.D. Tex. 1994); see also Torres v.
Southern Peru Copper Corp., 113 F.3d 540, 542-43 (5th Cir. 1997) (concluding that
tort suit against American and foreign corporations for alleged environmental damage in Peru arises under federal common law of foreign relations); Kern v. Jeppesen
Sanderson, Inc., 867 F. Supp. 525, 531 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (concluding that tort suit by
foreign plaintiffs against foreign and domestic corporations arising out of foreign airplane crashes "raise[s] questions of foreign relations which are incorporated into federal
common law").
Grynberg Prod. Corp. v. British Gas, P.L.C., 817 F. Supp. 1338, 1355 (E.D. Tex.
1993).
Republic of Philippines v. Marcos, 806 F.2d 344, 354 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied
sub nom. New York Land Co. v. Republic of Philippines, 481 U.S. 1048 (1987).
81But see Weisburd, supra note 62, at 59-64 (criticizing trend).
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2. Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause
The federal common law of foreign relations has also been
applied as an offshoot of the dormant foreign Commerce Clause.
As a general matter, dormant preemption under the foreign
Commerce Clause involves an antidiscrimination analysis similar to dormant preemption under the domestic Commerce Clause.
Courts ask whether the state act facially discriminates against
foreign commerce or has substantial discriminatory effects. But
at least in its application to state taxation of the instrumentalities
of foreign commerce, the dormant foreign Commerce Clause imposes an additional, and independent, prohibition: The state tax
must not prevent the federal government from speaking with
"one voice" in foreign relationsY' This so-called one-voice test
is functionally identical to dormant foreign relations preemption.' It requires courts to analyze the extent to which state law
will "offend" foreign nations and provoke foreign retaliation.
Thus, for example, the Court invalidated a state tax that posed
an "acute" risk of offense to a foreign nation,' but upheld a state
tax where risk of offense to foreign nation "would be attenuated
' Here again, the validity of state law turns on a court's
at best."89
independent assessment of its foreign relations implications.'
3. State ForeignRelations Activities
The federal common law of foreign relations has been invoked as a response to state foreign relations activities that have

8-1
The one-voice test was added to the dormant foreign Commerce Clause's antidis-

crimination analysis for the first time in Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles,
441 U.S. 434, 451 (1979). Japan Line borrowed the one-voice test from the ImportExport Clause analysis in Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276,285 (1976), which
in turn borrowed the test from Justice Felix Frankfurter's dissent in Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 534, 556 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
16 See Spiro, supra note 62, at 164.
7See
Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 194 (1983).
8 Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 453; see id. at 450-54.

9ContainerCorp., 463 U.S. at 195; see id. at 194-97.
"As I discuss in detail below, see infra notes 327-340 and accompanying text, the

Supreme Court significantly undermined this one-voice test in Barclays Bank PLC v.
Franchise Tax Board of California, 512 U.S. 298 (1994).
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emerged in the last quarter century." Much of this activity, such
as buy-American statutes, overseas trade missions and business
development offices, and international investment incentive programs, is directed toward enhancing state economies.9' Some of
it is more overtly political. For example, states have manipulated their "domestic" economic laws to achieve foreign policy
goals such as ending apartheid in South Africa93 and slave labor
in Myanmar ' Similarly, many localities have established themselves as nuclear-free zones or refugee sanctuaries.9' California's
Proposition 187 might also fall in this category.96

Many of these state "foreign relations" activities feature an
element of discrimination against foreign actors that might implicate the Equal Protection Clause and related antidiscrimination
provisions. However, they have also been attacked for their
foreign relations consequences independent of this discriminatory element. Applying Zschernig and related doctrines, courts

have invalidated some of these state actions under a federal com-

11For overviews of state foreign relations activities, see Richard B. Bilder, The Role
of States and Cities in Foreign Relations, 83 Am. J. Int'l L. 821 (1989); Earl H. Fry,
The US States and Foreign Economic Policy: Federalism in the "New World Order,"
in Foreign Relations and Federal States 122 (Brian Hocking ed., 1993); John M.
Kline, State and Local Boundary-Spanning Strategies in the United States: Political,
Economic, and Cultural Transgovernmental Interactions, in Globalization and Decentralization: Institutional Contexts, Policy Issues, and Intergovernmental Relations
in Japan and the United States 329 (Jong S. Jun & Deil S. Wright eds., 1996).
92See generally John M. Kline, State Government Influence in U.S. International
Economic Policy (1983) (describing and analyzing this activity).
93See Bilder, supra note 91, at 822.
4 See A State's Foreign Policy: The Mass that Roared, Economist, Feb. 8, 1997, at
32; see also David E. Sanger, New York Punishes Swiss Bank over Nazi Gold, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 10, 1997, at Al (discussing New York City Comptroller's decision to punish
Swiss banks for not cooperating with Nazi gold investigation).
91See Bilder, supra note 91, at 822 & n.7.
96Proposition 187 was a 1994 California ballot initiative that denied assistance and
education to illegal immigrants. It was subsequently codified at Cal. Educ. Code
§§ 48215, 66010.8 (West Supp. 1997); Cal. Gov't Code § 53069.65 (West 1997); Cal.
Health & Safety Code § 130 (West Supp. 1997); Cal. Penal Code § 113 (West Supp.
1997); Cal. Welfare & Insts. Code § 10001.5 (West Supp. 1997). Parts of Proposition
187 were invalidated on constitutional and statutory field preemption grounds in
League of United Latin American Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755 (C.D. Cal. 1995),
appeal pending, No. 97-55388 (9th Cir.) (argued Oct. 8, 1997).
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mon law of foreign relations rationale.97 Some commentators
have argued for a broader application of the doctrine.9"
4. CustomaryInternationalLaw

The final area in which the federal common law of foreign
relations has been applied concerns customary international
law. Customary international law is the law of the international
community that "results from a general and consistent practice
of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation."" In
contrast to treaties, customary international law is not mentioned in either the Supremacy Clause or Article III.'" For most
of our nation's history, customary international law had the
status of nonfederal general common law.'"' During this period

it did not implicate federal question jurisdiction and did not

"See Tayyari v. New Mexico State Univ., 495 F. Supp. 1365, 1377 (D.N.M. 1980)
(holding that decision by a state university to deny admission to Iranian students was
preempted); Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Board of Comm'rs, 80 Cal. Rptr. 800 (App.
Dep't Super. Ct. 1969) (holding that state buy-American statute was preempted);
Springfield Rare Coin Galleries, Inc. v. Johnson, 503 N.E.2d 300,305 (111. 1986) (holding
that state's expulsion of South Africa from a legal currency tax-exempt list was preempted); New York Times Co. v. City of New York Comm'n on Human Rights, 361
N.E.2d 963, 968 (N.Y. 1977) (holding that municipalities' ban on employment advertising by South African companies was preempted). In addition, several lower courts
have struck down state inheritance statutes similar to the one at issue in Zschernig.
See Harold G. Maier, The Bases and Range of Federal Common Law in Private International Matters, 5 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 133, 141-45 (1971) (citing and analyzing
cases); cf. Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 517 (1947) (holding that state laws with
"incidental or indirect effect" on foreign relations were not preempted).
18See, e.g., Patrick J. Borchers & Paul F. Dauer, Taming the New Breed of Nuclear
Free Zone Ordinances: Statutory and Constitutional Infirmities in Local Procurement Ordinances Blacklisting the Producers of Nuclear Weapons Components, 40
Hastings LJ.87 (1988); Howard N. Fenton, III, The Fallacy of Federalism in Foreign
Affairs: State and Local Foreign Policy Trade Restrictions, 13 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus.
563,588-90 (1993); Michael A. Olivas, Preempting Preemption: Foreign Affairs, State
Rights, and Alienage Classifications, 35 Va. J. Int'l L., 217,219-20 (1994).
"Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 102(2)
(1987).
"' The Constitution's only mention of customary international law is in Article I,
which gives Congress the power to "define and punish ...Offences against the Law
of Nations." U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl.
10.
101
See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as
Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 815,
824-26,849-52 (1997).
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bind the states as federal law. 2 In recent years, however, courts
and commentators have come to agree that customary international law applies as domestic federal common law. 3 A primary
rationale for this view is that "[t]he determination and application
of international law are integral to the conduct of foreign relations and are the responsibility of the federal government."''"
The judicial federalization of customary international law is
particularly significant because of changes in the content of that
law in recent years. Prior to World War II, customary international law primarily governed relations among nations."5 Since
World War II, it has expanded to govern certain human rights
issues that involve a nation's treatment of its own citizens (such
as torture, prolonged arbitrary detention, and some forms of discrimination)."° While the political branches have incorporated
much of the traditional customary international law relevant to
domestic litigation into domestic law via treaty or statute, they
have not incorporated most of this "new" customary international
law of human rights. 7 Even in the absence of such political
branch incorporation, however, the modern view is that customary international law applies as federal law by virtue of the federal common law of foreign relations. 8
To date, courts have treated customary international law as
federal common law primarily to establish Article III federal
question jurisdiction in international human rights cases." But
as many commentators have argued, if customary international
- See id. at 824.
101
See id. at 817 nn.3-4, 837 nn.150-151 (collecting sources). For a critique of this
view, see id. at 849-70; Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, The Current Illegitimacy of International Human Rights Litigation in United States Courts, 66 Fordham
L. Rev. (forthcoming 1997).
'1 Henkin, supra note 1, at 238.
101
Mark W. Janis, An Introduction to International Law 245 (2d ed. 1993).
0 On the content of this new human rights law, and the general trend it represents
in international law, see Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 101, at 838-42; Rosalyn
Higgins, Conceptual Thinking About the Individual in International Law, 24 N.Y.L.
Sch. L. Rev. 11 (1978); Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the
Rights of Individuals Rather Than States, 32 Am. U. L. Rev. 1 (1982).

10,
See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 101, at 869; Bradley & Goldsmith, supra
note 103.
"ISee Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 101, at 837 nn.150-51 (collecting sources).
119See id.at 873.

HeinOnline -- 83 Va. L. Rev. 1640 1997

1997]

FederalCourts, ForeignAffairs, and Federalism

1641

law is federal common law, it binds the states under the Supremacy Clause."0 On this view, a state law that is consistent
with federal statutes and the federal Constitution would nonetheless be invalid if inconsistent with customary international law.
This is a potentially significant development, for customary international law is often more protective of individual rights than
federal or state constitutions and statutes. The possibilities for
preemption under this rationale range from state juvenile death
penalty statutes to state restrictions on welfare benefits to aliens
to state choice-of-law rules.11' As the scope of customary international law continues to grow (and in the human rights context
there is every indication that it will112), so too will the areas of
state law potentially subject to preemption under a federal common law of foreign relations rationale.
In sum, since Sabbatino and Zschernig, courts have begun to
apply the federal common law of foreign relations to preempt
otherwise applicable state law in a variety of contexts. In each
of these contexts, federal judicial lawmaking is premised on an
independent judicial assessment of the foreign relations implications of applying state law. Such lawmaking requires courts, in
the absence of political branch guidance, to identify, weigh, and
accommodate the foreign relations interests of the United States.
This method and many of its consequences have received the
broad approval of commentators.
II. THE LESSON OF HISTORY
The central premise of the federal common law of foreign relations is that the Constitution's assignment of foreign relations
powers to the federal government entails a self-executing excluI'0 See, e.g., Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
§ 111 (1987); Brilmayer, supra note 14, at 295, 302-04; Louis Henkin, International
Law as Law in the United States, 82 Mich. L. Rev. 1555, 1561-63 (1984).
"' See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 101, at 846-47; Brilmayer, supra note 14, at
315-26.
See, e.g., Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
"I,
§ 702 cmt. a (1987); Theodor Meron, Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms as
Customary Law 99 (1989); Richard B. Lillich, The Growing Importance of Customary
International Human Rights Law, 25 Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 1, 7 n.43 (1995-1996).
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sion of state authority."3 The basis for this view is surprisingly
uncertain. Constitutional text is at best equivocal. Articles I
and II assign to the federal political branches numerous executory foreign relations powers, and Article I, Section 10 excludes
state authority in a defined set of foreign relations contexts."'
The most natural inference from these provisions and from the
Constitution's enumerated powers structure is that all foreign
relations matters not excluded by Article I, Section 10 fall within
the concurrent power of the state and federal governments until
preempted by federal statute or treaty."
The inconclusiveness of constitutional text leads proponents
of the federal common law of foreign relations to emphasize
other matters. This Part considers the historical claims most often
made in support of the doctrine. Some courts and commentators infer from the text of the Constitution that the framers intended all foreign relations powers to be vested exclusively in
the federal government."6 They bolster this inference with the
framers' well-known desire to establish federal control over foreign relations,. 7 as well as numerous nineteenth- and twentieth-

century Supreme Court decisions proclaiming foreign relations
to be an exclusive federal prerogative."8
1,3 See

supra note 54 and accompanying text.
supra notes 2-3.
- See Clark, supra note 62, at 1296.
116See, e.g., Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 427 & n.25; Clark, supra note 62, at 1296-99;
Moore, supra note 80, at 275-76; Peter J. Spiro, The Limits of Federalism in Foreign
Policymaking, Intergovernmental Persp., Spring 1990, at 32,34.
"7 See, e.g., The Federalist No. 42, at 279 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961) ("If we are to be one nation in any respect, it clearly ought to be in respect to
other nations."); The Federalist No. 80, at 535-36 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E.
Cooke ed., 1961) ("[T]he peace of the WHOLE ought not be left at the disposal of a
PART. The Union will undoubtedly be answerable to foreign powers for the conduct
of its members."); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Feb. 8, 1786), in
1 The Republic of Letters: The Correspondence between Thomas Jefferson and
James Madison 1776-1826, at 409,410 (James Morton Smith ed., 1995) (considering it
"indispensably necessary that with respect to every thing external we be one nation
only, firmly hooped together").
"See, e.g., United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233 (1942) ("Power over external
affairs is not shared by the States; it is vested in the national government exclusively."); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63 (1941) ("The Federal Government... is
entrusted with full and exclusive responsibility for the conduct of affairs with foreign
sovereignties."); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937) ("[I]n respect of
our foreign relations generally, state lines disappear. As to such purposes the State ...
1,4 See
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This Part explains why reliance on these sources is misplaced.
The Constitution was designed to give the federal political
branches comprehensive control over U.S. foreign relations, and
from the beginning, the Supreme Court upheld foreign relations
enactments against federalism challenges. But outside of Article I, Section 10, there is no evidence that the Constitution was
designed to establish a judicially enforceable, self-executing realm
of federal exclusivity in foreign affairs, and for the first 175 years
of the nation, courts did not recognize any such realm. After
showing that constitutional practice prior to 1964 did not support the innovations in Sabbatino and Zschernig, I explain why
this historical practice does not necessarily undermine the modem practice. For as this Part also explains, many of the reasons
for the absence of a federal common law of foreign relations
prior to 1964 had changed by that date.
A. Evidence

One of the primary and least controversial purposes of the
Constitutional Convention was to strengthen the foreign relations powers of the federal government vis-A-vis the states. 19
The Articles of Confederation lacked an effective supremacy
clause, executive, or judiciary, and Congress lacked adequate
power to raise revenue or to control the states in foreign relations. As a result, the states often pursued their own interests in
a manner that undermined the collective national interest in
military security, a unified international trade policy, and diplomatic respect. Individual states lacked the means (and often
the motivation) to protect against external security threats, but
the absence of a federal taxing power prevented Congress from
does not exist."); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 316
(1936) ("[Slince the states severally never possessed international powers, such powers
could not have been carved from the mass of state powers."); The Chinese Exclusion
Case, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889) ("For local interests the several States of the Union
exist, but for national purposes, embracing our relations with foreign nations, we are
but one people, one nation, one power.").
"This paragraph draws on Frederick W. Marks III, Independence on Trial: Foreign Affairs and the Making of the Constitution (1973); 1 Bradford Perkins, The

Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations: The Creation of a Republican
Empire, 1776-1865, at 54-80 (1993); Jack N. Rakove, The Beginnings of National

Politics: An Interpretive History of the Continental Congress 342-52 (1979).
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maintaining the national military needed to redress such threats.
In addition, debtor states had little incentive to comply with the

obligation imposed by the 1783 Treaty of Paris to pay prewar
debts to British creditors, and Congress lacked the means to force
them to do so. In turn, England refused to honor its treaty obligations, further exacerbating the military and economic insecurity of the new nation. More broadly, state noncompliance with
national treaty obligations undermined the national government's
ability to bargain effectively with foreign nations. Similarly, Congress could not prevent the states from pursuing their own com-

mercial policies with foreign nations, and thus could not threaten
other nations with the weapons of commercial warfare. It also
lacked the authority to enforce compliance with the law of nations by, for example, punishing affronts to foreign diplomats.
I have already outlined how the Constitution rectified these
and other foreign relations collective action problems under the

Articles of Confederation.'"

If did not do so, as popular lore

would have it, by giving the federal government exclusive power
in the foreign relations field. Article I, Section 10 did make certain traditional foreign relations functions at least presumptively
exclusive. But the foreign relations provisions of Article I, Section 10 were borrowed directly from the Articles of Confederation.12' With trivial exceptions, Article I, Section 10 did not impose new limitations on the states. Nor did it purport to bar
states from participating in all foreign relations-related functions.

Instead, the Constitution's primary innovations to control states
110
See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text.

121 Compare U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, with U.S. Articles of Confederation art. VI. Article VI of the Articles of Confederation, like Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution,
prohibited states, without consent of Congress, from entering into agreements with
foreign nations, from engaging in war, from keeping troops or ships of war in times of
peace, and from issuing letters of marque and reprisal. There were also some minor
differences between the two provisions. Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution
placed an absolute ban on treaty-making by states; Article VI of the Articles prohibited treaty-making by states without prior congressional consent. Article I, Section
10 prohibited states from laying imposts or duties without congressional consent unless "absolutely necessary for executing it's [sic] inspection Laws"; Article VI's prohibition on state imposts and duties was limited to those that interfered with certain
treaty stipulations. Finally, the Constitution did not replicate Article VI's prohibition
on states from "send[ing] any embassy to, or receiv[ing] any embassy from," a foreign
state without congressional consent.
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in foreign relations were (a) to give the federal political branches,
including the new President, broader foreign relations powers
that were easier to exercise, and (b) to create a more powerful
Supremacy Clause, a federal judiciary, and a President with executive power. Taken together, these mechanisms ensured state
compliance with the political branches' foreign relations enactments. But they left the determination of when the national
foreign relations interest would be best served by the exclusion
of state power largely to the discretion of the federal political
branches.
This discretion is conditioned on the satisfaction of procedural hurdles that make it costly and difficult for the political
branches to make foreign relations law." A primary purpose
for the establishment of these hurdles-especially with respect to
treaties-was to preserve state influence and protect state interests.'" Under the original Constitution, state legislatures retained
indirect control over the making of treaties and appointment of
ambassadors through their power to select Senators.'
The
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries are replete with examples of states acting "within the federal system to constrain or
influence the national government's conduct of foreign affairs.""
Numerous treaties and foreign relations statutes were blocked,
or limited in scope, out of concern for state prerogatives.'26 In
addition, as I shall discuss more fully in a moment, during much
of the nineteenth century, states played a significant role in im-Foreign relations statute-making is subject to the bicameral, presentment, and
veto requirements to which all statute-making is subject. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 7.
Treaty-making has its own procedural requirements as well: treaty-making by the
President, subject to consent by two-thirds of the Senate, see id. art. II, § 2; and implementing legislation by the Congress when treaties are non-self-executing.
- See Arthur Bestor, Respective Roles of Senate and President in the Making and
Abrogation of Treaties-The Original Intent of the Framers of the Constitution Historically Examined, 55 Wash. L. Rev. 1 (1979); Jack N. Rakove, Solving a Constitutional Puzzle: The Treatymaking Clause as a Case Study, 1 Persps. in Am. Hist. 233,
236-250 (1984); John C. Yoo, The Original Understanding of the Treaty Clause
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Virginia Law Review Association).
-2,U.S. Const. art. I, § 3, cl. 1, amended by U.S. Const. amend. XVII (1913).
' Kline, supra note 92, at 19.
2I For many examples, see Nicholas Pendleton Mitchell, State Interests in American Treaties (1936); Harold W. Stoke, The Foreign Relations of the Federal State
175-218 (1931).
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migration and (for a shorter period) extradition. Even military
control was not an exclusive federal prerogative as an original
matter. States originally retained the responsibility for training
and officering the militia, the primary military force in the United
States until after the War of 1812.127
State influences over the conduct of federal foreign relations
were also reflected in the debate about whether the political
branches' foreign relations powers were limited by the states'
reserved powers. This issue was most vigorously debated in the
treaty context." The Supreme Court never declared a treaty
unconstitutional on this (or any other) ground. 9 But its dicta
sometimes suggested, and commentators and governmental officials often agreed, that the treaty power was limited by states'
rights. 30 The Court finally resolved the issue in Missouri v.
17 See William H. Riker, Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance 57-60 (1964).
The original Constitution contained other limitations on the federal government's
foreign relations power vis-A-vis the states. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 1 (prohibiting
Congress from restricting prior to 1808 the migration or importation of persons admitted by states); id. art. I, § 9, cl. 5 (prohibiting Congress from taxing or laying duty
on articles exported from states); id. art. I, § 9, cl. 6 (prohibiting Congress from giving
preference to ports of one state over another or obliging vessels to enter, clear, or
pay duties in any state).
128
For an overview, see Quincy Wright, The Control of American Foreign Relations 88-93 (1922).
129 Henkin, supra note 1, at 185.
110Justice Samuel Chase suggested in 1796 that the federal treaty power was plenary, Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 235-237 (1796), but subsequent Supreme
Court dicta suggested the contrary. See, e.g., License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504,
613 (1847); see generally Henry St. George Tucker, Limitations on the TreatyMaking Power 44-55 (1915) (collecting additional cases). In fact, the federal government has sometimes declined to participate in treaty negotiations or accede to
treaty provisions on the ground that such issues were beyond federal power. See
Mitchell, supra note 126; Stoke, supra note 126, at 90-91; Kurt H. Nadelmann, Ignored State Interests: The Federal Government and International Efforts to Unify
Rules of Private Law, 102 U. Pa. L. Rev. 323,324 (1954). There was a spirited debate
about the scope of the treaty power early in this century. For the states-rights perspective, see Tucker, supra; Ralston Hayden, The States' Rights Doctrine and the
Treaty-Making Power, 22 Am. Hist. Rev. 566 (1917); William E. Mikell, The Extent
of the Treaty-Making Power of the President and Senate of the United States (pt. 2),
57 U. Pa. L. Rev. 528 (1909). For nationalist perspectives, see Charles Henry Butler,
The Treaty-Making Power of the United States (1902); Edward S. Corwin, National
Supremacy: Treaty Power vs. State Power (1913); Chandler P. Anderson, The Extent
and Limitations of the Treaty-Making Power under the Constitution, 1 Am. J. Int'l L.
636, 636 (1907); Arthur K. Kuhn, The Treaty-Making Power and the Reserved Sovereignty of the States, 7 Colum. L. Rev. 172, 173 (1907).
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Holland,' which held in 1920 that there were no reserved power
limitations on the scope of the treaty power.3 2 A related question throughout the period was whether the federal government's

enumerated foreign relations powers contained gaps. The Supreme Court resolved this question, too, in favor of national
power. It did so in large part through broad implications from
specific enumerations.'33 In addition, after the Civil War, the
Court recognized that some federal foreign relations powers
flowed not from enumerated constitutional powers, but rather
from nationhood and sovereignty."
These decisions demonstrate that in the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, the Supreme Court consistently upheld the

political branches' exercises of federal foreign relations power
against federalism and related enumerated powers challenges.
But they do not by themselves speak to the allocation of state

and federal power in the absence of a foreign relations enactment by the federal political branches. Did grants of executory
federal foreign relations powers entail a check on state foreign
relations activity even in the absence of their exercise? Through252 U.S. 416 (1920).
Id. at 432-35. Holland held only that the "invisible radiation from ... the Tenth
Amendment" did not limit the treaty power. Id. at 434. It suggested, however, that
the treaty power might be limited by other constitutional provisions. Id. at 432-33.
The Bill of Rights appears to be one such limitation. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1,
5-6 (1957) (plurality opinion). Federalism-related limitations that might survive
Hollandinclude the republican government guarantee and the integrity of state territory. See Louis Henkin, Arms Control and Inspection in American Law 172 n.15,
177 n.30 (1958).
113For example, the Court at one time inferred the federal power to acquire territory from the enumerated powers to make treaties and to declare war. See American
Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 541 (1828). Similarly, the Court inferred an
executive power to make international agreements binding on the states from the
"receive Ambassadors" clause of Article II. See United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S.
324, 330-31 (1937); see also Henkin, supra note 1, at 220-21.
"4See, e.g., B. Altman & Co. v. United States, 224 U.S. 583, 600-01 (1912) (power
to make executive agreements); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 705-07
(1893) (power to expel aliens); Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202, 212 (1890)
(power to acquire territory by discovery and occupation); The Chinese Exclusion
Case, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889) (power to exclude aliens). Such inherent power arguments were also made in the 1790s in connection with the Alien Act, see David P.
Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The Federalist Period, 1789-1801, at 258-59
(1997), and the common law crimes controversy, see Andrew Lenner, A Tale of Two
Constitutions: Nationalism in the Federalist Era, 40 Am. J. Legal Hist. 72,73 (1996).
13
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out the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Supreme

Court recognized such dormant preemption in other contexts.
The famous example is the dormant Commerce Clause.3 5 Others include the power to tax federal instrumentalities,36 the power

to enact fugitive slave legislation,'37 and, arguably, the power to
naturalize.1 38 In addition, even before Erie v. Tompkins, federal

courts interpreted the admiralty and interstate dispute heads of
federal judicial power in Article III to authorize the development, within39 these jurisdictions, of a preemptive judge-made
federal law.'

13- The origins of the doctrine in the Supreme Court lie in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), but the first "unequivocal example" in the Supreme Court
is Case of the State Freight Tax, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 232 (1872). See David P. Currie,
The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The First Hundred Years, 1789-1888, at 183
n.180 (1985).
1 See M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,435-36 (1819).
,17See Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 622-25 (1842).
8 In Chirac v. Chirac, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 259 (1817), the Court stated: "That the
power of naturalization is exclusively in congress does not seem to be, and certainly
ought not to be, controverted." Id. at 269. As David Currie has pointed out, this
statement was dictum that might have been based on a reading of the pertinent federal statute, which provided that an alien could become a citizen "on the following
conditions, and not otherwise." Currie, supra note 135, at 149 & n.196 (quoting Act
of Jan. 29, 1795, ch. 20, § 1, 1 Stat. 414, 414) (emphasis added); id. at 173, 265. See
also Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 593 (1840) (Barbour, J.) (reading
Chirac dicta as a "remark then made in relation to a power which had been executed"). This view finds additional support in the fact that before enactment of the
1795 federal naturalization statute, "several courts upheld the right of states to naturalize under their own laws." James H. Ketner, The Development of American Citizenship, 1608-1870, at 250 n.1 (1978) (citing Collet v. Collet, 6 F. Cas. 105 (C.C.D. Pa.
1792) (Wilson and Blair, Circuit Justices; Peters, District Judge) and Portier v. LeRoy,
1 Yeates 371 (Pa. 1794)); see also United States v. Villato, 28 F. Cas. 377, 379 (C.C.D.
Pa. 1797) (No. 16,622) (Iredell, J.) (suggesting in dicta that "the power of naturalization operated exclusively, as soon as it was exercised by congress") (emphasis added).
Chief Justice Roger Taney's opinion in Dred Scott rejected this view in dicta that
stated that the federal naturalization power is self-executing and exclusive with regard to federal citizenship. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 405-06, 416-18,
422-23 (1857). For some opinions on this question from the framing period, compare
The Federalist No. 32, at 201 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)
(arguing that naturalization power is exclusive because of its uniformity requirement),
with id. No. 42, at 287 (James Madison) (arguing that the Constitution authorizes
Congress "to establish an uniform rule of naturalization throughout the United States"
in order to prevent one state from granting citizenship to an undesirable that other
states must respect under Article IV's Privileges and Immunities Clause).
- See Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1917) (admiralty); Kansas
v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 95-98 (1907) (interstate disputes).
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There is no general explanation for why courts developed dormant preemption and federal common law doctrines in these contexts and not others.'

The important point for present purposes

is that numerous theories were available had courts seen fit to
invoke them in the foreign relations context.' But prior to 1964,
they did not. Sabbatino and Zschernig were viewed at the time
of their announcement to mark a significant break with prior law.
Professor Henkin's classic contemporary analyses characterized1
both Sabbatino and Zschernig as "new" constitutional doctrine. 41
Similarly, Hans Linde viewed Zschernig's dormant foreign rela-

doctrine to be "without precedent-new contions preemption
14 3
stitutional law.'
The perceptions of Sabbatino and Zschernig as constitutional

novelties might seem surprising in light of the many nineteenthand twentieth-century statements about the exclusivity of the

federal foreign relations power. But federal exclusivity by virtue of a judicially enforced dormant preemption should not be
confounded with federal exclusivity by virtue of either (a) the
110
For example, a self-executing exclusion of state authority is not implicit in Congress's bankruptcy power, see Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122,
193-96 (1819); define and punish power, see United States v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 479,
487 (1887); or copyright and patent power, see Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416
U.S. 470,478-79 (1974).
"' One such theory was that dormant preemption was appropriate when "the terms
in which a power is granted to Congress, or the nature of the power, require that it
should be exercised exclusively by Congress." Sturges, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 193
(dictum) (emphasis added). See also The Federalist No. 32, at 200-01 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (same). Another theory was that states lacked
power that they did not possess prior to the Constitution. See, e.g., 1 Joseph Story,
Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States §§ 626-27, at 434-35 (Boston,
Little, Brown, 3d ed. 1858). Yet another theory was that dormant preemption was
appropriate when federal uniformity was needed. See The Federalist No. 32
(Alexander Hamilton).
142Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution 239 (1972); Henkin, supra
note 41, at 806. Professor Louis Henkin's apparent belief that both decisions were
unprecedented flows from his view that Sabbatino announced a legislative power in
courts while Zschernig announced a species of dormant constitutional preemption. As
explained supra notes 53-60 and accompanying text, however, the doctrines are functionally identical.
,43Hans A. Linde, A New Foreign-Relations Restraint on American States: Zschernig v. Miller, 28 Zeitschrift ftir Auslandisches Offentliches Recht und V61kerrecht
594, 603 (1968). Hans Linde viewed a preemptive federal judicial lawmaking power
as a mere "implication" in Sabbatino. Id.
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political branches' occupation of the field through treaty and
statute, or (b) independent constitutional prohibitions. The latter two grounds served as a basis for federal exclusivity in the
period before 1964. But they did not amount to a federal common law of foreign relations.
Consider extradition, the context in which courts came closest
to recognizing something akin to dormant foreign affairs preemption. During the first half of the nineteenth century, "extradition
was practised by some of the States, which made and granted
demands for the surrender of fugitive criminals in international

cases."1'" A lack of federal question jurisdiction famously prevented the Supreme Court from deciding the constitutional merits
of this practice in its 1840 decision, Holmes v. Jennison 5 Chief
Justice Roger Taney, in his opinion for four Justices to uphold
jurisdiction, reasoned that Vermont's attempted extradition of
the plaintiff in error to Canada was a foreign compact prohibited by Article I, Section 10."46 He also argued in the alternative
that the extradition power was exclusively federal, although he
did not make clear whether this was because of dormant preemption or because the absence of federal extradition treaties constituted the affirmative "policy of the general government."'' 7 In
contrast, the four other participating Justices all rejected the
14 1 John Bassett Moore, A Treatise on Extradition and Interstate Rendition 54
(1891); see generally id. at 53-71 (collecting state extradition statutes and extradition
cases). As Moore's treatise makes clear, the validity of this practice was questioned
by some even during this early period. Id. at 70 n.5.
1,39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540 (1840). The Court split 4-4 on whether it had jurisdiction to
review the case under Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, so there was no opinion on the merits or judgment for the Court. See id. at 561. There were only eight
participating Justices because Justice John McKinley was absent during the term. See
id. at vii.
146Id.

at 570-74.

4 7

1 Id. at 574. Taney's opinion is laced with suggestions that federal power in "foreign
intercourse" is exclusive and that a concurrent state power to extradite was "incompatible and inconsistent with the powers conferred on the federal government." Id.
at 570. However, the opinion always ties the exclusivity point to a federal policy, inferred from the absence of federal extradition treaties, to prohibit all extraditions to
foreign countries. Id. at 574, 576. Similarly, when the opinion suggests by analogy
that the power of appointing ambassadors is exclusively federal despite the absence
of an express prohibition on states in Article I, § 10, it once again assumes that the
"general [federal] government deemed it to be the true policy of the country to have
no communication or connection with foreign nations." Id. at 577 (emphasis added).
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dormant preemption argument.4 ' The practice of state extradition waned in the decades after Holmes as the federal government began to regulate extradition by treaty and statute, and as
Taney's Holmes opinion rose to orthodoxy.'49 By the turn of the
century, it seemed clear that the extradition power was exclusive
even in the absence of federal enactments, although it was never
established whether this was so because of the Foreign Com-

"IJustices Smith Thompson and Philip Barbour rejected both the dormant preemption and Foreign Compacts Clause arguments. Id. at 579-86 (Thompson, J.); id. at 58694 (Barbour, J.). Justice John Catron rejected the dormant preemption argument but
stated that if additional facts had revealed an agreement between Vermont and Canada, he would have voted to strike down the extradition as a violation of Article I, §
10's prohibition on foreign compacts by states. Id. at 594-98 (Catron, J.). Justice
Henry Baldwin joined "fully and cordially" in the opinions of Justices Thompson,
Barbour, and Catron. Id. at 614 (Baldwin, J.). On remand from the Supreme Court's
4-4 decision, the Vermont Supreme Court concluded on the basis of further evidence
that the extradition did constitute "an agreement between the governor of this state,
in behalf of the state, and the governor of Canada." Ex Parte Holmes, 12 Vt. 631,
640 (1840). The court reasoned that this additional evidence of an agreement, combined with the opinion of Justice Taney (which got four votes) and Justice Catron's
crucial fifth vote on the Article I, § 10 rationale, required Holmes's release. Id. at
64142.
NI Moore's classic treatise, Moore, supra note 144, reports very little post-Holmes
state extradition activity. In 1841, Governor William Henry Seward of New York
asked British authorities in Canada to surrender a fugitive named Mitchell, and at the
same time wrote privately to President John Tyler and Secretary of State Daniel
Webster seeking assistance. See id. at 67-68. The President responded that he lacked
authority to request the extradition or "to sanction such a proceeding on the part of
the State." Id. at 68. The British authorities subsequently surrendered Mitchell to
New York after receiving a request from Webster for "friendly aid" and a letter from
Seward seeking the surrender as an act of courtesy. Id. Later the same year, the
same British authorities asked Seward to surrender a fugitive named De Witt. It is
unclear whether De Witt was ever surrendered, but Seward did seek advice from the
federal executive branch, and received a letter from Webster stating that "[t]he government of the United States ... would see with entire approbation the exercise of
the power understood to be vested in your Excellency, by the laws of New York, in
causing De Witt to be delivered up to the proper Canadian authorities." Id. at 69
(quoting letter from Secretary of State Webster to Governor Seward) (Sept. 16,
1841). See also id. (noting subsequent opinion to Webster from Attorney General
Hugh Legare "adverse to the power of a State to grant extradition"). Although
Moore reported no subsequent state extraditions, he did note that after Holmes,
three states enacted statutes providing for independent state extradition authority,
one as late as 1887. See id. at 73-74. He also noted his belief that these statutes were
"obnoxious to the constitutional objections raised against the law of New York"
struck down in People v. Curtis, 50 N.Y. 321 (1872). See Moore, supra note 144, at
74. For a discussion of Curtis, see infra note 150.
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pacts Clause or because of dormant preemption.' 5° But by this
time the issue of self-executing exclusivity had become largely
moot in light of the federal government's comprehensive regulation of the issue by statute and treaty.15'
Similarly, immigration was largely under the control of the
states for the first hundred years of the nation.'52 This practice
abated in the last half of the nineteenth century after the Supreme Court struck down certain state laws regulating the migration of aliens on dormant commerce grounds, and the federal
political branches began to enact immigration statutes and enter
into treaties that regulated the issue. 53 One of the dormant Com-

1'0Thus, for example, in United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886), a case involving the interpretation of a federal extradition treaty, the Court in dicta approved
of Taney's Ppinion in Holmes that the extradition power was exclusively federal
without making clear whether this was because of Article I, § 10 or dormant preemption. Id. at 414. Similarly, when the New York Court of Appeals held that an extradition pursuant to New York's 1822 extradition statute was unconstitutional, it too
embraced Taney's Holmes opinion, and it too left unclear whether its holding rested
on Article I, § 10 or an independent dormant preemption. Curtis, 50 N.Y. at 325-26.
Samuel Spear's 1885 treatise also argued for federal exclusivity on the alternative
grounds of Article I, § 10 and dormant preemption, although he included only the
Article I, § 10 argument under the heading of "The Constitutional Prohibition."
Samuel T. Spear, The Law of Extradition: International and Inter-State 15-20 (1885).
Summarizing all of these developments in 1891, Moore viewed it as "settled doctrine"
that the extradition power was exclusive, but emphasized that the issue "has by no
means been free from controversy, and has never been actually decided by the Supreme Court of the United States." Moore, supra note 144, at 53.
See Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 414-15:
[The question of exclusivity of the extradition power] in the absence of treaties
or acts of Congress on the subject, is now of very little importance, since, with
nearly all the nations of the world with whom our relations are such that fugitives from justice may be found within their dominions or within ours, we have
treaties which govern the rights and conduct of the parties in such cases. These
treaties are also supplemented by acts of Congress, and both are in their nature
exclusive.
Cf. Valentine v. United States, 299 U.S. 5, 8 (1936) (stating, in case interpreting federal extradition treaty, that "[i]t cannot be doubted that the power to provide for extradition is a national power; it pertains to the national government and not to the
States").
1 See Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law (17761875), 93 Colum. L. Rev. 1833 (1993). The first federal immigration statute is generally considered to be the Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477. See Neuman, supra,
at 1887 n.347.
151See Neuman, supra note 152, at 1886-87.
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merce Clause decisions, Chy Lung v. Freeman," exemplified the
logic behind what would later become foreign affairs preemption."'
But Chy Lung did not, as some have claimed in retrospect, "establish[] a presumption of state incapacity with respect to all matters implicating foreign relations. 1 5 6 Numerous post-Chy Lung
state anti-alien statutes provoked stormy diplomatic controversies that sometimes threatened war but that never raised a question about foreign affairs preemption."
The many pre-1964
statements about the exclusivity of the federal immigration
power came in cases involving the interpretation of a federal
statute or treaty and did not purport to reflect a notion of dormant foreign affairs preemption. ' In one such case as late as

92 U.S. 275 (1875).
"'In the course of invalidating on dormant Commerce Clause grounds a California
statute that gave a California bureaucrat discretion to require the posting of shipmaster bonds for incoming immigrants, the Court reasoned that the Constitution did not
leave the states the power to enact laws that would implicate the international liability of the entire nation. Id. at 279-80.
"1Spiro, supra note 62, at 138 n.66.
" Perhaps the best example are California's anti-Japanese laws, which produced
enormous diplomatic controversy, see infra notes 160-162 and accompanying text,
but which were upheld without any consideration of a dormant preemption theory.
See Frick v. Webb, 263 U.S. 326 (1923); Webb v. O'Brien, 263 U.S. 313 (1923);
Porterfield v. Webb, 263 U.S. 225 (1923); see also Ohio ex rel. Clarke v. Deckebach,
274 U.S. 392 (1927) (upholding ordinance prohibiting aliens from obtaining licenses
to conduct pool and billiard rooms); Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175 (1915) (upholding
a New York labor law that prohibited aliens from being employed on public works
projects). Professor Spiro wonders why the Supreme Court did not strike down some
of these post-Chy Lung anti-alien laws, since they provoked diplomatic controversy
and appeared to present a "classic opportunity to deploy the foreign relations rationale for constraining state activity in the area." Spiro, supra note 62, at 141. The absence of a post-Chy Lung dormant foreign relations preemption doctrine sparks
wonder only if one incorrectly assumes that Chy Lung established such a doctrine.
The absence of any mention or use of any such doctrine in these subsequent decisions
confirms what the rest of the historical evidence suggests, namely, that Chy Lung established no such doctrine. This reading is confirmed by Takahashi v. Fish & Game
Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948), which dramatically limited the decisions cited above,
but did so on Fourteenth Amendment equal protection grounds, not dormant foreign
relations preemption grounds. Id. at 419-20, 422 & nn.8-9; see also Clark v. Allen,
331 U.S. 503, 516-17 (1947) (rejecting a foreign relations attack on a state anti-alien
inheritance statute as "farfetched"); Blythe v. Hinckley, 180 U.S. 333, 340 (1901)
(rejecting as "extraordinary" the argument that a California statute permitting aliens
to inherit real property invaded the unexercised treaty power).

HeinOnline -- 83 Va. L. Rev. 1653 1997

1654

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 83:1617

1941, the Court emphasized that it remained an open question
whether "federal power in [immigration], whether exercised or
unexercised, is exclusive."'59
imSee, e.g., Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 649 (1948) (Black, J., concurring);
Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 217 (1923); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 42-43
(1915).
159
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62 (1941) (finding state alien registration law
to be preempted by federal statute). See also Henkin, supra note 1, at 434 n.57
(making similar point about Hines).
The claims in the text might surprise those who are used to thinking that immigration has long been a constitutionally guaranteed exclusive federal prerogative. Professor Gerald Neuman's article exploded this myth as it pertained to the 19th century,
see Neuman, supra note 152, and there is surprisingly little case law to support this
belief in the 20th century. Modern constitutional control over the states in the immigration field is largely secured by the Equal Protection Clause, not dormant preemption. See, e.g., Takahashi,334 U.S. at 419-20. Even post-1964 decisions that refer to
the exclusivity of the federal immigration power tend to have comprehensive federal
regulation, rather than self-executing constitutional exclusivity, in mind. See, e.g.,
Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 638 (1973) (referring to exclusive federal power
by virtue of Congress's "comprehensive regulation of immigration and naturalization"); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376-80 (1971) (considering only statutory preemption). The earliest decision I have found that squarely considers an argument based on constitutional federal exclusivity in immigration is De Canas v.
Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
The De Canas Court clearly believed that the
"determination of who should or should not be admitted into the country, and the
conditions under which a legal entrant may remain," id. at 355, was a power that the
Constitution gave exclusively to the federal government. Id. at 354-56 (rejecting
claim on facts). But the Court's reliance for this proposition on the 19th-century
dormant Commerce Clause decisions (including Chy Lung), id. at 354-55, was, as
Professor Neuman has suggested, an "anachronistic" projection of "this modern constitutional understanding onto the earlier period." Neuman, supra note 152, at 1893.
And indeed, as in the extradition context, this modern constitutional understanding is
largely moot in light of Congress's occupation of the field with a "complex scheme
governing admission to our Nation and status within our borders." Plyler v. Doe, 457
U.S. 202,225 (1982).
Thus, although some modern courts have held in the alternative to a statutory preemption argument that a state regulation was preempted by force of the constitutionally based exclusive federal immigration power, see League of United Latin American Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 786 (C.D. Cal. 1995), appeal pending, No.
97-55388 (9th Cir.) (argued Oct. 8, 1997), I have found no court that rests its decision
to preempt solely on a constitutionally based federal exclusivity in immigration.
Some worry that the recent focus on the states' historical role in immigration portends "continuing or revived state involvement" in immigration. Hiroshi Motomura,
Whose Immigration Law?: Citizens, Aliens, and the Constitution, 97 Colum. L. Rev.
1567, 1590 (1997) (book review). If the concern is that substantive federalism limitations on Congress's power to control immigration might develop, the concern seems
unwarranted. But if the concern is that Congress might choose to return some aspects of immigration regulation to the states, there appears to be nothing in our constitutional history or in current constitutional doctrine to prevent this development.
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The absence of a federal common law of foreign relations
prior to 1964 is significant because throughout the period, states
often acted in ways not prohibited by a federal enactment that
either looked like the exercise of a foreign relations power or that
stirred foreign relations controversy. As just discussed, immigration and (to a lesser extent) extradition were under state control for much of the nineteenth century. In addition, California's

numerous anti-alien acts and ordinances in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries provoked heated, and extended,
diplomatic controversy;"6 Theodore Roosevelt described California's anti-Japanese activities as the biggest foreign relations
problem of his Presidency. 6' Many of these anti-alien acts were
challenged on a number of constitutional and treaty grounds (all
of which were rejected), but no one suggested that they should
be preempted under a dormant foreign relations theory.62 Similarly, the antebellum Negro Seamen Acts caused "a persistent
diplomatic embarrassment" that the federal government, including federal courts, "proved powerless to solve."'63 A dormant
See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 224-26 (suggesting that Congress can by statute authorize
states to regulate certain aspects of immigration).
110For general accounts, see Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 650-663 (1948)
(Murphy, J., concurring); Thomas A. Bailey, Theodore Roosevelt and the JapaneseAmerican Crises: An Account of the International Complications Arising from the
Race Problem on the Pacific Coast (1934); Elmer Clarence Sandmeyer, The AntiChinese Movement in California (1939); Dennis James Palumbo, The States and
American Foreign Relations 147-192 (1960) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, on file with the Virginia Law Review Association).
'- See Bailey, supra note 160, at x, 307.
-The Supreme Court upheld the anti-alien land acts that caused a great deal of
controversy without considering anything like a dormant foreign relations preemption doctrine. See Frick v. Webb, 263 U.S. 326 (1923); Webb v. O'Brien, 263 U.S. 313
(1923); Porterfield v. Webb, 263 U.S. 225 (1923); Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197
(1923) (Washington state statute). The many articles discussing legal objections to
these and related state laws never discussed the possibility of dormant foreign relations preemption. See Raymond Leslie Buell, Some Legal Aspects of the Japanese
Question, 17 Am. J. Int'l L. 29 (1923); Charles Wallace Collins, Will the California
Alien Land Law Stand the Test of the Fourteenth Amendment?, 23 Yale L.J. 330
(1914); Nelson Gammans, The Responsibility of the Federal Government for Violations of the Rights of Aliens, 8 Am. J. Int'l L. 73 (1914); Dudley 0. McGovney, The
Anti-Japanese Land Laws of California and Ten Other States, 35 Cal. L. Rev. 7
(1947); Thomas Reed Powell, Alien Land Cases in the United States Supreme Court,
12 Cal. L. Rev. 259 (1924); Elihu Root, The Real Questions under the Japanese
Treaty and the San Francisco School Board Resolution, 1 Am. J. Int'l L. 273 (1907).
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foreign relations doctrine would most likely have been ineffective in light of contemporary slavery politics; nonetheless, no
such doctrine was contemplated as a solution.
In addition, in the years following the Russian Revolution,
numerous New York state courts invoked state law and state
public policy to deny local effect to nationalizations by the unrecognized Soviet Union.'" These decisions were one sticking
point in subsequent negotiations leading to the United States'
recognition of the Soviet Union in 1933.65 Nevertheless, such
decisions were viewed to be valid applications of state law until
they were later preempted by President Roosevelt's executive
agreement with the Soviet Union." Similarly, during the late
16Neuman, supra note 152, at 1877. The Negro Seamen Acts, which required temporary imprisonment or quarantine of black employees on incoming vessels, were
adopted by several Southern states between 1822 and 1860. See Philip M. Hamer,
British Consuls and the Negro Seamen Acts, 1850-1860, 1 J.S. Hist. 138 (1935)
[hereinafter Hamer, British Consuls]; Philip M. Hamer, Great Britain, the United
States, and the Negro Seamen Acts, 1822-1848, 1 J.S. Hist. 3 (1935) [hereinafter
Hamer, Great Britain]. South Carolina enacted the first and most prominent such act
in 1822. See Hamer, Great Britain, supra, at 3. Riding circuit in 1823, Justice William Johnson declared the South Carolina Act invalid under both the 1815 commercial treaty with Great Britain and the dormant Commerce Clause (the first use of the
dormant Commerce Clause). Elkison v. Deliesseline, 8 F. Cas. 493, 495 (C.C.D.S.C.
1823) (No. 4366); see also 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 659 (1824) (opinion of President James
Monroe's Attorney General, William Wirt, drawing on similar logic). Ultimately,
Johnson determined that the Court lacked jurisdiction to issue a remedy in Elkison,
see 8 F. Cas. at 498, and in any event, South Carolina subsequently ignored the decision. When Britain later complained to the United States about South Carolina's
continued enforcement of the Act, President Andrew Jackson's Attorney General
John Berrien concluded that the Act was an exercise of police power that did not
conflict with the Constitution or any treaty. See 2 Op. Att'y Gen. 426 (1831). The
United States subsequently responded to continued foreign sovereign complaints
about the Negro Seamen Acts with the assertion that it lacked the authority to invalidate them. See Hamer, Great Britain, supra, at 16-28. The British government
over the next 30 years negotiated with several states over the matter, with mixed success. See Hamer, British Consuls, supra; Hamer, Great Britain, supra.
WSee, e.g., Petrogradsky Mejdunarodny Kommerchesky Bank v. Nat'l City Bank
of N.Y., 170 N.E. 479 (N.Y. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 878 (1930); Fred S. James &
Co. v. Rossia Ins. Co., 160 N.E. 364 (N.Y. 1928); Sokoloff v. Nat'l City Bank of N.Y.,
145 N.E. 917 (N.Y. 1924); see generally Louis L. Jaffe, Judicial Aspects of Foreign
Relations (1933) (analyzing these and related decisions).
161See Donald G. Bishop, The Roosevelt-Litvinov Agreements: The American
View 179-85 (1965).
6 See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 228-34 (1942); United States v. Belmont,
301 U.S. 324, 331-32 (1937); Note, Effect of Soviet Recognition upon Russian Confiscatory Decrees, 51 Yale L.J. 848 (1942).
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nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, states' failures to protect aliens or to prosecute perpetrators of mob violence created
diplomatic embarrassments for the federal government that led

many Presidents to call for enactment of federal criminal law to
address the problem.67 No one in these debates suggested, however, that federal courts develop such a law under a federal
common law of foreign relations rationale. 68 Moreover, I have
found no evidence that anyone thought that a federal common
law of foreign relations preempted nineteenth-century state foreign policy declarations, 69 New York's 1895 retaliatory action
against Prussia for restrictions on New York insurance compa-

nies,1 70 or the state buy-American laws of the 1930s.17' There are
many similar examples. 72
A parallel phenomenon existed with respect to customary international law. Throughout the nineteenth century and for
much of the twentieth, customary international law had the domestic status of general common law.17 1 State and federal courts
alike applied customary international law, but this law was not
part of the "Laws of the United States" within the meaning of
Article III or the Supremacy Clause. 7 As a result, states could

167See William H. Taft, The United States and Peace 46-61 (1914). See also 6 John
Bassett Moore, A Digest of International Law §§'1022-31, at 809-83 (1906). For discussions of the problems caused by mob violence in the states, and proposed solutions, see, e.g., 1 Charles Cheney Hyde, International Law: Chiefly as Interpreted
and Applied by the United States §§ 290-91, at 516-21 (1922); Charles H. Watson,
Need of Federal Legislation in Respect to Mob Violence in Cases of Lynching of
Aliens, 25 Yale L.J. 561 (1916).
6 Late 18th-century intimations that such a power existed, see, e.g., United States
v. Worrall, 28 F. Cas. 774, 778 (C.C.D. Pa. 1798) (No. 16,766), did not survive several
early 19th-century Supreme Court decisions. See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.)
591, 657-58 (1834); United States v. Coolidge, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 415, 416-17 (1816);
United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 33-34 (1812). See generally Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law: Part One, 133 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1003
(1985) (describing federal common law criines debate).
169See, e.g., Wright, supra note 128, at 264-65 & n.5 (1922); Palumbo, supra note
160, at 38-48.
170 See, e.g., Palumbo, supra note 160, at 48-50.
I See, e.g., Percy W. Bidwell, The Invisible Tariff 255-62 (1939).
7 See, e.g., Moore, supra note 80, at 313; Palumbo, supra note 160, at 50-88,225-28.
See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 101, at 824-26, 849-52.
See id. at 824-25.
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violate customary international law, 75 and the Supreme Court
could not review state court interpretations of customary international law. 76 The Court once held that customary international law was not federal law over a lone dissent that argued
the contrary under logic akin to the federal common law of foreign relations."
Furthermore, many private international law rules-transnational choice of law, transnational commercial law, and the law
governing enforcement of foreign judgments-had the domestic

status of general common law. Federal courts sitting in diversity
could apply these laws to resolve "foreign relations" disputes

within their jurisdiction, usually without regard to the pertinent
state law. But again, these laws were not federal law, and federal
court interpretations of them were not binding on the states. 8

"-'See Wright, supra note 128, at 161 (stating in 1922 that a "state constitution or
legislative provision in violation of customary international law [is] valid unless in
conflict with a Federal constitutional provision or an act of Congress"); Charles Pergler, Judicial Interpretation of International Law in the United States 19-20 (1928)
(same); see generally Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 101, at 824-26, 849-52
(providing additional evidence).
176See, e.g., Transportes Maritimos do Estado v. Almeida, 265 U.S. 104, 105 (1924)
(holding that claim of foreign sovereign immunity is question of general law that does
not present a federal question); Oliver Am. Trading Co. v. Mexico, 264 U.S. 440, 442-43
(1924) (same); Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 444 (1886) (holding that question of whether
forcible seizure in foreign country is grounds to resist trial in state court is "a question
of common law, or the law of nations," that Supreme Court has "no right to review").
7 New York Life Ins. Co. v. Hendren, 92 U.S. 286 (1875). The Court held that it
lacked jurisdiction to review "general laws of war, as recognized by the law of nations
applicable to this case" because they do not involve "the constitution, laws, treaties,
or executive proclamations, of the United States." Id. at 286-87. In dissent, Justice
Joseph Bradley argued that "unwritten international law" was part of the "laws of the
United States" because the law of nations was an exclusive federal concern. Id. at
288 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
178
Thus, for example, state courts sometimes departed from the views of federal
courts over the content of the law merchant. See Fletcher, supra note 25, at 1521,
1558-62. Similarly, several state courts declined to follow the rule of reciprocity for
the enforcement of foreign judgments announced in Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113,
227 (1895), see, e.g., Johnston v. Compagnie G6n6rale Transatlantique, 152 N.E. 121,
123 (N.Y. 1926), and the Supreme Court held that the issue did not present a federal
question, Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Tremblay, 223 U.S. 185, 190 (1912).
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B. Significance
The absence of a judge-made foreign relations law prior to
1964 shows that the pre-1964 Supreme Court statements about
federal exclusivity in foreign relations do not support the modern practice. As in the extradition and immigration contexts,
these broader statements about federal exclusivity in foreign affairs were made in cases rejecting federalism or enumerated
power challenges to political branch exercises of foreign relations
power.' It is unclear whether the statements merely recognized
the fact that the political branches had occupied the field in
question, or were designed to support the political branches'
plenary power to enact the laws in question. But as the jurisprudence preceding Sabbatino and Zschernig and the reactions
to those decisions indicate, the existence of a plenary federal foreign relations lawmaking power in the federal political branches
in the pre-1964 period was not viewed to entail a self-executing
or exclusive power in the absence of its exercise. The exclusivity
statements by themselves thus provide no support for the modern practice. Their invocation is anachronistic.
A similar analysis applies to the bete noire of U.S. foreign relations law, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp." In
the course of upholding a congressional delegation to the President of the power to ban certain arms sales, Curtiss-Wright asserted that "the states severally never possessed international
powers, 18. and that the "investment of the federal government
with the powers of external sovereignty did not depend upon
the affirmative grants of the Constitution,"'" but rather passed
1, This is true, for example, of all the famous decisions cited supra note 118. See
United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942) (holding that an executive agreement preempted state property laws); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937) (same);
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 73-74 (1941) (holding that a state immigration statute was preempted by a similar federal statute); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 322 (1936) (upholding Congress's statutory delegation to the
President); The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889) (upholding the validity of the federal political branches' power to exclude aliens by statute).
1-299 U.S. 304 (1936). Professor Bradford Clark has recently relied on CurtissWright as a justification for the federal common law of foreign relations. See Clark,
supra note 62, at 1296-97.
1' 299 U.S. at 316.
" Id. at 318.
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from Great Britain to the United States as a corporate entity by
virtue of the law of nations.183 These statements have been severely criticized on a number of grounds.' In any event, they
provide no support for the federal common law of foreign relations. Curtiss-Wrightsays nothing about the scope of the "international powers" the states never possessed; to the extent the
statement is true, it is likely limited to traditional foreign relations
powers expressly denied to the states in both the Articles of
Confederation and the Constitution. 5 Moreover, assuming that
the United States' "powers of external sovereignty" are extraconstitutional, neither international law nor the nature of sovereignty says anything about the allocation of sovereign power
within a federal system, much less anything about the existence
or scope of a self-executing federal power.'86 Most importantly
for present purposes, Curtiss-Wright addressed the validity of
the political branches' exercise of a foreign relations power, and
did not consider a self-executing realm of exclusive federal for-

",Id. at 316.
ImProfessor Henkin sums up the criticism well: The notion that "the new United
States government was to have major powers outside the Constitution is not intimated in the Constitution itself, in the records of the Convention, in the Federalist
Papers, or in contemporary debates." Henkin, supra note 1, at 19-20; see also Harold
Hongju Koh, The National Security Constitution 94 (1990) (summarizing the "withering
criticism" of Curtiss-Wright). Curtiss-Wright's more particular historical-conceptual
claims about the sources and locus of foreign relations power after the American
Revolution are part of a larger debate about the meaning and nature of sovereignty
in the revolutionary and constitution-building periods. For the view that the states
retained powers of "external sovereignty" in the post-revolutionary period, and that
the United States acquired these powers via the Articles and the Constitution rather
than directly from Great Britain, see David M. Levitan, The Foreign Relations
Power: An Analysis of Mr. Justice Sutherland's Theory, 55 Yale L.J. 467, 478-90
(1946); Claude H. Van Tyne, Sovereignty in the American Revolution: An Historical
Study, 12 Am. Hist. Rev. 529 (1907). For the view that the states never possessed
foreign relations powers, see Richard B. Morris, The Forging of the Union Reconsidered: A Historical Refutation of State Sovereignty over Seabeds, 74 Colum. L. Rev.
1056, 1088-89 (1974); Curtis Putnam Nettels, The Origins of the Union and of the
States, 72 Proceedings Mass. Hist. Soc'y 68 (1957-1960). For an account that emphasizes the nuances and uncertainties of the issue, see Jack P. Greene, Peripheries and
Center: Constitutional Development in the Extended Politics of the British Empire
and the United States, 1607-1788, at 153-80 (1986).
is'See supra note 121.
11 See Henkin, supra note 1, at 436 n.64 ("[I]nternational sovereignty implies nothing
about the distribution of responsibility between nation and state in a federal system.").
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eign affairs power. For 150 years prior to Curtiss-Wright, and
for almost thirty years after, courts recognized no such power.
Finally, the historical account casts serious doubt on originalist claims in support of the federal common law of foreign relations. "' The relevance of an original intent argument to a doctrine that did not exist prior to 1964 is unclear. I have not
comprehensively examined the founding period on this issue.
But the framers' frequently cited statements about the importance of federal control over foreign relations were made in the
context of explaining the executory powers of the federal political branches, the jurisdiction (as opposed to lawmaking capacities
of) the federal courts, or the narrowly defined limitations imposed by Article I, Section 10." In this light, the original intent
concerning the structure of federal control over states in foreign
affairs appears to be what the constitutional text suggests and
what 175 years of subsequent practice confirmed: Such control
was guaranteed by (a) Article I, Section 10's limitations on state
activity, (b) the broad foreign relations powers conferred on the
political branches, and (c) the availability of a federal judiciary
to interpret the Constitution, treaties, statutes, and general common law.
I have engaged in this lengthy historical exegesis to establish
that, contrary to conventional wisdom, the federal common law
of foreign relations announced by Sabbatino and Zschernig
marked a sharp departure from prior law. For originalists of a
certain sort, this analysis will suffice to undermine the legitimacy
of the modem practice.'89 For many others, however, including
some who consider themselves originalists,' the historical ac'87See

supra notes 116-118 and accompanying text.

s Consider the famous examples cited in footnote 117. Madison in Federalist 42
was discussing Congress's executory foreign relations powers under Article I. Hamilton in Federalist 80 was discussing alienage jurisdiction. And Jefferson in his letter to
Madison was discussing the Virginia assembly's resolution to give the federal gov-

ernment control over foreign commerce.
1891 refer here to the Bork-Scalia version of originalism, which relies heavily on

original understanding, and which imposes a strong presumption against judgeinitiated deviations from historical constitutional practice. See Robert H. Bork, The

Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law 143-160, 251-59 (1990);
Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 849 (1989).
1 See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995
Sup. Ct. Rev. 125, 127 (describing "interpretive fidelity," the technique of translating
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count will not by itself suffice. This is because many of the international relations and constitutional law assumptions underlying
the historical absence of judge-made federal foreign relations law
had changed dramatically by the 1960s when the practice began.
The obvious truth of this latter point makes it unnecessary to
trace these changes in detail. So I mention only four highlights.
First, many of the state acts that gave rise to foreign relations
controversies fell within the reserved power of the states. Far
from impinging upon an exclusive federal power, these acts were
thought to fall within state prerogatives to regulate local land
transactions, or to protect the health, safety, and morals of their
citizens.19 Before Holland in 1920, many courts, federal officials, and academic commentators suggested that these reserved
powers limited even the federal political branches' exercises of
the treaty power.9 2 In these contexts, a theory of dormant foreign relations preemption was unthinkable. By the 1960s, of
course, dual federalism had been rejected, especially in contexts
related to foreign relations. 93
Second, we have seen that in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the adverse foreign relations effects caused by
states were viewed as doctrinally irrelevant to the allocation of
state and federal power in foreign affairs. This was consistent
with then-prevailing categorical/formalistic approaches to constitutional interpretation, which focused more on the nature of
the power exercised than on its effects.'94 By the 1960s, however,
this categorical/formalistic approach had been largely replaced
by a more instrumental approach to constitutional adjudication
that focused on the effects of state action on federal power and
by a balancing of state and federal interests."' As a result, for"that original [constitutional] structure into the context of today," as a version of
originalism).
M9'
Professor Neuman emphasizes the related point that the federal government's
reluctance in the 19th century to enact federal laws regulating the migration of persons was inextricably tied to antebellum disputes over slavery. See Neuman, supra
note 152, at 1889, 1893.
19See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
193
See Edward S. Corwin, The Constitution and World Organization 9-20 (1944);
Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 Va. L. Rev. 1 (1950).

19See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96
Yale L.J. 943, 949-52 (1987).
195See id. at 966-67.
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eign relations effects might today be more relevant to the assessment of the legitimacy of state action than in the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries.
Third, prior to Erie, federal courts were able to resolve many
public and private international law controversies by recourse to
general common law.'96 Because federal courts were not bound
by state court interpretations of general common law, they could
achieve at least a modicum of federal judicial control in these
areas in virtue of federal jurisdiction alone.197 Erie's abrogation
of general common law in federal courts, and its insistence that
every rule of decision in federal court be authorized by state or
federal law,'98 eliminated this means of federal judicial control.
Novel forms of federal common lawmaking might be necessary
to achieve similar control in a post-Erie, post-general common
law world.
Finally, the nature of international relations, and of the United
States' role in such relations, had changed dramatically by the
1960s, when federal judicial lawmaking in foreign relations began.
The United States had become one of two world superpowers in
an increasingly dangerous world characterized by the cold war
and the possibility of nuclear destruction. Among many constitutional alterations wrought by these changes were an unprecedented increase in federal power at the expense of the states in
foreign relations and a related centralization of foreign relations
power in the President.' 9 The underlying structural pressures
that led to these constitutional changes might also entail a need
for novel foreign relations lawmaking powers in the federal judiciary. It is probably no accident that the Supreme Court applied a judge-made federal foreign relations law for the first time

See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 101, at 826.
198304 U.S. at 78 ("Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by
Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State."); see also
Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law (pt. 2), 133 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1231, 1312
(1985). ("[After Erie, a] common-law rule ... must be associated with the sovereign
that has authority to promulgate it: either the state or the federal government.").
'" See Koh, supra note 184, at 93-100; G. Edward White, The Transformation of the
Constitutional Regime of Foreign Relations (unpublished manuscript, on file with

the Virginia Law Review Association).
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less than two years after the Cuban Missile Crisis in a case involving a Cuban expropriation of American property.2'
In sum, our constitutional history does not, as many think,
provide support for the modern federal common law of foreign
relations. Sabbatino and Zschernig were genuine constitutional
innovations. For 175 years, federal judicial lawmaking in foreign
affairs did not supplement the political branches' comprehensive
power to preempt state law through foreign relations enactments. The historical evidence undercuts the federal common
law of foreign relations' most frequently invoked basis of support.
But many reasons for the absence of the practice before 1964
had changed by that date, often dramatically. These changed
circumstances might support a functional justification for the
federal common law of foreign relations. It is to an analysis and
critique of this functional justification that I now turn."'
III. A REvISIONIST VIEW
The federal common law of foreign relations leaves the final
word about the existence and scope of federal preemption in the
foreign relations field to the federal political branches. When
analyzing the legitimacy of the doctrine, then, the issue is not
whether the federal government has adequate authority vis-h-vis
the states to conduct foreign relations. Rather, the issue is
whether the political branches share this comprehensive federal
foreign relations lawmaking power with the federal judiciary.
The issue can be understood as a search for the proper default
rule in the absence of an exercise of foreign relations power by
the federal political branches: Should the default rule be federal
common law or state law?
11o
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398.
20,1 hope to circumvent the debate about the relative significance to modern constitutional interpretation of text, original understanding, historical practice, and other
factors. See generally Symposium, Fidelity in Constitutional Theory, 65 Fordham L.
Rev. 1247 (1997). I have just shown that there is no textual or historical basis for the
modern practice. In the next Part, I argue that the modern functional claims for the
doctrine that take into account the changed circumstances outlined above are equally
invalid. My ultimate aim is to show that whatever one's theory of constitutional interpretation, there is no justification for the federal common law of foreign relations.
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After describing the functional case for a default rule that favors federal common law, I argue in this Part for the opposite
default rule that favors state law control. The argument proceeds in three steps. I first note that the foreign relations issues
preempted by the federal common law of foreign relations are
much different from the traditional foreign relations functions
that Article I, Section 10 makes presumptively federal, and I raise
a number of questions about the normative claim that the federal common law of foreign relations should apply in these new
domains. I then argue that the need for such federal judicial
lawmaking is greatly exaggerated. The Constitution's presumptive federal foreign relations lawmakers, Congress and the President, have adequate means to monitor and, when necessary, to
override state practices affecting foreign relations. Finally, I argue that because courts are not good at making the judgments
required by the federal common law of foreign relations, the
doctrine produces a number of overlooked judicial error and
decision costs that, in contrast to state activity that intrudes on
federal foreign relations prerogatives, the political branches are
not likely to redress.
This Part has two aims. The first is to replace wooden notions
of foreign affairs exclusivity with a framework that more accurately captures the realities of modern international relations and
the institutional dynamics of judicial lawmaking in the foreign
affairs context. The second is to show, within this new framework, that the federal common law of foreign relations lacks justification. This second aim poses more difficulties, because it depends on empirical and institutional claims that are plausible but
hard to demonstrate with certainty. My hope is that some will
find value in my framework for understanding the problem even
if they are not convinced by my solution within this framework.
A. The FunctionalCasefor the FederalCommon Law of
Foreign Relations
Although the federal common law of foreign relations lacks a
clear basis in constitutional text or a long historical pedigree, it
might find support in functional arguments analogous to those
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invoked to justify the dormant Commerce Clause. Many have
pointed to this analogy.' But the literature does not contain a
comprehensive account of the functional case for the federal
common law of foreign relations. In this Section I try to provide
such an account.
The functional case for the federal common law of foreign
relations begins with the fact that state decisionmakers lack a
national perspective and have every incentive to pursue parochial
interests at the expense of other states and, more generally, the
nation. The pursuit of such interests can harm the national foreign relations interest, either by preventing the political branches
from speaking with "one voice," or by offending a foreign sovereign in a manner that redounds to the detriment of the entire
nation. The high likelihood that state activities will produce
such foreign relations externalities perhaps justifies a comprehensive federal foreign relations power. But it does not by itself
require exclusive federal power in this area. It might suffice to
place foreign relations powers within concurrent federal-state
authority until the national government decides that the existence
of these externalities necessitates exclusive federal control.
For these reasons, the functional case for a federal common
law of foreign relations requires the important additional assumption that the federal political branches lack the institutional
capacity "to anticipate or deal with all the possible state encroachments on the national [foreign relations] interest."2 3 On
this view, uncoordinated state activity can produce adverse foreign relations consequences for the nation as a whole that are
not easily redressable by the overburdened national political
branches. When this point is combined with the assumptions that
(a) a residual concurrent state foreign relations authority is very
likely to affect adversely the United States' conduct of foreign
relations, and (b) the federal political branches desire exclusive
control in this area, it appears to follow that foreign relations
matters should at least presumptively be governed by federal

- See, e.g., Henkin, supra note 1, at 164; Richard B. Bilder, The Role of States and

Cities in Foreign Relations, 83 Am. J. Int'l L. 821, 830 (1989).

- Henkin, supra note 1, at 436 n.64; see also Moore, supra note 80, at 256; Spiro,

supra note 62, at 144-45.
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law."° Thus, the argument goes, when the political branches are
silent, federal courts charged with interpreting the structural
provisions of the Constitution must invalidate state laws that
impermissibly impinge upon the federal foreign relations power,
and, when necessary, replace that law with a judge-made rule.
This reasoning purports to show that states have no legitimate
interest in the conduct of foreign relations. Its widespread acceptance explains the absence of any serious federalism objection
to the federal common law of foreign relations. But this reasoning does not by itself explain the legitimacy of the doctrine
vis-a-vis the federal political branches. The federal common law
of foreign relations is a paradigmatic example of "prerogative"
federal common law made by judges in the absence of political
branch guidance on the basis of independent judicial assessments
of federal interests./ 5 It requires judges to determine on a caseby-case basis both when the foreign relations interests of the
United States require a federal foreign relations law, and the
content of that law.2' Such prerogative judicial lawmaking occurs in relatively few contexts because of the familiar host of
separation of powers concerns that it raises: It intrudes on political branch prerogatives to make federal law; it circumvents the
numerous procedural requirements for federal foreign relations
-lawmaking, thereby lowering the costs of federal lawmaking and
diminishing the goals promoted by such costs; and it lacks
democratic legitimacy. 7

204Moreover, even in the absence of strategic behavior by the states, uniform federal
regulation of a foreign relations issue might be viewed as preferable to the nonuniformity inherent in state-by-state regulation. See Chemerinsky, supra note 67, at 349.
205 See Merrill, supra note 21 (explaining and critiquing judicial prerogative lawmaking power).
See supra notes 46,51-56 and accompanying text.
- See Merrill, supra note 21, at 349-50. Some might view these separation of powers difficulties as relatively insignificant because Congress retains the power to override judicial decisions in this context. This is true, but it is also true that Congress can
override state acts that intrude on federal prerogatives in foreign affairs. In neither
case does the availability of a (non-costless) congressional override warrant an other-

wise unjustified intrusion on political branch power in the first place. And since both
the federal common law of foreign relations and state foreign relations activity can
intrude on the prerogatives of the federal political branches, the goal of analysis should

be to identify which intrusion is worse, all things considered.
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These standard concerns appear to have special force in the
foreign relations context. The fine-grained foreign relations determinations required by the federal common law of foreign relations are "of a kind for which the Judiciary has neither aptitude,
facilities nor responsibility and which has long been held to belong in the domain of political power not subject to judicial in2 8 Judges generally lack foreign relations intrusion or inquiry.""
formation and expertise.' ° But even if they had access to the
information possessed by the political branches and even if foreign relations training were a prerequisite to judicial service,
they still would not be well-suited to make such determinations.
Judges lack national political accountability. They are incapable
of the centralized decisionmaking that is thought to be so important in foreign relations.210 And the nature of the judicial process
imposes further limitations:
[Cjourts tend to establish rules of more-or-less general applicability, which can only relate to the needs of foreign policy grossly,
and on the basis of assumptions and generalizations hardly consonant with flexibility, currentness, and consistency. On the
other hand, when the courts do attempt to differentiate, distinguish, and make exceptions, they-unlike the Executive-must
deal in doctrines, must justify in reasoned opinion.'
These same concerns underlie the political question, act of state,
and related judicial abstention doctrines in foreign affairs. 12 Taken

Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948).
See also Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297,302 (1918) ("The conduct of the
foreign relations of our Government is committed by the Constitution to the Executive and Legislative... Departments.").
209See Jonathan I. Charney, Judicial Deference in Foreign Relations, 83 Am. J. Int'l
L. 805, 810 (1989).
210
For a summary of the reasons why centralization is thought to be so important to
foreign relations decisionmaking, and an analysis of why federal courts are so deficient in this regard, see John Yoo, Federal Courts as Weapons of Foreign Policy: The
Case of the Helms-Burton Act, 21 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 101, 119-23 (1997).
211
Henkin, supra note 41, at 826.
212 See generally Charney, supra note 209 (outlining and assessing judicial deference
and abstention in foreign affairs cases); see also Curtis A. Bradley, Territorial Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of Globalism, 37 Va. J. Int'l L. 505, 516 & n.49
(1997) (arguing that same concerns underlie presumption against extraterritorial application of federal law).
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alone, they counsel caution about the development of a judgemade federal foreign relations law.
Nonetheless, these concerns need not affect the legitimacy of
the federal common law of foreign relations. Although federal
courts might be generally unsuited to make federal foreign relations law on both legitimacy and competence grounds, the adverse consequences of state-by-state regulation in the face of
federal political branch silence might be worse. States suffer
from many of the same disabilities as federal courts in this context. Moreover, federal courts, in contrast to the states, have independence from local political processes and, as a branch of
the national government, are likely to be more sensitive to national foreign relations interests. Even in the absence of strategic behavior by the states, one might think that, all things being
equal, suboptimal but uniform federal judge-made regulation of
foreign relations is preferable to the nonuniformity inherent in
state-by-state regulation of a foreign relations issue. 13 Finally,
the federal common law of foreign relations is designed to protect political branch prerogatives in foreign relations that the political branches themselves are structurally unsuited to protect.
Any remaining concerns about the legitimacy or competence of
the federal common law of foreign relations are thus mitigated
by the political branches' ability to override judicial errors in the
development of such law.
The best justification for the federal common law of foreign
relations, then, is that it sets aside certain separation of powers
and institutional competence concerns for the sake of more important national uniformity values. 1' The remainder of this Part
13

Cf. Redish, supra note 56, at 135 ("The need for uniformity in the law affecting
foreign nations is clear, and application of state law would preclude the attainment of
this uniformity.").
-Some might believe that if there is no federalism objection to the federal common law of foreign relations because federal authority is exclusive, then separation of
powers objections to the doctrine are irrelevant. This reasoning seems incomplete. If
the federal lawmaking power in question is an exclusive prerogative of the federal
political branches, then an intrusion by either the states or the federal courts raises
constitutional difficulties. One might turn the standard objection on its head: Because federal courts are barred by separation of powers from making federal foreign
relations law, any federalism objection to the states doing so should be monitored
and redressed by the political branches themselves. Of course, the federal common
law of foreign relations might be less problematic than state-by-state regulation on
1
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provides a much different account of how these separation of
powers and federalism concerns play out.
B. The Waning of the Distinction between
Domestic and ForeignAffairs
Foreign relations was traditionally understood to be relations
among the national governments of sovereign nation-states. The
main concerns of foreign relations so conceived were military
and diplomatic issues, and the primary participants in foreign
relations were the executive branches of national governments.
In the eighteenth century, as today, these traditional foreign relations functions were thought to be essential attributes of sovereignty.2"5 Not surprisingly, the functional case for a self-executing
prohibition on subnational foreign relations activity is strongest
under this traditional conception. Concurrent authority in these
traditional areas would make it especially costly and difficult for
the central government to participate effectively in international
affairs as traditionally conceived.2 "6 It would also be especially
likely to promote destructive strategic behavior by the states that

would undermine a central purpose of the union. Finally, courts
can identify traditional foreign relations activities like treaty-

making and war-making with relative ease, thus making prohibitions on subnational activity in these contexts relatively easy to
enforce. These points were as obvious in the late eighteenth
century as they are today, and both Article VI of the Articles of
Confederation and Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution at
least presumptively barred states from engaging in these tradi-

tional foreign relations functions.

7

any number of grounds, and indeed this is the most complete argument for the modern practice. My point is simply that this comparative cost analysis, rather than conclusory arguments based on federal exclusivity, is appropriate.
215See generally Jerrilyn Greene Marston, King and Congress: The Transfer of Political Legitimacy, 1774-1776, at 206-23 (1987) (collecting late 18th-century sources).
216
Thus, even federal constitutions that provide subnational units with some concurrent traditional foreign relations responsibilities narrowly define these responsibilities and frequently make them subject to prior central government approval. See
Federalism and International Relations: The Role of Subnational Units 77-299 (Hans
J. Michelmann & Panayotis Soldatos eds., 1990) (analyzing constitutions of Australia,
Belgium, Canada, Germany, Switzerland, and the United States).
217See Articles of Confederation art. VI; U.S. Const. art. I, § 10.
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The federal common law of foreign relations is rarely if ever
concerned with such traditional foreign relations functions, because Article I, Section 10, bolstered by 210 years of federal foreign relations enactments, establishes exclusive federal control
in these traditional areas. But foreign relations is no longer
limited to these traditional categories. Especially in the last thirty
years, the increasing integration of the international economy,
changes in transportation and communications technology, and
the growth of international law and institutions have led to an
unprecedented interdependence among nations on a variety of
levels." ' These factors reflect a significant increase in international cooperation, coordination, and regulation that has blurred
the distinction between foreign and domestic relations along
several axes. For purposes of analyzing the legitimacy of the
federal common law of foreign relations, it suffices to describe
three aspects of this waning of the distinction: changes in the
content of foreign relations and international law; the interdependence of domestic and foreign affairs; and the rise of new
foreign relations participants.
First, the traditional agenda of foreign relations has been replaced by a variety of issues formerly the concern of domestic
governance alone:
Today, in contrast to previous eras of international relations,
trade, investment, technology and energy transfers, environmental and social issues, cultural exchanges, migratory and
commuting labour, and transfrontier drug traffic and epidemics
have forced their way on to the foreign-policy agenda, usually
below, but sometimes parallel with, the great issues of national
security, military balance, and diplomatic status. This expansion of the field of foreign policy into non-military and nondiplomatic issue-areas began after the First World War, accelI's This

is the starting assumption for much of modern international relations theory.
See, e.g., Seyom Brown, New Forces, Old Forces, and the Future of World Politics 3
(Post-Cold War ed. 1995); Robert 0. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (1977). Of course, many periods throughout
history could be said to be marked by unprecedented interdependence because of

economic integration, technological innovations, and related factors. My point in the
next few pages is simply that this interdependence has reached such a level that a distinction between domestic and foreign relations is no longer feasible as a criterion for
allocating jurisdictional authority.
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erated after the Second World War, and has now become a
characteristic feature of global and regional interdependence. 9
This list fails to include the manner in which a nation treats its
own citizens, which before World War II was considered a
purely "internal" affair, but which today is a central foreign relations concern.
The change in the agenda of foreign relations is reflected in
changes in the content of the legal obligations imposed by public
international law. Traditionally, public international law regulated relations among nations.'0 It rarely overlapped with domestic law, and it rarely regulated private activity."' Today, by contrast, it frequently regulates both public and private activities
that were formerly viewed as domestic concerns. Public international law has pierced the veil of sovereignty to regulate the way
in which a nation treats its citizens.' It also regulates issues like
environmental protection and family law that in prior times
were exclusively governed by domestic law.'m
Second, and relatedly, as the world becomes more interconnected, domestic law and activity increasingly have foreign consequences, and vice versa. This follows in part from the commonplace observation that "[a]s integration increases, the 'effect' that
local action will have beyond its own local border increases. '
It also results from the increasing frequency with which "domestic" law is applied in transnational contexts. As we saw above,
the application of tort, contract, and property laws in interna21 9

Ivo D. Duchacek, Perforated Sovereignties: Towards a Typology of New Actors
in International Relations, in Federalism and International Relations: The Role of
Subnational Units, supra note 216, at 1, 2.
210
See Janis, supra note 105, at 245-46.
221 For exceptions to this generalization, see Louis Henkin, International Law: Politics and Values 169-73 (1995) (customary international law); Louis Henkin, The
Treaty Makers and the Law Makers: The Law of the Land and Foreign Relations,
107 U. Pa. L. Rev. 903, 911-13 (1959) (treaties).
222 See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
-See Barry E. Carter & Phillip R. Trimble, International Law 1185-1279 (2d ed.
1995) (environmental law); Adair Dyer, The Internationalization of Family Law, 30
U.C. Davis L. Rev. 625 (1997) (family law).
2
1 Lessig, supra note 190, at 138. Similarly, external matters increasingly have domestic effects. See Michael Clough, The Changing Character of American Foreign
Policy, in Global Changes and Domestic Transformations: New Possibilities for
American Foreign Policy 10-11 (1993); Kline, supra note 91, at 331.
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tional litigation is sometimes viewed to implicate foreign relations.' A related contributing factor is the dissolution of the
public/private distinction in international commerce. Private
transnational commercial transactions that for most of this century were regulated by domestic law are now regulated by
treaty. "6 In addition, foreign sovereigns who once engaged in
only public acts now frequently engage in private commercial
activity and litigation that were once limited to private parties.'
Finally, the changing nature of international regulation and concern means that even domestic law that applies to domestic persons for domestic acts can implicate foreign relations. Human
rights violations usually take place within a nation's territory
and usually involve a nation's own citizens. But as these purely
"domestic" acts take on international legal and political significance, they too implicate foreign relations.
Third, as foreign relations has expanded to include formerly
domestic concerns, the participants in foreign relations have
changed. National governments do not enjoy a monopoly over
the conduct of foreign relations as conceived in modern times.
Throughout the world, subnational units like the U.S. states
have joined international organizations, multinational corporations, and other non-national actors in the conduct and regulation of international affairs.' This in part reflects the fact that
our conception of foreign affairs has changed to include many
supra notes 76-84 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3; Vienna Convention
on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Apr. 10, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 668; Rome
22See
226

Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, opened for signature
June 19, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 1492.
27 The modern "restrictive" theory of foreign sovereign immunity, which extends

immunity "to sovereign or public acts (jure imperii) of a state, but not with respect to
private acts (jure gestionis)," reflects this fact. See Changed Policy Concerning the
Granting of Sovereign Immunity to Foreign Governments, 26 Dep't St. Bull. 984, 984
(1952) (letter from Department of State Acting Legal Adviser Jack B. Tate to Acting
Attorney General Philip Perlman) (May 19, 1952); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (1994)
(no foreign sovereign immunity from suit in United States court in cases based upon,

among other things, certain commercial activities, illegal expropriations, tortious acts,
and arbitration agreements).

,,See, e.g., Brian Hocking, Introduction to Foreign Relations and Federal States, in
Foreign Relations and Federal States, supra note 91, at 1, 6; Jessica T. Mathews, Power

Shift, Foreign Aff., Jan.-Feb. 1997, at 50, 50-52; (1997); Spiro, supra note 62, at 153-54.
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matters under the traditional control of subnational units. But it
also reflects the more active role that subnational units (and
other non-national actors) have taken in transnational political
and economic affairs. As international markets and means of
communication have expanded, subnational units have become
increasingly aware of, affected by, and in contact with foreign
elements. " To the extent that central governments are unable
or unwilling to redress local needs and interests, state and local
governments have been doing so unilaterally in both the economic"' and political31 realms.
The rise in subnational foreign relations activity tells us little,
of course, about the activity's normative desirability. But we
should also avoid the automatic assumption that this development is normatively undesirable. This is especially true because
the federal political branches have made clear that, in contrast
to traditional foreign relations activities which largely have been
federalized through statute and treaty, they do not always, or
even usually, prefer federal regulation of these new foreign relations issues. The recent increase in state and local involvement
in such issues "has occasioned little reaction from Congress or
the Executive." 2 And when the political branches do react, they
often choose to protect state interests over foreign relations interests when the two appear to clash. A good example is the
United Siates' recent ratification of a variety of international
human rights treaties. 3 These treaties create numerous potential
229See generally Hocking, supra note 228, at 8-30.
mSee Fry, supra note 91, at 124; Kline, supra note 91, at 329-37. The main forms of
state economic activity are the opening of overseas business development offices, international investment incentive programs, unilateral export promotion programs and

activities, and governor trade missions. See Kline, supra note 91, at 332-35. As a result of these international economic activities, states have "gained greater interest in
a range of issues involving foreign market access, subsidy regulations, trade financing
agreements, product certification and customs documentation, and other topics formerly
considered the province of specialized national government bureaucracies." Id. at 333.
13, See Hocking, supra note 228, at 6; Kline, supra note 91, at 338-40. As discussed
above, states and localities have in recent years imposed sanctions against oppressive
regimes and enacted nuclear-free resolutions. See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
2
Bilder, supra note 202, at 823.
- The United States ratified the Convention against Torture and the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination in 1994, the
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conflicts with state law.' In the face of international pressure,
the President and Senate have consistently attached reservations,
understandings, and declarations to these treaties to ensure that
they do not preempt or affect inconsistent state law." Similarly,
California's worldwide unitary tax on multinational corporations has provoked enormous diplomatic controversy with our
closest trading partners since the 1980s.6 The President negotiated a treaty that would have preempted this law, but the Senate
withheld its consent. 7 And in the face of substantial pressure
from foreign governments, Congress consistently failed to enact
legislation preempting the unitary tax. 8
Even when the political branches enact preemptive federal
foreign relations law, they often do so in a manner that reflects
the interests of the states and minimizes intrusion on their prerogatives. When Congress codified the international law standards for determinations of foreign sovereign immunity, it ensured that otherwise-applicable state law would continue to
govern the merits of such suits. 9 Similarly, in federal implementing legislation for the Uruguay Round of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"), "political sensitivInternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1992, and the Genocide Convention in 1989. See Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions:
The Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89 Am. J. Int'l L. 341, 347-48 (1995).
See id. at 348.
3,See Henkin, supra note 233, at 345-48; Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 103; Peter
J. Spiro, The States and International Human Rights, 66 Fordham L. Rev. (forthcoming 1997). To take a typical example, the Senate attached a "federalism understanding" to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights that "serves to
emphasize domestically that there is no intent to alter the constitutional balance of
authority between the State and Federal governments or to use the provisions of the
Covenant to 'federalize' matters now within the competence of the States," S. Rep.
No. 102-23, at 18-19 (1992), and other reservations and conditions that ensure that
"changes in U.S. law in these areas will occur through the normal [federal] legislative
process." Id. at 4. For a critical view of these provisions under international law, see
Henkin, supra note 233, at 345-46.
For a good account of the controversy, see Brian Hocking, Localizing Foreign
Policy: Non-Central Governments and Multilayered Democracy 130-51 (1993).
- See id.
- See id. In addition, the Supreme Court also declined to strike down the California
tax on dormant foreign Commerce Clause grounds. Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise
Tax Bd. of Cal., 512 U.S. 298, 324-28 (1994). For further analysis of this decision, see
infra notes 327-340.
1,Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (1976)
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1606 (1994)); see also Weisburd, supra note 62, at 26-27.
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ity to state sensibilities were [sic] reflected in several ways. 2 °
Most significantly, the legislation "precluded the agreements from
having any direct effect, and indeed required an action by the

United States Government for the purpose of striking down a
state law. 24 1 In addition, the federal government has actively
cooperated with and supported the unilateral state economic ac-

tivities described above.242 The overtly political international activities of states, such as nuclear-free ordinances and state divestment movements, are more controversial. For example,
Congress by statute overruled several governors' resistance to

allowing the participation of national guard troops in Central

American military activities in the mid-1980s.243 But Congress
declined to preempt the most notorious recent state foreign re-

lations activity-state sanctions against South Africa-when it
enacted the Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986,2' and Massachusetts's

recent sanctions against Myanmar 45 soon led to similar sanctions
by the federal government. 6
In short, foreign relations is no longer "a distinct issue area: it
is about 'something' and that 'something' has come to embrace

110
Henkin, supra note 1, at 169. Section 102 of the Uruguay Round Agreements
Act contains these protections for state interests. Uruguay Round Agreements Act,
Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 102,108 Stat. 4815 (1994) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 3512 (1994)).
241David W. Leebron, Implementation of the Uruguay Round Results in the United
States, in Implementing the Uruguay Round 175, 228 (John H. Jackson & Alan 0.
Sykes eds., 1997). The legislation also created a formal consultation role for states in
the implementation of the Uruguay Round results, and gave states an opportunity to
participate in any World Trade Organization dispute settlement proceeding that
challenges state law. For an excellent overview of these issues, see id.
142See Enid F. Beaumont, Domestic Consequences of Internationalization, in
Globalization and Decentralization: Institutional Contexts, Policy Issues, and Intergovernmental Relations in Japan and the United States, supra note 91, at 381; see
also Weisburd, supra note 62, at 26 (citing statutory evidence that "Congress assumes
the states will play a role in foreign trade, a role they have eagerly accepted").
- National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987, Pub. L. No. 99-661,
§ 522, 100 Stat. 3816, 3871 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 12,301 (1994)), constitutionality
upheld, Perpich v. Department of Defense, 496 U.S. 334,354-55 (1990).
2See Kline, supra note 91, at 342.
',' Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 7, §§ 22G-22M (West Supp. 1997).
2-See Exec. Order No. 13,047, 62 Fed. Reg. 13,047 (1997). See also Frank Phillips,
State Was in Lead on Burma; Backers of Mass. Law Welcome U.S. Sanctions, Boston
Globe, Apr. 23, 1997, at Bi; Peter Baker, U.S. to Impose Sanctions on Burma for
Repression; Clinton Decision Defies Business Community, Wash. Post, Apr. 22, 1997,
at Al.

HeinOnline -- 83 Va. L. Rev. 1676 1997

1907]

FederalCourts, ForeignAffairs, and Federalism

1677

an increasingly large number of issues once assumed to be the
preserve of domestic politics."2 7 Foreign relations includes many
matters traditionally regulated by states. States are increasingly
engaged in activities that were formerly the sole responsibility
of the federal government. The political branches do not always
(or even usually) prefer national foreign relations interests over
state interests, or uniform federal regulation to non-uniform state
law regulation of an issue, even if the issue provokes complaints
from foreign governments.
This analysis casts doubt on the widely held view that the
states have no legitimate interest in the regulation of foreign
relations. Many who hold this view are misled by the label
"foreign relations," which is invariably associated with traditional
foreign relations issues and thus with exclusive federal control.
But the issues implicated by the federal common law of foreign
relations-state common and criminal law, choice of law, procedural law, nondiscriminatory international economic activities,
and state human rights activities-differ significantly from traditional foreign relations matters. Concurrent authority over these
nontraditional foreign relations matters are much less likely to
undermine the United States' ability to participate in international affairs, and much less likely to harm the national foreign
relations interest. And, in contrast to state activities in traditional foreign relations contexts, many affirmative benefits accrue
from the decentralization of these new foreign relations functions.
For example, nontraditional state foreign relations activities such
as international trade activity and involvement in the international human rights movement assist both the U.S. government
and third parties.248 Subnational foreign relations initiatives increased awareness about the United States' economic policies
against oppressive regimes in South Africa and Myanmar 9
2, Hocking, supra note 236, at 25. We can of course imagine many domestic matters that could not fairly be characterized as involving or affecting U.S. foreign relations. But the number of such matters is shrinking. At the very least, a potential foreign relations interest is raised by any issue that involves a foreign party or transaction,
a foreign or international law, or a U.S. law that regulates extraterritorially.
2 See Hocking, supra note 236, at 8-30; John M. Kline, Managing Intergovernmental
Tensions: Shaping a State and Local Role in US Foreign Relations, in Foreign Relations and Federal States, supra note 91, at 105.
219See supra note 94 and accompanying text.

HeinOnline -- 83 Va. L. Rev. 1677 1997

1678

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 83:1617

Similarly, the State and Commerce Departments approve of the

manifold state international economic activities presumably because they find that decentralization of these activities serves
U.S. interests more effectively than centralized federal control."0
In our post-Erie world, a judge-made federal common law of
foreign relations in the absence of political branch authorization
is only legitimate to the extent that it regulates uniquely federal

interests."' To the extent that foreign relations as conceived in
modern times implicate traditional state interests, prevailing understandings of American federalism suggest that the decision to
regulate these matters by federal law be made by the national

political branches where state interests are represented."

Poli-

tical protections for state interests are absent when the unelected

federal judiciary preempts state law under a foreign relations rationale without any apparent political branch authorization.
This explains why the federal common law of foreign relations

lacks the nuance, compromise, and accommodation that characterize the relatively few political branch preemptions in these

new foreign relations contexts. It also calls into question the
normative basis for the federal common law of foreign relations
as currently practiced.
It remains true, of course, that concurrent state regulation in

the new foreign relations areas can provoke foreign sovereign
complaints or otherwise adversely affect U.S. foreign relations
-Cf. Hocking, supra note 236, at 15 ("[N]ational governments, confronted by an
ever more complex policy environment, struggling to manage their foreign relations
in the face of multiple external pressures, may seek to divert these by delegating their
responsibilities.").
2' See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
2See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550-55 (1985). In
recent years, the Supreme Court has expressed incomplete confidence in Garcia's
"political process" justification for the elimination of federalism as a judicially enforceable limitation on federal lawmaking power. See Printz v. United States, 117 S.
Ct. 2365 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); Gregory v. Ashcroft,
501 U.S. 452 (1991); see also John C. Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70
S. Cal. L. Rev. (forthcoming 1997) (arguing that these and other recent Supreme
Court federalism decisions have overruled Garciasub silentio). Whether the political
process provides full or partial constitutional protection for state interests, the point
remains that the political process justification for federal interference with state interests "applies only to congressional (and perhaps, though less forcefully, to presidential) initiatives undertaken at the expense of the state" and not to "such initiatives
undertaken by an unelected federal judiciary." Merrill, supra note 31, at 17.
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in a fashion that sometimes argues for a uniform federal rule. 3
Such negative foreign relations externalities are the primary

concern underlying the federal common law of foreign relations.
But the presence of such externalities does not, by itself, justify
federal judicial lawmaking. In the absence of a serious break-

down in the political process, our constitutional democracy normally depends on the elected federal political branches to correct
this sort of problem. Political instead of judicial federalization is
especially warranted here since the values to be attached to the

competing federalism and foreign relations interests appear increasingly contested.'
Many will respond to this latter point by saying that the federal political branches are not reliable in this context. The next

Section questions the validity of this response in detail. My aim
thus far has been merely to cast doubt on the wooden identity

between foreign affairs and exclusive federal power by showing
that states retain genuine interests in foreign relations as conceived in modern times, and that the identification and accommodation of competing foreign relations and state interests in
the modern era are difficult, uncertain, and contested. Although

this analysis undermines a central tenet of the federal common
law of foreign relations, it does not constitute a comprehensive
argument against the doctrine. The blurring of the distinction

between domestic and foreign affairs does not mean that there
are no longer uniquely federal foreign relations interests. The

13 Peter Spiro has recently made the interesting argument that dormant foreign relations preemption is "obsolete" because foreign nations respond to state foreign relations activities by retaliating against the offending state rather than the entire nation.
See Spiro, supra note 62, at 161-69. The externalities-reducing logic of dormant foreign
affairs preemption is largely (but not completely) undercut to the extent that Spiro's
factual premise of tailored retaliation is true. But Proposition 187 and California's
unitary tax-Spiro's two examples of this phenomenon, id. at 163-66--provoked numerous national as well as local protests, and in any event they are, as Spiro concedes,
"a slim basis on which to discern a trend." Id. at 166. Nonetheless, if the trend Spiro
has identified develops, it will provide another powerful reason for abandoning the
federal common law of foreign relations.
24 Cf. Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making
Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 1091, 1112 (1986) ("Many
of the same considerations that argue for the essentially unlimited central power-in
a nutshell, the complexity and pervasiveness of modern economic activity-argue
strongly againsttreating the central power as exclusive.").
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federal political branches' frequent protection of state interests
over foreign relations interests does not suggest that they always
wish to protect these interests. And the fact that concurrent
authority over nontraditional foreign relations matters is often
good (but sometimes bad) for the U.S. foreign relations process
does not by itself say much about the legitimate scope of the
federal common law of foreign relations.
So from a functional perspective, the waning of the distinction
between domestic and foreign relations makes much harder, but
does not resolve, the crucial question whether the foreign relations context requires a shift in the normal burden of inertia from
those who want federal regulation of an issue to those who want
state regulation. Ultimate resolution of this question requires
answers to comparative institutional competence and related federal separation of powers questions that are often overlooked in
this context. This is the subject of the next Section.
C. The Neglected Perspective of Separationof Powers

This Section focuses on the many problems that arise from
viewing the federal common law of foreign relations "through
the lens of federalism without the filter of the separation of
powers. ""

Proponents of the modern practice have so deeply

identified foreign relations with federal power that they have
failed to consider how the distribution of this power among federal political and federal judicial actors affects its exercise. For
reasons of institutional competence and substantive legitimacy,
however, the federal political branches are the presumptive makers of all nonconstitutional federal law, especially foreign relations law. 6 The federal common law of foreign relations is an
exception to this normal rule of political branch hegemony in
foreign relations. It is justified only in order to prevent the states
from intruding on political branch prerogatives in foreign relations, and it is always subject to political branch revision. Accordingly, its legitimacy turns on two related assumptions: (a) that
25 Laurence H. Tribe, Intergovernmental Immunities in Litigation, Taxation, and
Regulation: Separation of Powers Issues in Controversies about Federalism, 89 Harv.
L. Rev. 682, 683 (1976).
-6 See supra notes 208-212 and accompanying text.
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the federal political branches are incapable of adequately monitoring and redressing state intrusions on their ability to conduct
relations with other countries; and (b) that the costs of such state
activity in the face of federal political branch silence are greater

than the costs associated with federal judicial lawmaking.'

This

Section argues that both of these assumptions are wrong.
1. The ExaggeratedNeed for the FederalCommon Law of
ForeignRelations

The federal common law of foreign relations' assumption that
the political branches are incapable of monitoring and redressing untoward state foreign relations activity at an acceptable
cost is like the one used to justify dormant Commerce Clause

preemption. z8 But the analogy is inapposite. The federal political branches have many more resources to monitor and control
state intrusions on their foreign relations prerogatives than they
do in the context of discrimination against interstate commerce.
a. Congress

We have relatively little information about congressional
agenda-setting in the foreign relations context, at least outside

2" Cf. Saul Levmore, Interstate Exploitation and Judicial Intervention, 69 Va. L.
Rev. 563, 570 n.17 (1983) (arguing in dormant Commerce Clause context that "[i]n
justifying the legislative costs of reversing [erroneous] judicial intervention, the question is not whether courts are better than Congress at protecting the national interest
but rather whether courts are more responsive to the national interest than are state
legislatures").
21 See Ernest J. Brown, The Open Economy: Justice Frankfurter and the Position
of the Judiciary, 67 Yale LJ. 219, 222 (1957); Choper, supra note 60, at 1586-87; Julian
N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 Yale L.J. 425, 435 (1982).
Dormant Commerce Clause scholars justify the doctrine on three related grounds: (1)
Congress lacks any mechanism to consider the "myriad of state and local rules that
may arguably intrude on the national domain," Choper, supra note 60, at 1586; see
also Brown, supra, at 222; (2) even if Congress had such a mechanism, individual
state discriminations against interstate commerce are relatively unimportant, and
thus congressional time-pressures and other factors leading to congressional inertia
would prevent full congressional consideration of these issues, Choper, supra note 60,
at 1586-87; and (3) even if these structural obstacles could be overcome, "the task of
determining on an ad hoc basis the compatibility of isolated local ordinances with the
broad demands of the federal system" is more suited to an adjudicative rather than a
legislative body, id. at 1586.
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of the international economic arena." Nonetheless, it seems
safe to assume that Congress will be much more aware of state
activity with adverse foreign relations consequences than it is of
state legislation that discriminates against interstate commerce.
Most cases of interstate discrimination will be limited to a relatively small geographical area that will not implicate national attention or interest, and thus will have a particularly hard time
getting on the political branches' limited legislative docket. This
is less true of state activity that provokes foreign relations controversy, which implicates national responsibility, and which often generates national attention. Furthermore, Congress has
special committees and subcommittees with permanent staffs
devoted to monitoring various aspects of the United States' relations with foreign countries.' It can also rely on the President
to provide information concerning the existence of disruptive
state behavior."' As foreign relations comes to include economic
and political factors that more directly affect the interests of
constituents and organized groups, congressional awareness of
state activity harmful to national foreign relations will only grow.
But even if Congress (or one of its committees) is aware of
such state activity, will it redress the problem? This is a complex question that is difficult to answer because we lack a very
rich understanding of when or why Congress enacts foreign relations law.' The difficulty of the question is exacerbated by the
waning of the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs,
which makes it difficult to generalize about the foreign relations
lawmaking process.
Nonetheless, the following observations seem appropriate.
The likelihood of congressional redress for untoward state activity will increase as does the clarity and extent of the threat
posed to the national interest. To the extent that state activity is
less threatening, some would predict that Congress would be

15 See James M. Lindsay & Randall B. Ripley, Foreign and Defense Policy in Congress: A Research Agenda for the 1990s, 17 Legis. Stud. Q. 417, 424 (1992) ("We do
not know much about how specific foreign and defense issues get onto the discretionary agenda in Congress.").
110For an overview collecting many sources, see id. at 426-29.

261See
216See

id. at 423-24.
id. at 418-420.
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less likely to respond, since constituents and organized groups
tend to care little about foreign relations issues.263 But this
analysis applies, if at all, only to traditional foreign relations
concerns such as foreign sovereign immunity. The GATT and
North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") debates
demonstrated that as foreign relations comes to include political
and economic factors that more broadly implicate organized interests, the foreign relations lawmaking process will share many
of the characteristics of the domestic lawmaking process. As the
GATT and NAFTA process showed, states as an interest group
will become more active in protecting their interests in these
contexts. But as GATT and NAFTA also showed, two countervailing factors create special pressure for the national political
branches to federalize such matters. First, the expansion of the
category of foreign relations enhances potential federal power
and creates new incentives for federal legislators to exercise this
power to obtain increased political support from interested political groups.' Second, the demands of globalism create pressure
for legal uniformity and harmonization that can be achieved
most easily at the federal level.6
Although these observations are admittedly general, they suggest that Congress is more likely to address state activity that
harms the national foreign relations interest than it is to address
other harmful state acts. But even assuming that Congress is
relatively nonresponsive in this context, the need for a judgemade foreign relations law still does not follow. This is because
there is another federal foreign relations lawmaker: the executive
branch.

Il See Eric Ulsaner, A Tower of Babel on Foreign Policy?, in Interest Group Politics 299,300 (Allan J. Cigler & Burdett A. Loomis eds., 3d ed. 1991).
"I See Barry Friedman, Federalism's Future in the Global Village, 47 Vand. L. Rev.
1441, 1473-78 (1994); Jonathan R. Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators
and the Economic Theory of Regulation: Toward a Public-Choice Explanation of
Federalism, 76 Va. L. Rev. 265 (1990).
6 See Andreas Falke, The Impact of the International System on Domestic Structure: The Case of American Federalism, 39 Amerikastudien 371, 372, 384 (1994);
Friedman, supra note 264, at 1472.
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b. The Executive Branch

The executive branch has special monitoring capabilities and
preemptive lawmaking powers when foreign relations is at issue.
As for monitoring, it is inconceivable that the executive branch
will be unaware of a state's action that adversely affects U.S. for-

eign relations or unduly burdens the federal government's ability
to conduct foreign relations. The President is the primary agent

of U.S. foreign relations and the primary organ of communication with foreign governments. 6 And the executive branch receives all foreign government complaints about state activity.
When the executive branch identifies harmful state foreign
relations activity, it is much better positioned than Congress to

address it. Foreign relations is (and is perceived to be) the President's responsibility. He is thus more accountable for foreign
relations problems than Congress, and has a greater interest in
redressing state-created foreign relations difficulties. The President also has a massive executive branch bureaucracy at his dis-

posal to monitor and redress such difficulties. Importantly, the
executive branch's ability to respond to these difficulties is not
burdened by collective action problems to nearly the same degree as Congress. 67
In addition, the President's unique role in foreign relations
enables him to redress unacceptable state foreign relations ac-

tivity in a variety of ways. First, he exercises special influence
on the congressional foreign relations agenda and the content of
foreign relations legislation.268 Second, he or one of his subordi26 See
267See

Henkin, supra note 1, at 41-45.
Terry M. Moe & Scott A. Wilson, Presidents and the Politics of Structure, 57
Law & Contemp. Probs. 1, 24-28 (1994).
268 This is the "two-presidencies" thesis, which suggests that the President has special agenda-setting and legislative-output influence in foreign relations. See Aaron
Wildavsky, The Two Presidencies, Trans-action, Dec. 1966, at 7. Wildavsky's thesis
has been subject to numerous criticisms. See, e.g., The Two Presidencies: A Quarter
Century Assessment (Steven A. Shull ed., 1991). With some exceptions, the consensus
today appears to be that the President "is still dominant over the Congress in foreign
policy, but it is not the monolithic dominance implied by Wildavsky." Lance T.
LeLoup & Steven A. Shull, Congress Versus the Executive: The "Two Presidencies"
Reconsidered, 59 Soc. Sci. Q. 704, 717 (1979). And again, the blurring of the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs attenuates the usefulness of the analysis.
See Donald A. Peppers, "The Two Presidencies": Eight Years Later, in Perspectives
on the Presidency 462, 469 (Aaron Wildavsky ed., 1975).
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nates can communicate directly with states on behalf of the fed-

eral government in order to influence or alter the offensive state
activity. 69 Sometimes this communication is nothing more than
an informal telephone call to the proper state or local official.

Other times the State Department will send a formal letter to
the state urging it to cease its offensive behavior. And some-

times the executive branch will file an amicus brief in state

court.27 These means of "informal" presidential control are often
employed and often, though not always, successful in changing
the offending state behavior."1
Third, the President has limited but important federal lawmaking powers that enable him, on his own, to preempt state
law that adversely affects the nation's foreign relations or the
political branches' ability to conduct such relations. Some of
these powers derive directly from the Constitution itself. For
example, incident to his power to recognize foreign govern-

ments,m the President can enter into international agreements
that preempt state law. The most famous instance is the Litvinov Agreement, which officially recognized the Soviet Union and
assigned all Soviet property in the United States to the federal
government. This "executive agreement" preempted inconsis-

119Legal officers in the State Department reported in telephone conversations with
me and my research assistant that the Department lacks specific internal procedures
with respect to these informal means of exercising control over state foreign relations
activity. See Memorandum from Kristof Hess to Jack Goldsmith (Oct. 31, 1996) (on file
with the Virginia Law Review Association). But they acknowledged that the Department does frequently perform this role through informal conversations, formal letters,
and amicus participation in courts. For documented examples throughout different
periods of American history, see John Bassett Moore, The Principles of American
Diplomacy 191 (1918); Stoke, supra note 126, at 151; Ronan Doherty, Note, Foreign
Affairs v. Federalism: How State Control of Criminal Law Implicates Federal Responsibility Under International Law, 82 Va. L. Rev. 1281, 1306-07 (1996); Palumbo,
supra note 160, at 2-3, 108, 217.
7 See, e.g., Embassy of Benin v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment,
534 A.2d 310, 311 (D.C. Ct. App. 1987); Hunt v. Coastal States Gas Producing Co., 583
S.W.2d 322,334-35 (Tex.) (Steakley, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 992 (1979).
"I For recent examples of executive intervention that did not succeed, see Doherty,
supra note 269, at 1306-07.
22 This power derives from the President's Article II power to receive ambassadors.
U.S. Const. art. II, § 3.
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It also ended state court

uncertainty about the domestic effect of the Soviet Union's extraterritorial confiscations."
Much more significant than the President's constitutionally
derived powers are the broad and numerous foreign relations
lawmaking powers delegated to the executive by Congress."
Congress has delegated these powers to the executive precisely
because the President has access to superior expertise and because structural advantages allow the President to take quick
and decisive action. The broadest such delegation is the Inter-

national Emergency Economic Powers Act ("IEEPA").76 Presidential lawmaking power under IEEPA is triggered by "any un-

usual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or
substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States."'2 IEEPA

enables the President to respond quickly to suspend or invalidate state law whose application would interfere with or impede
the federal government's conduct of foreign relations. The best
known example is President Carter's invocation of IEEPA to
lift state-law judicial attachments on Iranian assets and suspend

private (largely state-law governed) claims against Iran as part
of the deal to secure the release of the hostages in Iran.278
The President's IEEPA power is not limited to such emergency

situations. Presidents "have declared national emergencies with
little regard to whether a real emergency has actually existed,""
and courts have broadly construed the IEEPA delegation.' ° But
,13See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301
U.S. 324, 331 (1937).
114See Jaffe, supra note 164, at 180-98 (collecting and analyzing pre-Litvinov
Agreement state court cases).
215 For a good general introduction, see Harold Hongju Koh & John Choon Yoo,
Dollar Diplomacy/Dollar Defense: The Fabric of Economics and National Security
Law, 26 Int'l Law. 715 (1992).
2 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-06 (1994).
-7 Id. § 1701(a).
28This action was upheld by the Supreme Court in Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453
U.S.9 654 (1981).
2 Koh & Yoo, supra note 275, at 744.
110See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 672-74. For criticisms of these broad readings
of IEEPA, see Koh, supra note 184, at 138-43; Jules Lobel, Emergency Power and
the Decline of Liberalism, 98 Yale L.J. 1385, 1417-18 (1989).
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the IEEPA power is not limitless, and it would not be politically
expedient for the President to exercise it fully or frequently.
Nonetheless, its availability, in combination with other statutory
bases for emergency federal foreign relations lawmaking by the
executive,2' attenuates concerns that state activity will create a
foreign relations crisis that cannot be immediately addressed by
a federal political branch.
c. Residual Concerns

It is hard to imagine an area in which the political branches
together exercise more control over state activity than in foreign
relations. The President's monitoring, consultation, and lawmaking powers, in combination with Congress's manifold powers,
mean that the federal government can respond more quickly
and effectively to untoward state foreign relations activity than
to other untoward state activities. In addition, changes in global
politics and the global economy appear to have created unusual
incentives for the federal political branches to nationalize a variety of matters currently under state control.' In this light,
Professor Henkin's assessment from 1964 rings even truer today:
"The foreign relations of the United States do not cry for the
courts to fill an obvious lack of law left for them by the Constitution or by necessary implication from the words or silences of
the political branches."' 3
Some will nonetheless insist that there is a need for judge-made
foreign relations law because congressional inertia remains a
problem and the President has a crowded agenda and will not
always be politically willing or legally able to exercise foreign
28See, e.g., Trading with the Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-44 (1994); Defense

Production Act, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2061-2171 (1994); Export Regulation Act, 50
U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-20 (1994).
z See supra notes 264-265 and accompanying text.

3Henkin, supra note 41, at 817-18. In the article from which this quotation is
drawn, Professor Henkin was skeptical about the constitutional basis for, and necessity of, the federal common law of foreign relations articulated in Sabbatino. Id. at
816-18. Although Henkin has modified his views about the legitimacy of the federal
common law of foreign relations over the years, compare id. with Henkin, supra note

1, at 139-40, he has consistently acknowledged the nuances in this relationship and
the important role played by the states in the conduct of U.S. foreign relations, see id.

at 140, 150-51, 165, & 436 n.64.
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relations lawmaking powers. To take a much-cited example,
California's unitary method for taxing multinational corporations
provoked numerous foreign sovereign complaints and threats
The political branches
directed to the national government.'
were- either unwilling or unable to preempt the offensive state
activity. In this and other contexts, the argument goes, important federal foreign relations interests would be unprotected if
judge-made foreign relations law were eliminated.
There are three responses to this argument. The first is to be
skeptical of the existence of important federal foreign relations
interests that the political branches, even with special incentives
and enhanced lawmaking capacities, do not protect with enacted
federal law."5 The notion of such unprotected foreign relations
interests is frequently invoked but rarely explained. Such a notion has little to support it but contested intuition that likely rep-resents little more than substantive disagreement with the state
law in issue. How do we know such unprotected federal foreign
relations interests exist? What are the criteria for their identification? Proponents of the federal common law of foreign relations offer no answers. The most accurate and reliable measure
of these interests is the national political process, especially as
these interests become more difficult to identify with certainty.
As we have seen, there is little reason to think that this process
does not function properly to protect these interests.
In this light, the oft-stated but little-analyzed notion that state
activity prevents the federal government from speaking with
"one voice" in foreign relations makes little sense. The federal
government itself rarely speaks with one voice in foreign relations." Foreign relations law is replete with struggles between
the statute-makers, the treaty-makers, the President, and sometimes the courts, for control of the federal foreign relations
voice." As Edward Corwin correctly noted, the Constitution's
284See supra notes 236-238 and accompanying text.
211See Merrill, supra note 21, at 352-53.
286 See Ralph G. Steinhardt, Human Rights Litigation and the "One-Voice" Orthodoxy in Foreign Affairs, in World Justice? U.S. Courts and International Human
Rights 23,27 (Mark Gibney ed., 1991).
- Indeed, the executive branch itself often speaks with more than one voice in foreign relations. In many contexts, the Defense Department, the State Department,
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allocation of foreign relations power among the political branches
is an "invitation to struggle" for control of the conduct of U.S.
foreign relations.' The Constitution does not purport to limit
activity that affects foreign affairs to a single person or voice; at
best, it provides a mechanism for final authoritative decisionmaking in foreign relations. 9 In addition, it is difficult to see
how state activities could ever prevent the federal government
from exercising its foreign relations powers. The federal political branches always retain the power to preempt state law or ac-

tivity.2" Any argument that federal preemption is not always
available assumes a breakdown in the federal political process
of precisely the sort that I have just questioned.
The second response is that these state foreign relations activities remain subject to independent constitutional prohibitions.29 '

Many state laws that create foreign relations controversy are in
some fashion discriminatory-either against aliens, or against

foreign countries, or against foreign commerce.292 A number of
constitutional provisions-for instance, the Equal Protection and
the dormant Commerce Clauses-are designed to redress the evils
the National Security Council, and increasingly the Departments of Commerce and
Treasury, and the United States Trade Representative, all compete for control of the
foreign relations agenda. For examples from the trade context, see Paul B. Stephan
III, Don Wallace, Jr. & Julie A. Roin, International Business and Economics: Law
and Policy 773-75 (2d ed. 1996).
2 Edward S. Corwin, The President: Office and Powers, 1787-1984 at 201 (Randall
W. Bland, Theodore T. Hindson & Jack W. Peltason eds., 5th rev. ed. 1984).
See id. at 200-201.
,90
See Itel Containers Int'l Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60, 80-81 (1993) (Scalia,
J., concurring) ("[N]o state law can ever actually 'prevent this Nation from "speaking
with one voice"' . . . or 'interfere with [the United States'] ability "to speak with one
voice"' .... The National Government can always explicitly pre-empt the offending
state law." (citations omitted)).
21,Some might object that the availability of constitutional prohibitions should not
be used as an argument in favor of nonconstitutional lawmaking like the federal
common law of foreign relations. For two reasons, I do not think this objection applies here. First, the labels "constitutional" and "nonconstitutional" are misleading
in this context. Although the federal common law of foreign relations is subject to
congressional revision, it is still a constitutional doctrine to the extent that it (like, for
example, much of Article I, § 10 of the Constitution) reverses the normal burdens of
inertia for federal lawmaking. Second, I have argued that the federal common law of
foreign relations is illegitimate independent of the availability of related constitutional
antidiscrimination protections. I invoke these latter doctrines merely to mitigate the
concerns of those unconvinced by my argument.
292See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
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that inhere in these and related forms of discrimination. My
analysis does not question the validity of these doctrines, which
are available to invalidate state actions that offend constitutional
principles on grounds other than their foreign relations consequences.293 It merely questions whether there is a need for an additionaljudicially enforced limitation based on the foreign relations
quotient of state action that survives antidiscrimination scrutiny.
Finally, even if the concerns about federal political branch responsiveness to state foreign relations activity had some validity,
they would not, by themselves, justify the federal common law
of foreign relations. Assuming that it makes sense to speak of
federal foreign relations interests that are unprotected by the
national political process, it remains an open question whether
federal courts can adequately, and at an acceptable cost, protect
those interests while accommodating competing interests, including the legitimate interests of states. This is the subject of
the next Subsection.
2. The Overlooked Costs of the FederalCommon Law of Foreign
Relations

The federal common law of foreign relations is designed to
protect political branch prerogatives in foreign relations and,
more broadly, to protect the national foreign relations interests.
Before assessing the theoretical arguments as to whether courts
can perform this function, it is worth noting that in most cases
involving the federal common law of foreign relations, courts do
not in fact perform this function. They do not consult related
federal foreign relations enactments or attempt to assess the actual content of national foreign policy on the matter. Rather,
like most academic proponents of the federal common law of
foreign relations, they appear to make an unguided intuitive
judgment about the "foreign relations" quotient of a particular
case. Once this intuitive judgment has been satisfied, they conclude, without further analysis, that the issue must be governed
",The analysis does call into question the "one voice" component of the dormant
foreign Commerce Clause. See supra notes 85-89 and accompanying text. But the
antidiscrimination component, which is central, would still apply.
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by uniform federal law. And the content of this law, like the basis for judicial federalization, is rarely (if ever) informed by an
analysis of the actual foreign relations policies of the political
branches.294
This criticism is important, because it suggests that courts do
not engage in the tasks necessary to legitimate the practice. But
could they, even in theory? Is there any reason to think that federal courts could, in the absence of political branch guidance,
accurately determine when and how the foreign relations interests of the United States require preemption of state law? In answering this question, it is useful to compare the federal common
law of foreign relations with Article I, Section 10's structurally
similar requirement that states not keep troops or ships of war
absent prior congressional consent. Both prohibitions on state
activity are motivated by the fear that concurrent authority encourages states to engage in strategic behavior at the expense of
the national foreign relations interest. And both address this fear
by raising the costs of such unilateral state action in a manner-a
requirement of prior national consent-that ensures that the state
does not produce unacceptable foreign relations externalities.
But there are important differences. The prohibitions in Article I, Section 10 have a well-defined scope; their enforcement
involves the relatively straightforward inquiry as to whether the
state has kept troops or ships of war. The federal common law
of foreign relations, by contrast, contemplates that courts will, in
the absence of political or constitutional guidance: (a) identify
the foreign relations interests of the United States; (b) decide
whether the state activity unduly interferes with these interests
or with the political branches' management of these interests;
and, if so, (c) craft a federal law that accommodates these interests with other competing interests, including the interests of the
states. The latter tasks are much more open-ended and much
more demanding of the judiciary than the Article I, Section 10

2

4 The examples here are too numerous too cite.
For representative cases, see
Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968); Republic of Philippines v. Marcos, 806 F.2d
344 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied sub nom. New York Land Co. v. Republic of Philippines, 481 U.S. 1048 (1987).

HeinOnline -- 83 Va. L. Rev. 1691 1997

1692

VirginiaLaw Review

[Vol. 83:1617

inquiry.295 And as we have seen, the potential scope of the federal common law of foreign relations is much broader.96
The complex judgments that inhere in the federal common
law of foreign relations suggest that courts will often err in creating this law. It is difficult to demonstrate this point directly

without appealing to contested intuitions, because there is no
settled independent measure of which state foreign relations activities should be preempted. This is precisely the problem in this

area. Even without such an independent measurement, however, there is little reason to believe that federal courts can accurately make the judgments demanded by the federal common
law of foreign relations. First, by definition, federal courts lack
guidance by the political branches. Second, the judgments that

inhere in judicial lawmaking in this context are quintessential
standards.' Standards are supposed to gain case-by-case accuracy at the price of ex ante predictability by requiring the decisionmaker to make fine-grained contextual assessments of the
values in issue. But the success of a standard depends on the legal decisionmaker's ability to make intelligent and accurate
judgments.29 For the well-known reasons summarized above, 99

judges are particularly unsuited to make the fine-grained for-

' A similar point can be made by comparing the dormant Commerce Clause with
the federal common law of foreign relations. Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence
is often criticized for having high decision and error costs. And yet this jurisprudence
imposes many fewer demands on judges than the federal common law of foreign relations. The essential purpose of the dormant Commerce Clause cases-to keep the
channels of interstate commerce running smoothly without disruption from discriminatory state laws-is relatively straightforward, and American judges have at least a
rudimentary understanding of domestic commerce and domestic political considerations
tempting states to favor their own citizens and corporations. By contrast, questions
touching on foreign relations are infinite in their variety and potential complexity,
and judges tend to have very little understanding of these issues.
,96See supra Section I.C.; see also Weisburd, supra note 62, at 20 ("To argue that
federal common law must govern whenever a case implicates the international relations
of the United States is to provide a basis for taking all cases with international elements out of the state courts."); Linde, supra note 143, at 606 ("Independent judicial
policing of all state laws affecting foreign interests would in the modern world leave
few fields untouched ... ").
n See Cass R. Sunstein, Problems With Rules, 83 Cal. L. Rev. 953, 964-65 (1995).
I's See id. at 964-65.
2"See supra notes 208-212 and accompanying text.
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eign affairs judgments that inhere in the federal common law of
foreign relations.
This suggests that courts will often commit errors in the development of a federal common law of foreign relations. Two
types of error are possible: mistaken application of state law when
a federal common law rule would be appropriate, and mistaken
development of federal common law when state law should be
applied.' Although both types of error are mitigated by the
possibility of congressional override, such an override faces wellknown hurdles."° If these hurdles applied with equal force to
both types of error, they would tell us very little. °2 There are
plausible reasons, however, to think the hurdles to political
branch overrides are more easily surmounted with respect to
adverse state foreign relations activity than with respect to erroneous judicial federalizations of state law.
Section III.C.1 tried to explain why the hurdles to political
branch correction of untoward state foreign relations activity
are relatively insignificant. The likelihood of federal foreign
relations lawmaking by the political branches increases with the
threat state activity poses to the federal foreign relations interest. 3 Because political branches' responsiveness will be at its
height in such cases, we can worry less about courts erroneously
applying state law when they should have developed federal
common law.
The same is not true with respect to judicial errors in the creation and application of a federal common law of foreign relations.
An error in this context results when a court federalizes an issue
that does not in fact implicate the national foreign relations interest in a way that warrants a federal rule. This type of judicial
"IMoreover, a court might correctly decide that federal law should govern, but impose a rule that does not accurately capture the federal foreign relations interest.
30, See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 Mich. L. Rev.
67, 98-99 (1988); Daniel J. Meltzer, State Court Forfeitures of Federal Rights, 99
Harv. L. Rev. 1128, 1169-70 (1986); Merrill, supra note 31, at 22-23; Allan C.
Hutchinson & Derek Morgan, Calabresian Sunset: Statutes in the Shade, 82 Colum.
L. Rev. 1752, 1764-66 (1982) (book review).
"2Cf. Meltzer, supra note 301, at 1170 (legislative inertia argument is a "doubleedged sword").

- Cf. Eule, supra note 258, at 436 (making same point in context of dormant Commerce Clause).
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error-for example, the erroneous federalization of tort or contract law, or of a private international law rule-will not itself
typically affect U.S. foreign relations interests. Such an error
will not trigger the political branches' special means to monitor
and control adverse foreign relations activity, and thus will likely
encounter the usual hurdles to congressional override. The
states, of course, form a powerful interest group adept at overcoming such hurdles. 34 But they still face the burden of inertia.
This burden is almost certainly heightened by globalization's
countervailing pressure for uniform federal laws.0 5 In addition,
much of judge-made foreign relations law has a misleading constitutional flavor that might dissuade the political branches from
attempting to overrule it. Congress is especially unlikely to overrule lawmaking by the lower courts, where the large majority of
this law is made.'
There is thus good reason to believe that an asymmetry in
likely political branch responses privileges judicial mistakes in
creating a federal common law of foreign relations. The doctrine also suffers from other serious problems. Its standard-like
inquiries suggest that its promise of uniformity in federal foreign
relations law is illusory. There is every reason to expect that
judges who lack training and expertise in foreign relations will
reach different conclusions about the foreign relations consequences of particular state acts. This problem is exacerbated by
the fact that most of the federal common law of foreign relations
is made by the relatively decentralized lower federal and state
courts. Casual empiricism confirms the prediction of nonuniformity. The many cases in which judges federalize an issue under a foreign relations rubric are matched by many similar cases
in which judges, because they view the foreign relations effects
of applying state law differently, decide to apply state law.3 w
-See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation 153 (1994)
[hereinafter Eskridge, Dynamic Interpretation]; William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding
Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 Yale L.J. 331, 360 (1991).
- See supra notes 265, 270-271 and accompanying text.
See Eskridge, Dynamic Interpretation. supra note 304, at 151; Robert A. Katzmann, Bridging the Statutory Gulf Between Courts and Congress: A Challenge for
Positive Political Theory, 80 Geo. L.J. 653, 662 (1992).
3 See, e.g., Trojan Techs., Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 916 F.2d 903, 905-09 (3d Cir. 1990)
(holding that Pennsylvania's buy-American statute was not preempted); Toronto-
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This means that both the source and the content of the law are
uncertain in these cases-hardly the good the federal common
law of foreign relations is thought to serve.
The federal common law of foreign relations also fails to
serve its stated goal of ensuring that the foreign relations decisionmaking process is centralized in the federal political branches.
The availability of federal judicial lawmaking can only discourage
the federal political branches from exercising their constitutionally mandated foreign relations responsibilities. Moreover, it
encourages interested groups to seek novel federal foreign relations law in the courts, where the hurdles to lawmaking are generally lower than in the political branches. It is thus no surprise
that foreign sovereigns and others with foreign relations interests
increasingly participate in federal courts as parties and amici,
announcing their interest in, or offense at, the state action in
question. This gives foreign sovereigns potentially significant influence over the shaping of federal foreign relations law, since a
complaint by a foreign sovereign about the application of state
law is strong evidence of a foreign relations concern, and a
court's rejection of such a claim might itself cause offense.
All these difficulties with the federal common law of foreign
relations-its tendency to ignore federal enacted law, its casual
inquiry into actual U.S. foreign relations interests, its tendency
to make errors in identifying and accommodating these interests, its inherent nonuniformity, its decentralizing effects on the
federal foreign relations lawmaking process, and its encouragement of foreign sovereign amici activity-are well illustrated by
a pair of recent Fifth Circuit decisions.
In Torres v. Southern Peru Copper Corp.,38 Peruvian citizens
brought a state law tort suit in a Texas state court against American and foreign corporations (including the named defendant,
Peru's largest mining company) for environmental damage that
occurred in Peru. In Marathon Oil Co. v. Ruhrgas, A.G.,' plaintiffs sued Germany's largest gas company in a Texas state court
Dominion Bank v. Hall, 367 F. Supp. 1009, 1013-14 (E.D. Ark. 1973) (applying state
law to find that reciprocity is not a condition to giving conclusive effect to a foreign
judgment in Arkansas).
' 113 F.3d 540 (5th Cir. 1997).
- 115 F.3d 315 (5th Cir. 1997).
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for a variety of business-related torts arising out of agreements
to explore for gas in the North Sea. Defendants in both cases
removed to federal court on the ground that the private law
claims arose under the federal common law of foreign relations. 0
Unsurprisingly, the governments of Peru and Germany both supported these contentions with letters of protest to the State Department and amicus briefs that emphasized that the suits would
31
adversely affect their relations with the United States".
The
same panel of the Fifth Circuit held that plaintiffs in Torres
stated a claim under the federal common law of foreign relations but that plaintiffs in Marathon Oil did not. 2
The key to the conclusions reached in these cases was the
court's differing assessment of the foreign relations consequences
of each suit. In Torres, the court was "alerted... to the foreign
policy issues" in the case by Peru's "vigorousness in opposing
the action."3 3' With no apparent input from the executive branch
and no analysis of U.S.-Peruvian relations, the court concluded
that the complaint in Torres "raises substantial questions of federal common law by implicating important foreign policy concerns."3 4' This was so, the court explained, because the Peruvian
government's close involvement with, and regulation of, the Peruvian mining industry's harvest of Peruvian natural resources
meant that the lawsuit "strikes not only at vital economic interests but also at Peru's sovereign interests."3 5 By contrast, in
Marathon Oil, the court concluded that the suit would not
"impact severely the vital economic interests of a highly developed and flourishing industrial nation such as Germany" and
did not "strike at [Germany's] sovereignty."3 6' The court did not
explain why a suit against Peru's heavily regulated but privately
owned copper company implicated important United States for-

30 Defendants' ultimate goal in both cases was seeking a forum non conveniens
dismissal that could more easily be obtained in federal, rather than state, court.
311 MarathonOil, 115 F.3d at 320; Torres, 113 F.3d at 542.
3 Marathon Oil, 115 F.3d at 320; Torres, 113 F.3d at 543.
313
Torres, 113 F.3d at 542-43. The court was careful to emphasize that Peru's amicus
participation "does not, standing alone, create a question of federal law." Id.
314

Id. at 543.

315Id.
316Marathon Oil, 115

F.3d at 320.
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eign relations interests, while a suit against Germany's largest but

less regulated gas company did not.3 17 Its independent analysis
of the Torres lawsuit's effect on U.S. foreign relations led it to
overlook and act in a manner inconsistent with the requirements
of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA"). 318 And as is
to be expected when decentralized courts make federal common
law on the basis of independent foreign relations judgments, the
federal common law rule announced in Torres is inconsistent
with scores of very similar cases in which federal jurisdiction was
denied.319

"'The court clearly believed that Peru had a more intimate relationship with the
Southern Peru Copper Corporation than Germany did with Ruhrgas, and that Peruvian copper was a more important national resource for Peru than North Sea gas was
to Germany. But its analysis further assumed that (a) the Torres suit would have a
profound adverse effect on Peru, Torres, 113 F.3d at 543, while the Marathon Oil suit
would have little effect on Germany, and therefore, that (b) the suit in Torres thus
implicated important U.S. foreign policy interests while the suit in Marathon Oil did not,
Marathon Oil, 115 F.3d at 320. These assumptions lacked any apparent factual basis.
31828 U.S.C. § 1330, 1602-11 (1994). The FSIA bars all U.S. courts from exercising
jurisdiction when, according to its provisions, a foreign sovereign is immune from suit.
Id. §§ 1330(a), 1604. It also establishes the exclusive basis for federal jurisdiction when,
according to its terms, foreign states are not immune from suit. Id. § 1330; see also
Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 434 (1989). The
FSIA specifies that when a foreign sovereign's immunity from suit is denied and the
case goes forward, otherwise-applicable state law governs the merits. 28 U.S.C. § 1606
(1994). The jurisdictional and immunity provisions of the FSIA are carefully limited
to (among other things) suits against a foreign state or an agency or instrumentality
of foreign states, which is defined to include a separate legal person, a majority of
whose shares is owned by the foreign state. Id. § 1603(b). Entities that are closely
related to a foreign sovereign but who do not satisfy this definition cannot invoke the
FSIA's jurisdictional or immunity provisions. See Joseph W. Dellapenna, Suing Foreign Governments and Their Corporations 21-24 (1988). Congress believed the
FSIA's provisions sufficed to "serve the interests of justice and ... protect the rights
of ... foreign states ... in United States [state and federal] courts." 28 U.S.C. § 1602
(1994). The court in Torres ignored these provisions and effectively declared that
they did not suffice to protect the rights of foreign states. Based on its own casespecific analysis of the requirements of U.S. foreign relations, the court established a
mechanism by which foreign corporations with connections to foreign states too attenuated to invoke the jursidiction of the FSIA could avail themselves of federal jurisdiction and, even more generously than the FSIA, of the protections of federal
judge-made law rather than otherwise applicable state law. Torres, 113 F.3d at 543.
319 See, e.g., Gates v. Victor Fine Foods, 54 F.3d 1457, 1461, 1465 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied sub nom. Fletcher's Fine Foods, Ltd. v. Gates, 116 S. Ct. 187 (1995); Edlow
Int'l Co. v. Nuklearna Elektrarna Krsko, 441 F. Supp. 827, 831-32 (D.D.C. 1977);
United Arab Shipping Co. v. AI-Hashim, 574 N.Y.S.2d 743,744 (App. Div. 1991).
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Torres and Marathon Oil together illustrate the difficulties that
inhere in a federal common law of foreign relations. But what
about the objection that the problems created by residual state
control of such cases-the threat of fifty different voices in foreign affairs-are more significant? The intuition that supports
this objection is powerful. I hope by now that the misconceptions
on which it rests are clear. There is little reason to think that
state control over matters not governed by enacted federal law
affects U.S. foreign relations in a way that warrants preemption.
Of course, states-like corporations, individuals, and federal government officials-can pursue their self-interest to the detriment
of U.S. foreign relations. The political branches, however, are
quite capable of identifying and responding to any adverse consequences of this behavior. A supplemental federal judicial lawmaking power discourages such political branch action while
creating serious problems of its own. It is worth remembering
that only the federal government (including federal courts), and
not the states, makes federal foreign relations law.32° Many of the
just-identified problems of a federal common law of foreign relations-disincentives for political branch action in this context,
decentralization of the federal foreign relations lawmaking process, and nonuniformity of federal foreign relations law-are thus
not present in a world governed by state law in the absence of a
controlling federal enactment.
IV. ASSESSMENT AND OBJECTIONS
After briefly summarizing the normative case for the elimination of the federal common law of foreign relations, this Part
considers the significant support for this conclusion in recent
Supreme Court decisions. It then addresses two general objections to my analysis.
A. Is the Supreme Court Moving in This Direction?
The best argument for the federal common law of foreign relations is that its federalism benefits are so important that they

320State courts can (and must) apply federal common law when such law is legitimate. My argument is that it is not legitimate.
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outweigh separation of powers and judicial competence concerns
" ' I have argued that the federal common
raised by the practice.32
law of foreign relations represents a sharp break with 175 years
of historical practice,3" that the evils addressed by the doctrine
are overstated, that the political branches have relatively little
need for federal judicial assistance in protecting their foreign
relations prerogatives,3"4 and that the federal courts are not wellsuited to provide such assistance in any event.3' In light of the
likely asymmetry in political branch responses to judicial errors
in the development of federal foreign relations law 26 1conclude
that the federal common law of foreign relations lacks justification, and should be abandoned.
Several developments in the Supreme Court since the birth of
the federal common law of foreign relations in the 1960s support
this conclusion. The most significant development came in Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Board of California.3" At issue

there was California's method for taxing multinational corporations. Opponents of the state's "worldwide combined reporting"
had tried unsuccessfully for over thirty years to convince the
federal political branches to preempt it.3" Unsurprisingly, their
failure in the political process prompted suit in federal court.
There, plaintiffs claimed that the statute "impair[ed] federal uniformity in an area where federal uniformity is essential" by
"preven[ting] the Federal Government from 'speaking with one
'
voice' in international trade."329
In support of this claim, they
33
relied heavily on Zschernig," the enormous diplomatic contro-

See supra Section III.A.
See supra Part II.
32,
See supra Section III.B.
321

"2

124See

supra Section III.C.1.
See supra Section III.C.2.
326See id.
3- 512 U.S 298 (1994).
31,See id. at 324-25 & n.23. For a general account of these efforts, see Hocking, supra
"2

note 236, at 130-51.
329512 U.S. at 320 (quoting Japan Line Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434,
448 (1979) (quoting, in turn, Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285 (1976))).
- See Petitioner's Brief at 42-43, Barclays Bank (No. 92-1384).
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versy provoked by the California scheme, 31 amicus filings from
foreign nations alleging offense at the California law,332 and a variety of executive branch pronouncements.333

The Court rejected the challenge and in the process gutted
the essential components of the federal common law of foreign

relations. First, it rejected the foreign relations effects test. It
made clear that courts had no authority to identify these effects
and weigh them against the competing legitimate interests of
states. 4 Instead, the Court emphasized that it was the job of
"Congress-whose voice, in this area, is the Nation's-to evaluate whether the national interest is best served by tax uniformity,
or state autonomy."335 Second, the Court made clear that the

"one voice" test could not serve as a criterion for judicial federalization. 336 The Court accordingly dismissed as irrelevant the
California scheme's inconsistency with "Executive Branch com-

munications that express federal policy but lack the force of
law., 37 What mattered was that no federal law validly enacted by
one of the political branches had preempted the state action.338

Third, the Court established a presumption that congressional
inaction in the face of adverse state foreign relations activity in-

311See id. at 43. The amicus brief filed by our closest trading partners cited dozens of
Diplomatic Notes and other formal communications to the United States complaining
about the California practice. See Brief of the Member States of the European
Communities (Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom) and the governments of Australia, Austria, Canada, Finland, Japan, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner app., Barclays Bank (No. 92-1384).
332See, e.g., id.; Brief of the Government of the United Kingdom as Amicus Curiae
in Support of Petitioner, Barclays Bank (No. 92-1384); see also Barclays Bank, 512
U.S. at 324 n. 22 (cataloging reactions of foreign governments to California's method
of taxation).
33 See Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. at 328 & n.30.
- Id. at 328 (petitioners' claim of potential retaliation by trading partners "directed
to the wrong forum" because "[t]he judiciary is not vested with power to decide 'how
to balance a particular sovereign risk of retaliation against the sovereign right of the
United States as a whole to let the States tax as they please' (quoting Container
Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 194 (1983))).
33-Id. at 331.
336Id.

at 328-31.

.37 Id.

at 330.
- Id. at 328-30.
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dicates "Congress' willingness to tolerate" the state practice.3 9

These three factors, taken together, undermine much of the logic
of the federal common law of foreign relationsY
Other recent foreign relations decisions outside the federalism context mark an analogous retreat from doctrines that require courts to make foreign relations judgments. In E.E.0. C.
v. Arabian American Oil Co. (Aramco),' the Court established

a strict presumption against extraterritoriality in the absence of
a plain legislative statement to the contrary. After explaining
that this rule "serves to protect against unintended clashes between our laws and those of other nations which could result in
3 ' the Court invited Congress to amend
international discord,""

Title VII and "calibrate its provisions in a way that we cannot. '

As Curtis Bradley has explained, the Court in Aramco recognized
its relative incompetence to make fine-grained foreign relations
judgments, and it conceived its proper role to be one of encouraging the political branches to embody such judgments in federal legislation.'
A similar strategy was at work in the Court's most recent act
of state decision. As discussed, Sabbatino made the act of state

doctrine's applicability turn on a judicial assessment of the foreign relations implications of examining the validity of foreign
acts of state. 5 Not surprisingly, in light of the institutional competence and structural factors discussed above, act of state juris"3'Id. at 327; see also id. af 326 ("Congress implicitly has permitted the States to use
the worldwide combined reporting method."); id. at 331 (Blackmun, J., concurring)
(stating that majority opinion relies on "congressional inaction to conclude 'that Congress implicitly has permitted the States to use the worldwide combined reporting
method'). The Court did not specify whether this inference is limited to cases, like
Barclays Bank, in which Congress had expressly considered and rejected federalization of the state activity in question. See Eskridge, supra note 301, at 90 & n.140.
-See Spiro, supra note 62, at 164 (Barclays Bank represents "a highly significant
retreat in a line of foreign Commerce Clause rulings articulating a 'one voice' approach
parallel to other forms of foreign affairs preemption"); see also Barclays Bank, 512
U.S. at 332 (Scalia, J., concurring) (majority opinion effectively eliminates the "speak
with one voice" test).
4'499 U.S. 244 (1991). Aramco is a subsidiary of the Arabian American Oil Company. See id. at 247.
Id. at 248.
','Id. at 259 (emphasis added).
See Bradley, supra note 212, at 112.
'4'See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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prudence for a quarter century following Sabbatino was notoriously confused and inconsistent. 6 In W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v.
Environmental Tectonics Corp., 7 the Supreme Court went a
long way toward eliminating the relevance of inquiries into the
foreign relations implications of decisions. At issue was whether
the act of state doctrine barred the adjudication of a suit between Americans that involved bribes to Nigerian officials. Both
lower courts had engaged in fine-grained inquiries into the foreign relations consequences of the adjudication. 8 But the Court
rejected this standard-like approach to the doctrine's applicability. 9 It held that these inquiries are irrelevant unless the validity of a foreign act of state is in question.35 This approach
significantly narrowed the scope of judicial foreign relations inquiries in the act of state context and left it to the federal political branches to embody any concerns about these adjudiciations
in a federal enactment.
Taken together, Barclays Bank, Aramco, and Environmental
Tectonics suggest that in nonconstitutional foreign relations
cases in which the political branches' wishes are uncertain, the
Court follows an interpretive strategy that both eschews foreign
policy judgments by the judiciary and encourages the political
branches to consider and address such concerns in enacted federal law. 5 This is precisely the strategy we would expect based
36 See Joseph W. Dellapenna, Deciphering the Act of State Doctrine, 35 Vill. L.
Rev. 1, 3-9 (1990).
- 493 U.S. 400 (1990).
-The district court concluded that the act of state doctrine should apply because
inquiry into foreign sovereign motivation would "result in embarrassment to the sovereign or constitute interference in the conduct of foreign policy of the United
States." 659 F. Supp. 1381, 1392-93 (D.N.J. 1987). The court of appeals concluded,
to the contrary, that the doctrine did not apply because the inquiry into motivation
would not produce "unique embarrassment... [or] particular interference with the
conduct of foreign affairs." 847 F.2d 1052, 1061 (3d Cir. 1988).
-4 Environmental Tectonics, 493 U.S. at 404-06.
3
Id. at 406.
3s, This interpretive strategy functions much like information-forcing default rules in
contract theory. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Con-

tracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 Yale L.J. 87, 97 (1989); Robert E.
Scott, A Relational Theory of Default Rules for Commercial Contracts, 19 J. Legal

Stud. 597, 609-11 (1990). On the application of contract theory default rules to statutory interpretation, see Cass Sunstein, Justice Scalia's Democratic Formalism, 106
Yale L.J. (forthcoming 1997).
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on the judiciary's relative incompetence in ascertaining the appropriate content of an uncertain federal rule that is ultimately
subject to political branch expertise and control.35 This strategy
is especially appropriate in the context of the federal common
law of foreign relations, for there are independent reasons to

believe that Congress will intervene and remedy untoward state

activity when appropriate.53
The Court's pursuit of a similar information-forcing strategy
in the domestic federalism context provides further support for
the elimination of the federal common law of foreign relations.
The Court's various state-protecting plain-statement rules aim
to ensure, among other things, that the political branches rather
than the courts make the decision to preempt state law3 4 Along
similar lines, the Court's most recent federal common law rulings have criticized the "runaway tendencies of 'federal common
law' untethered to a genuinely identifiable (as opposed to judi"I See Sunstein, supra note 351.
-,This is an important point. One problem with a judicial information-forcing
strategy is that a court cannot always be confident that its information-forcing rule
worked when Congress responds with silence. Consider the presumption against extraterritoriality. What if a court applies this doctrine to an ambiguous statute and Congress does not respond? Did the rule force information? Does the silence represent
agreement with a court's choice of legal regimes or is it simply a product of legislative
inertia and limited resources? If forcing information were a court's only objective, it
should have established the opposite presumption, in favor of extraterritoriality, because it is much more likely that such a presumption would run counter to congressional
wishes and induce complaints from foreign sovereigns, thus providing an informative
congressional response. There are all sorts of institutional reasons why the Court
does not in fact engage in such "pure" information-forcing strategies. The point here
is that we can only be confident that an information-forcing rule will work to the extent that we think it is likely to induce an informative legislative response. In this respect, the elimination of the federal common law of foreign relations is a better information-forcing rule than the presumption against extraterritoriality, for, as I
explained above, there are powerful independent reasons to think that political branch
silence is meaningful, and (to put the same point a different way) that the political
branches will respond when the absence of federal law is the wrong rule. Cf. Bradley,
supra note 212, at 166-69 (arguing that presumption against extraterritoriality may
force Congress to decide extraterritorial scope of federal law).
3-1
See, e.g., Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 786-88 (1991);
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460-64 (1991); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon,
473 U.S. 234, 238-40 (1985); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey,
Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45
Vand. L. Rev. 593, 596-98 (1992) (analyzing the Court's application of clear statement rules during the 1970s and 1980s).
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cially constructed) federal policy,"3 "5 and emphasized that reliance
upon such law is limited to those cases involving a "significant
conflict between some federal policy or interest and the use of
state law. 356 These decisions did not involve foreign relations
and did not purport to affect the legitimacy of Sabbatino or
3 " But they do reflect a narrowing
Zschernig.
of federal common
law generally, and a distinct preference for political rather than
judicial preemption.
Finally, it is worth emphasizing how little Supreme Court jurisprudence (as opposed to lower court precedent and academic
commentary) depends on the existence of a federal common law
of foreign relations.3"8 The Court has already severely restricted

the content of its two recognized federal common law of foreign
relations doctrines-the act of state doctrine and the one-voice
component of the dormant foreign Commerce Clause. 59 The
three act of state decisions since Sabbatino declined to apply the

doctrine." These decisions have created numerous restrictions
35

O'Melveny & Myers v. F.D.I.C., 512 U.S. 79, 89 (1994).
Atherton v. F.D.I.C., 117 S. Ct. 666, 670 (1997) (quoting Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966)).
"I See id. at 673-74 (distinguishing the claimed federal interest as "far weaker than
was present in," among other cases, Sabbatino).
3m Perhaps the most cited decision in support of the federal common law of foreign
relations is Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981),
which stated that the federal common law includes areas "concerned with ... international disputes implicating ...our relations with foreign nations." This statement,
however, was dictum. The Court held only that there was no federal common law
right of contribution from antitrust co-conspirators. Id. at 643-44. The decision had
nothing to do with foreign relations.
351
The Court never directly applied the dormant foreign relations preemption doctrine announced in Zschernig. Soon after Zschernig, however, the Court dismissed
factually similar cases for lack of a substantial federal question. See Maier, supra
note 97, at 141-43 & n.43 (citing Gorun v. Fall, 393 U.S. 398 (1968), and Ioannou v.
New York, 391 U.S. 604 (1968) (per curiam)).
310
See W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400, 40910 (1990) (concluding that validity of foreign act of state not in question); Alfred
Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 689-95 (1976) (finding nothing in record that reveals an official act of state); First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de
Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 764-70 (1972) (three-Justice plurality) (concluding that doctrine
does not apply when executive branch advises against its application); id. at 770-73
(Douglas, J., concurring) (sovereign waived act of state doctrine by filing suit); id. at
773-76 (Powell, J., concurring) (potential for conflict between political and judicial
branches not sufficient to apply act of state doctrine).
-6
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and exceptions that effectively limit the doctrine to the facts of
Sabbatino"6 The validity limitation announced in Environmental Tectonics, in particular, seems to have significantly curtailed the act of state doctrine's relevance. As for the one-voice
test in dormant foreign Commerce Clause cases: Barclays Bank
effectively eliminated it.362
B. Objections
My argument for the elimination of the federal common law of
foreign relations is subject to at least two important types of objection. The first is that it ignores intermediate solutions between
the extremes of the current practice and its elimination. The
second is that it ignores problems of interpretive indeterminacy.
1. IntermediateSolutions
To this point I have analyzed the validity of judge-made foreign relations law on the assumption that the alternatives were
to retain the practice in its current form or eliminate it. This assumption was made for analytic purposes to highlight the logic
and consequences of the modern practice. But there are a number of intermediate solutions between the extremes of the modern practice and its elimination. One might object that one or
some of these intermediate solutions are preferable to the elimination of judge-made foreign relations law.
a. A Narrower,More CategoricalApproach
One intermediate solution would be for courts to replace the
open-ended and relatively indeterminate effects standard for
judge-made foreign relations law with narrower, more categorical foreign relations lawmaking criteria. For example, Professor
Arthur Weisburd, who is generally critical of the federal common
law of foreign relations, suggests that application of the doctrine
i See Dellapenna, supra note 318, at 294-319 (discussing limitations on and exceptions to the act of state doctrine).
-2See supra note 336 and accompanying text. In addition, as mentioned above, the
Court-has stated that the immigration power is exclusively federal, but it does not appear that a constitutionally based exclusive power adds anything to the federal political
branches' comprehensive occupation of the field. See supra note 159.
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be limited to three circumstances: (a) "any matter that requires a
prior decision about what counts as a foreign state"; (b) "matters
where a foreign state's public policy will be subject to formal judicial evaluation"; and (c) "immigration matters."363 Professor
Henkin suggests a different list: "the determination of customary international law and comity for judicial purposes; guidelines
for the interpretation of treaties and the meaning of particular
treaty provisions; the principles of (international) conflicts of
laws; rules as to access of foreign governments to domestic courts
and the treatment of foreign judgments. "
A narrower categorical approach would reduce the decision
costs and perhaps some of the error costs that inhere in the current practice. But as the disagreements between Professors Weisburd and Henkin indicate, the fundamental problem of deciding
which narrowly defined categories warrant judicial preemption
would remain. The task would be for courts to determine which
judicially identifiable categories of preemption best serve the
doctrine's underlying purposes. This task would be subject to
all of Section III's criticisms-the uncertain need for such law,
courts' relative incompetence to choose the appropriate category of preemption and the content of this law, asymmetry in
political branch incentives to revise judicial errors, and so on.
The most plausible categories for self-executing and exclusive
federal foreign relations powers are found in Article I, Section
10 of the Constitution: international agreements, the regulation
of war, and the taxation of imports and exports. 6 As explained
above,366 the best functional justification for these prohibitions on
state power is that concurrent state power in these areas is especially likely to harm the federal foreign relations process, and
the clarity of the prohibitions attenuates the need for judicial
enforcement and minimizes errors when judicial enforcement is
necessary. These considerations suggest that any rule-based approach to the federal common law of foreign relations should

3 Weisburd, supra note 62, at 59.
3
6 Henkin, supra note 1, at 139 (citation omitted). Professor Henkin, unlike Professor
Weisburd, supra note 62, at 59, does not purport to make his list exclusive.
31

See Spiro, supra note 62, at 170 n.190.
supra Section III.A.

366See
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track the categorical form and traditional foreign relations content of Article I, Section 10.
This conclusion is less significant than it might at first appear,
for a federal common law of foreign relations so conceived
would have very little practical scope. This is so because the
closer a state act gets to impinging on a traditional foreign relations prerogative of the federal government, the more likely it is
that this act is either barred by Article I, Section 10 or a federal
political branch enactment, or that the federal political branches
will intervene to protect these prerogatives. Consider the sending
and receiving of ambassadors. The problem is this: Although
Article VI of the Articles of Confederation prohibited states
from "send[ing] any embassy to, or receiv[ing] any embassy
from," foreign states' 67 Article I, Section 10 does not mention
this prohibition. And yet for some, it seems inconceivable that
this quintessentially international activity should be anything
other than an exclusive prerogative of the federal government. "
As an initial matter, it is far from inconceivable that states retain some authority to "send and receive ambassadors." Foreign
trade and economic development missions are standard activities for U.S. governors. So too is the receiving and entertaining
of foreign sovereign representatives. However, as states begin
to send and receive ambassadors in a fashion that impinges on
traditional diplomatic prerogatives, enacted federal law becomes
implicated. Although Article I, Section 10 is silent on this point,
its express prohibition against states entering into treaties or
making compacts or waging war attenuates the possibility that
states will send and receive ambassadors in a manner that interferes with federal diplomatic prerogatives. The complex web of
treaties, statutes, and regulations that govern U.S. diplomatic
relations provides further protection for federal prerogatives in
this context.69 Any remaining doubt about the adequacy of le367U.S.

Articles of Confederation art. VI.
- See Clark, supra note 62, at 1297-98; see also Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14
Pet.) 540,575 (1840) (Taney, J.).
- See, e.g., Diplomatic Relations Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 254a-254e (1994); Foreign Sov-

ereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-11 (1994); Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations, Apr. 23, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261; Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961,23 U.S.T. 3227,500 U.N.T.S. 95.
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gal protection for federal interests in this context is dissipated by
the Logan Act, which prohibits citizens from communicating with
foreign governments "with intent to influence [their] measures
or conduct.., in relation to any disputes or controversies with
37 And even if these provisions did not prothe United States.""
hibit a state's attempt to send or receive an ambassador in a way
that disrupted federal prerogatives, there is no reason to think
that the political branches are less than fully capable of acting
quickly to do so."'
For these reasons, it seems unlikely that a rule-based approach
to the federal common law of foreign relations limited to traditional foreign relations activities would differ much from my
proposed elimination of the doctrine. And as the scope of the
doctrine expands to include nontraditional state foreign relations
activities that require more fine-grained contextual assessments,
a rule-based approach will be much harder to craft, and error
costs of any such rule will likely be significant.
b. Executive Suggestion
Another intermediate solution is that courts should make
federal foreign relations law only when the executive branch officially suggests-in the form of a brief or other communication
to a court-that the foreign relations interests of the United
States require such law. The executive's statement would constitute case-specific federal law binding on courts. In the twentieth
century, such an "executive suggestion" has been employed in a
number of discrete contexts."2 Most prominently, it was used to
determine a foreign sovereign's immunity from suit during the

- 18 U.S.C. § 953 (1994). The Logan Act was enacted in 1798. For its background
and history, see Detlev F. Vagts, The Logan Act: Paper Tiger or Sleeping Giant?, 60
Am. J. Int'l L. 268, 269-80 (1966); Kevin M. Kearney, Note, Private Citizens in Foreign Affairs: A Constitutional Analysis, 36 Emory LJ.285, 287-306 (1987).
-' Cf. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987, Pub. L. No. 99-661,
§ 522, 100 Stat. 3816, 3871 (Congress's response to state governors' exploitation of
the gap in federal authority to call up National Guard troops).
- The executive suggestion is largely a 20th-century development. See John Norton
Moore, The Role of the State Department in Judicial Proceedings, 31 Fordham L.
Rev. 277,284 & n.41 (1962).
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thirty-year period prior to the enactment of the FSIA in 1976.3' 3
It has also been deemed binding on courts for issues such as the
recognition of nations and governments and the existence of a
state of war or neutrality.374
At first glance, the executive suggestion appears to solve many
of the problems associated with judge-made foreign law, because
the executive has the expertise, the democratic accountability,
and the centralized decisionmaking capabilities that federal courts
lack. But outside of very discrete contexts identified to be the
exclusive prerogative of the President, the executive suggestion
has been strongly criticized by commentators375 and resisted by
courts.376 While it does not suffer from many of the problems associated with the federal common law of foreign relations, the
executive suggestion does suffer from other debilitating flaws.
Most significantly, in contrast to the delegated executive lawmaking powers discussed above, the executive suggestion has no
legal basis. Congress has not generally authorized executive
lawmaking power of this sort. Article II cannot plausibly support this power, and Article III is viewed by many to prohibit
it.3" In addition, case-specific federal lawmaking without notice,
opportunity to be heard, or appellate review does violence to
basic notions of due process. And the existence of a power to
" See Ex Parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 588-89 (1943); see generally Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Claims against Foreign States-A Proposal for Reform of United States Law, 44
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 901 (1969).
314See Moore, supra note 372, at 278-79 (collecting sources).
311 See, e.g., Philip C. Jessup, The Use of International Law 77-86 (1959); Moore,
supra note 372, at 296-302; Thomas M. Franck, The Courts, The State Department
and National Policy: A Criterion for Judicial Abdication, 44 Minn. L. Rev. 1101,
1102-04 (1960).
376In First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972), a
majority of Justices rejected the view that the executive could determine through an
executive suggestion whether courts should or should not apply the act of state doctrine.
Id. at 773 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 782-85 (Brennan, J., dissenting). And the
Court in both Sabbatino and Zschernig went out of its way to avoid tying the federal
common law of foreign relations to executive branch representations. See supra note
41 and accompanying text.
Yn See, e.g., Philip C. Jessup, Has the Supreme Court Abdicated One of Its Functions?, 40 Am. J. Int'l L. 168, 170-71 (1946).
37 The State Department's pre-FSIA practice was to give foreign states an informal
hearing on the question of immunity. See Lowenfeld, supra note 373, at 912-13. But
the State Department lacked most of the procedural accouterments needed for a fair
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make case-specific federal law would likely impose unwanted
burdens on the executive branch." The executive's pre-FSIA
control over foreign sovereign immunity determinations provides
a nice example. Such control was generally viewed to be more
hurtful that helpful to the foreign relations process because it

politicized the immunity determinations and made a denial of
immunity seem more offensive to foreign sovereigns than did a
similar ruling by a judge. 8 For this reason, the executive branch
strongly supported the statutory codification of foreign sovereign
immunity in 1976.381
Perhaps because of these problems, no one has seriously proposed that the executive suggestion replace the federal common
law of foreign relations. But this analysis does raise the question: Why not solve any difficulties presented by state foreign
relations activities by having the State Department promulgate

administrative rules to regulate such activities? This would
solve the legitimacy and institutional competence concerns of the
federal common law of foreign relations as well as the legitimacy and due process concerns of the executive suggestion."8 A

full analysis of this position is not my task, for I have argued
that the federal political branches currently require no supplemental assistance. But those who think they do must explain
why courts rather than agencies should supply this assistance.383

adjudication, including adequate factfinding resources, appellate review, or written
opinions. See id. at 912 & n.33.
31 See Jessup, supra note 375, at 85; Note, Judicial Deference to the State Department on International Legal Issues, 97 U. Pa. L. Rev. 79, 91-92 (1948).
See Jessup, supra note 375, at 85; Lowenfeld, supra note 373, at 913; Moore, supra note 372, at 299. See also Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, H.R. Rep.
No. 94-1487, at 7 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6606 (one purpose of
enacting FSIA was to free the State Department "from pressures from foreign governments to recognize their immunity from suit and from any adverse consequences
resulting from an unwillingness of the Department to support that immunity").
- See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487, at 9
(1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6608.
- Cf. Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110 Harv. L.
Rev. 469 (1996) (making similar point in context of federal criminal law).
- Cf. Eule, supra note 258, at 435-37 (making similar point in context of dormant
Commerce Clause).
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c. Motive Review
A third intermediate solution is judicial review of state activity based on impermissible purpose or motive to conduct foreign
relations. This approach finds passing support in Zschernig
and some lower court decisions."' It would avoid many of the
evils of a foreign relations effects test. In a world in which most
state activity can affect foreign affairs, it would likely do a better
job than the effects test of preventing states from competing with
the federal government for control of foreign relations. It would
also be easier for courts to administer than an open-ended effects test. As many have pointed out, courts are much better at
smoking out impermissible purpose than they are at identifying,
weighing, and accommodating the effects of government action."6
A motive test would also narrow the federal common law of
foreign relations' scope of preemption significantly, for most state
laws potentially subject to preemption-for example, most private international law rules and the manner in which a state
treats its citizens-are facially neutral and were not designed with
the purpose of influencing U.S. foreign relations. By contrast, a
motive test would likely prohibit state foreign relations activities
such as nuclear freeze ordinances and political sanctions that,
for many, present the strongest case for the federal common law
of foreign relations.
I have argued that the federal political branches do not require judicial assistance in preventing states from intruding on
federal prerogatives in foreign relations. But if I am wrong about
this, then for the reasons just stated motive analysis seems the
best way for courts to proceed in regulating state foreign relations activity. The primary problem that courts would face in
this regard would be the definition and identification of the impermissible foreign relations ends.
389 U.S. at 433-34 & n.5.
- See, e.g., Springfield Rare Coin Galleries, Inc. v. Johnson, 503 N.E.2d 300, 305
(Ill. 1986); see also Maier, supra note 97, at 155-59.
See, e.g., John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust 136-40 (1980); Ashutosh
Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis, 85 Cal. L. Rev. 297, 321-23
(1997); Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental
Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 413, 505-14 (1996); Regan,
supra note 254, at 1143-60.
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2. Indeterminacy of Interpretation

One might object to my definition of judge-made foreign relations law as foreign relations law made by courts in the absence
of political branch authorization. Most statutory interpretation
can be construed as a form of delegated or interpretive federal
common lawmaking. There is no generally accepted way to
know when legitimate statutory interpretation ends and groundless judicial lawmaking begins. Indeed, in our post-realist world,
the distinction makes little sense, at least in very large gray areas
of statutory interpretation. This standard problem raises the
question: How do courts distinguish between, on the one hand,
permissible federal common law authorized by the Constitution,
statute, or treaty, and on the other, impermissible federal common law that lacks any basis in enacted federal law? Others
have addressed this problem in detail." My modest aim here is
to suggest how my thesis that judicial preemption of state foreign relations activities must be grounded in a federal enactment
relates to these standard interpretive difficulties.
First, every area of federal common law discussed in this Article lacks plausible authorization in a federal enactment." As a
result, the insistence that courts focus on political branch enactments rather than on their own assessments of the foreign
relations consequences of an adjudication will significantly limit
the scope of the doctrine. Thus, for example, the FSIA's requirement that otherwise applicable state law governs legal disputes involving foreign sovereigns makes it difficult to conclude
(as many courts have done) that a federal common law of foreign relations should govern certain tort, property, and contract
issues in alien diversity suits against non-sovereigns. 9 Similarly,
the political branches have consistently attached reservations,
understandings, and declarations to their ratifications of international human rights treaties to ensure that the norms of these
treaties do not apply as domestic federal law that trumps state
See Eskridge, Dynamic Interpretation, supra note 304, at 48-80; Merrill, supra
note 21; at 328-32; Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State,
103 Harv. L. Rev. 405, 411-13 (1989).
-s This explains why courts that have developed the federal common law of foreign
relations have not relied on enacted federal law.
9See my criticism of Torres supra note 319 and accompanying text.
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law.3"' In this light, the near-unanimous academic view that customary international human rights law applies as an element of
the federal common law of foreign relations to trump state law
has little justification.39' For these customary international human
rights norms are based almost exclusively on the very treaties
that the political branches
have taken pains to exclude from the
39
law.
federal
of
domain
Second, in the few plausible cases in which there is genuine
uncertainty about whether enacted law supports a federal common law of foreign relations rule, my thesis does not speak to
the debate about statutory interpretation or the appropriate
level of authorization for federal common law. It insists only
that the interpretive analysis not be informed by a notion of
dormant foreign relations preemption, or by the federal courts'
independent view of the foreign relations consequences of applying state law.
CONCLUSION

In this Article, I have made historical and normative claims.
On the historical side, I have argued that the federal common
law of foreign relations does not, as many suppose, have a long
pedigree. The doctrine appeared on the scene for the first time
in 1964. And the doctrine has found much less support in subsequent Supreme Court jurisprudence than is commonly thought.
The Court applied the doctrine in only a few instances after
1964, and in recent years it has significantly undercut the force
of these precedents. In sum, the federal common law of foreign
relations had a late birth and an uncertain life in Supreme Court
jurisprudence.
On the normative side, I have argued that the federal common law of foreign relations lacks justification. The most frequently cited normative bases for the doctrine-original intent
and longstanding historical practice-are belied by my historical
analysis. The functional case for the doctrine is more powerful.
This case is strongest when states impinge on traditional federal
'

See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 101, at 869-70.
See id.

391See
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foreign relations prerogatives like war-making and treaty-making.
But in these and related traditional foreign relations contexts,
federal exclusivity is effectively assured by Article I, Section 10
and by extant federal enactments. The federal common law of
foreign relations is thus relevant, if at all, only to nontraditional
foreign relations matters such as state common law and procedural rules as applied in the transnational context, newer forms
of state transnational economic and political activity, and purely
domestic state acts that implicate the new customary international law of human rights. These new foreign relations issues
are much more closely tied to traditional state prerogatives than
traditional foreign relations issues, and decentralization of these
matters often serves salutary ends. This complicates the tradeoff between the national foreign relations interests and state interests, and raises the question whether federal courts are the
appropriate branch of the federal government to resolve the
contest in the first instance. I have argued that this question
should be answered in the negative because the federal political
branches are well-suited to identify and redress genuine state
threats to the national foreign relations interest, and because the
error and decision costs of a supplemental federal judicial lawmaking power are high.
There is a more general lesson here. Like the federal common law of foreign relations, other jurisdictional aspects of
American foreign relations law implicitly depend on a discrete
and manageable distinction between foreign and domestic affairs. For example, the political question doctrine in the foreign
affairs context sometimes requires courts to abstain from reviewing a political branch action because the conduct of foreign
relations is a political branch prerogative or because an adjudication would cause adverse foreign relations consequences.393
Similarly, constitutional limitations on federal power are less
rigorous when the federal government acts in foreign relations

393See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979); Baker v. Car, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
See generally Thomas M. Franck, Political Questions/Judicial Answers: Does the
Rule of Law Apply to Foreign Affairs? (1992) (analyzing and critiquing widespread
but inconsistent use of political question doctrine in foreign relations cases).
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contexts.39' As the line between domestic and foreign relations
blurs, the continued viability of these and related doctrines as
currently understood is uncertain. An important challenge for
U.S. foreign relations law is to rethink how its jurisdictional doctrines apply in a world in which "foreign relations" is no longer
a distinctive category.

3, See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936); Missouri
v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920); see generally Henkin, supra note 221 (arguing that
there are no enumerated power limits on the federal government's power to make
foreign relations law).
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